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ABSTRACT 
Using critical discourse analysis this dissertation 
examined the mainstream, dominant discourse of the 
discipline of educational psychology. This analysis included 
a discussion of social, political, and epistemological 
issues. From a position of Foucauldian skepticism regarding 
the human sciences assumptions of educational psychology 
were interrogated, and the discipline as a "regime of truth" 
- a nexus of power, knowledge, and social control - was 
critiqued. Evidence was offered showing that the discourse 
of the discipline produces the "truth" of the discipline. 
Two textbooks nominated by members of Division 15 
(Educational Psychology) of the American Psychological 
Association as "classic" texts were utilized as sources of 
the discipline's dominant discourse. These mainstream texts 
are presented as social artifacts and sites of social 
struggle embedded in political, historical, and economic 
contexts. An intertextual reading, i.e., reading "texts 
against texts", provides a way for perspectives that have 
been marginalized or disqualified from the mainstream 
disciplinary perspective to provide counter-discourses to 
mainstream texts. The result is the disrupting of knowledge 
claims and practices sanctioned by the discipline, through 
viii 
which students are judged and labeled by their approximation 
to the "norm" established by the discipline. 
The practice of intertextual reading and critical 
analysis is recommended as a way for educational 
psychologists and those being initiated into the discipline 
to work toward a critical literacy. Through such literacy 
educational psychologists may become more reflexive 
regarding the discipline and their own practice. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
People know what they do; they frequently know why 
they do what they do; but what they don't know is 
what what they do does. 
{Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.187) 
A Story 
It was my first class as teacher of an educational 
psychology course. 1 My enthusiasm had been growing as I 
prepared for the class. I was eager to engage my students in 
not only learning the content of the discipline, but also 
helping students become conscious of their experience as we 
"did" educational psychology. In other words, I wanted the 
course to be a space where we would study educational 
psychology and practice it at the same time. This seemed a 
worthwhile goal to pursue, as I believed it would add to the 
relevancy of the coursework for the students, most of whom 
were preservice teachers. 
We were reading through the syllabus with a nice amount 
of discussion, checking understanding, asking questions. The 
excitement I felt seemed matched by the students as we 
engaged the coursework for the first time. We had come to 
1 Several works that were very helpful to me began with 
stories and I decided to appropriate the practice. See Apple 
{1996), Macedo {1994), Sawicki (1991). This story has left an 
enduring "mark" on me. For an interesting examination of the 
place stories can hold in educational research see Carter 
{1993). 
2 
the course requirements, and I was explaining how the grades 
would be determined. The giving of "grades 112 was an aspect 
of the class that I had really thought over seriously. 
"Grades", or the "marks" we get, had meant much to me as a 
student; I assumed that the grading system was equally as 
important to my first set of educational psychology 
students. I was eager that my students be successful, and 
understanding the grading system would help them meet the 
requirements of the course. It seemed fairly simple: I took 
the responsibility to ensure that the material was presented 
effectively, and that the marking system was clear and fair; 
the student's effort would complete the equation for 
success. 
Then it happened. I had included a series of "pop 
quizzes" that would account for fifty percent of the grade. 
One student raised her hand. "Why 'pop' quizzes?" she 
inquired. I welcomed the question. It was perfect really in 
that it was a clear example of how we could connect the 
content and process of the course. I had thought about it 
and I was ready with an answer. My response included 
explanations of two concepts that we would study in the 
course: 1) the usefulness of a reinforcement schedule which 
was of the "variable-interval" type; and, 2) the 
2My use of quotation marks here, and frequently 
throughout this work, indicates irony. Quotation marks are 
also used to express a tension in using a word with shifting 
meaning. 
3 
effectiveness of "spaced" over "massed" study. Because 
students never knew when the quiz would occur they would be 
"motivated" to study as the course went along. I assured the 
students that the material on the quiz would be nothing 
tricky or obscure as it would come from what they had read 
or what we had discussed in class; there was no need for 
them to become overly concerned. Actually, I explained, I 
was doing them a favor as "studies show" that there is much 
more long-term learning following study that is spread out 
over time rather than study that is "massed" as happens when 
students "cram" for tests. I didn't allow myself to 
entertain the remembrance of a conversation I had with a 
colleague while preparing the course. The associate had 
assured me that I had to do something to make sure the 
students came to class. She used pop quizzes, and I decided 
to do the same. 
I was satisfied (secretly very pleased) with my 
response to the student's inquiry. "Okay?" I asked. It was 
not okay. The student said that she felt trapped. She 
described herself as a serious student, but there might be a 
time when she has to miss class. What if it was on a day 
when there was a pop quiz? I had stated in the syllabus that 
quizzes could not be made-up, but that I would drop the 
lowest mark, which could be an "F" if she had to miss a 
quiz. "Did that help?" Her expression revealed that it 
really didn't, but the student thanked me for my answer. The 
rest of the students seemed to accept my rationale as there 
were no further questions on the topic, and the class 
continued. 
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Later that evening I reflected on the happenings of the 
class. It seemed as though we were off to a great start. I 
pictured the student who had presented me with the 
opportunity to explain the "pop quiz" aspect of the grading 
system. I had a degree of certainty both in that the answer 
given was grounded in the discipline under study, and in the 
"effectiveness" of the practice I had explained. Then 
gradually, the initial pleasure that I had felt gave way to 
embarrassment. The student had seen other dimensions in the 
practice of "pop quizzes". In one sense the "case was 
closed". I was the teacher; my decisions were well thought 
out and benevolent. However, the student had resisted by 
facing the unequal power relationship between teacher and 
student, and by questioning the grading practice. In the 
process of questioning she had exposed an example of "what 
what we do does". The scientific knowledge was justifying 
the use of pop quizzes to exert control over the students to 
attend class and to study. Because of the student's 
resistance and my reflection on practice I realized that my 
answer was not nearly so important as the questions which 
had arisen in the student and in myself. 
Purpose of the Story 
The story serves as an appropriate introduction of this 
dissertation for several reasons. First, it highlights the 
autobiographical aspect of research in general, and of this 
work in particular. Foucault (1988) has said that, "Each of 
my works is a part of my own biography. For one or another 
reason I had the occasion to feel and live those things" 
(p.11). Similarly, those who read this work do, in some 
sense, read me. 
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The work of this dissertation began as an uneasy 
reading (Apple, 1993) of mainstream educational psychology's 
discourse. Through a critical reading and analysis of the 
discipline I began to understand that much of what I had 
accepted as "objective", "neutral", and "stable" in the 
discipline was actually a product of social negotiations 
(Gergen, 1985) and "reflection of conventions" (Kincheloe, 
1993) imbued with political interests. This dissertation is 
an opportunity for me to affirm my right, but more 
importantly, my responsibility to read, understand, and 
transform (Freire & Macedo, 1987; Giroux, 1987) my 
experience of both teaching and learning educational 
psychology. 
Second, the story demonstrates the "relational" aspect 
of education. Schooling is primarily and in multiple ways 
relational (Apple, 1996). The relational aspects extend 
beyond student-teacher and student-student relationships. 
The work that I am presenting includes the interrogation of 
power relationships that exist throughout the educational 
6 
institution as well as the dynamic relationships among 
power, knowledge, and social control. I am interested in the 
relationship of the mainstream theoretical perspectives of 
the discipline's discourse and the everyday practices of 
education that both limit and make possible student agency. 
When these perspectives and processes are recognized it is 
possible to resist and contest them, to support a more 
emancipatory pedagogy concerned with a critical and 
democratic social order. I argue that the relations of what 
is said and done in the name of the discipline marks 
educational psychology as a "site of struggle" (Aronwitz & 
Giroux, 1991). 
Third, the story highlights the significance of the act 
of questioning, my own and my student's. Questioning is a 
means of critical examination that aims to problematize the 
discipline, i.e., to question what has been taken-for-
granted (Foucault, 1984). In particular, this dissertation 
questions the commonly accepted view of educational 
psychology as a neutral field of study. Thus, the work that 
follows is an interrogation of the very specialized 
scientific and technical discipline of educational 
psychology. 
Fourth, the story positions this work as a postmodern3 
critique. In modernity, theory provides the foundation 
supporting the logic of scientific methodology and its 
3 This position is discussed in more depth in Chapter III. 
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interest in prediction, explanation, and control. Yet, 
theory has also been stripped of its classical interest in 
ends and ethics (Giroux, 1981). Theory holds quite an 
"allure" for educationalists in general (Thomas, 1997), and 
educational psychologists in particular, as it is taken up 
and used in the interest of technical progress. A postmodern 
critique is " ... a different way of seeing and working, 
rather than a fixed body of ideas, a clearly worked-out 
position or a set of critical methods and techniques" (Usher 
& Edwards, 1994, p.2). This dissertation is concerned with 
interrogating and thinking about the discipline's 
theoretical perspectives more complexly. My intention is to 
theorize in a way that helps in understanding the present 
predicament in education, to make the familiar strange 
(Ball, 1990; Foucault, 1984), and where possible and 
necessary engage in resistance that could transform it 
(hooks, 1994). 
A postmodern critique of the discourse does not mean 
that the discourse of the discipline of educational 
psychology is not taken seriously. on the contrary, Apple 
(1996) insists that constructive criticism "is the mark that 
[a] position is taken seriously" (p. xix). In a sense, the 
discourse itself invites critical analysis because a 
discourse is a "stumbling block ... a point of resistance and 
a starting point for an opposing strategy (Foucault, 
1978/1990, p. 10). In this sense the dominant discourse of 
educational psychology can even be considered useful as it 
provides an opportunity for interrogation and disruption. 
The openings that result from this disruption provide a 
space where re-imagining of educational psychology can take 
place, and ethical conversations and a language of 
possibilities can be engaged {Giroux, 1992; Welch, 1990). 
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The remainder of this chapter will present a discussion 
of the discipline of educational psychology as a project of 
modernity. The discourse expresses increasingly multiple 
perspectives regarding its position and potential for 
teacher education. The stance of this particular work as 
educational research within and against the discipline is 
introduced as a process concerned with critical educational 
theory and a social constructionist epistemology. This work 
is presented as an example of poststructuralist research 
that is explained in terms of key issues: meaning, language, 
and discourse; the formation of subjectivities; relations of 
power and knowledge. Before closing the chapter, two 
significant points regarding the researcher and APA Style 
are presented. Finally, an overview of the remaining 
chapters is presented. 
Educational Psychology as Modern Discipline 
Educational psychology is a discipline concerned with 
the multifaceted issues of the teaching-learning process. 
The discipline claims a history beginning at the end of the 
nineteenth century and founded by pioneers from general 
9 
psychology (Berliner & Calfee, 1996). This is mentioned not 
only as an interesting fact of the discipline's history, but 
also to draw attention to the issue of the discipline as 
social enterprise. Features of the history of the discipline 
are often left out of introductory textbooks {Glover & 
Ronning, 1987). Sprinthall & Sprinthall {1990, 5th ed.) is a 
notable exception. 4 Anderson et al. {1995) offer the 
explanation that historical information is unnecessary for 
preservice teachers. However, ignoring history serves to 
make a discipline's context invisible and denotes 
unimportance. Such assumptions must be interrogated. 
Throughout this dissertation issues of historical importance 
are presented that have been ignored in much of the 
mainstream discourse. 
Today the influence of the discipline is obvious as its 
practices, knowledge-base, research, and concepts pervade 
educational discussions. However, educational psychologists 
are currently concerned with, and embroiled in, debate over 
the place of their discipline in discussions of school 
crisis5 and reform, as well as the place of educational 
4See historical descriptions in: Charles {1987); Fancher 
{1979); Joncich {1962); Walberg & Haertel {1992); as well as 
Berliner & Calfee {1996). 
5 It should be noted that I am aware of the recent work of 
Berliner and Biddle {1995) who make a case that issues of the 
"crisis" have been "manufactured" by powerful people (e.g., 
the Christian right, members of the media) who are involved in 
a myth-making activity that seeks to dismantle the ·public 
school system. While I believe both that some of their points 
have merit and that their general argument is flawed, it is 
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psychology in teacher education programs. 
Many members of the educational psychology community 
are optimistic regarding the status of the field and the 
potential of educational psychology to help improve the 
teaching and learning process. For example, it has been 
noted that the field "seems to have come of age, it has 
matured, it is sophisticated, it is pretty independent from 
other fields and areas of psychology" (Salomon, 1995, p. 
105). The authors of the newly celebrated Handbook of 
Educational Psychology (Berliner & Calfee, 1996) assert 
that, 
It is clear that our field has been and continues to be 
highly productive and remarkably influential. Its 
findings, concepts, methods, and points of view are 
widely adopted by scholars in other disciplines and 
cross a wide range of research and evaluation 
activities .... The field is alive and growing. (p. 1020) 
The newsletter for members of the American Psychological 
Association (APA) Division 15, Educational Psychology 
(November 1996), contains some confident messages to the 
U.S. President and members of the Congress as they face 
legislative decisions on education: 
•.. [Educational psychologists] have developed and 
tested various theories, and have come to some 
important decisions about what works in the 
classrooms .... and what doesn't work and why ..•. We are 
the backbone of education, and the basis for many other 
important fields •.•. Every legislator should have an 
not my purpose to engage the work directly here. Most 
educationalists agree that there is a crisis, although they 
differ around arguments of cause and means of amelioration. 
See Giroux & McLaren ( 1986). This topic will be addressed 
later in the chapter. 
educational psychologist on staff as a consultant and 
resource! (Neeley, 1996, p. 1) 
Wittrock (1992) is confident that: 
11 
[Educational psychology] can become recognized as a 
core field of psychology, responsible for contributing 
to the creation of psychological theory, to knowledge 
and research about education, and reciprocally, through 
research and development, to the understanding and 
improvement of education. (p. 140) 
Anita Woolfolk (1995), eminent author of educational 
psychology textbooks, explains to her readers who are 
preservice teachers that "if you can become a more expert 
learner by applying the knowledge from this text •.. then you 
will be a better teacher as well" (p. 10). 
Despite these waves of optimism there exists the 
contrasting perception of educational psychology as a "field 
marked by little definitional consensus, many theoretical 
persuasions, and diversified scholarship" (Walberg & 
Haertel, 1992, p.6). Furthermore, "although the diversity is 
interesting •.. the field of educational psychology does not 
have much of a core" (Salomon, 1995, p. 105). It has been 
noted that the "closing decades of the twentieth century 
have seen many challenges to the hegemony of educational 
psychology as the 'master science'" (Berliner & Calfee, 
1996, p. 1020). Others have expressed a sense of "growing 
awareness among educational psychologists of the need to 
reexamine their own discipline" (Peterson, Clark, & Dickson, 
1990, p.524). It has even been asked if educational 
psychology "as a discipline is on the verge of extinction" 
12 
(Grinder, 1989, p. 4). 
Some of the discrepancy in the views presented above 
may be explained by recognizing that arguments vary 
according to audience. Educational psychologists are 
positive and optimistic about the discipline's potential to 
help ameliorate the crisis in education when policy makers 
(who provide funding for projects) are addressed. When 
talking to each other educational psychologists tend to be 
more forthright in discussing the problematics of the 
discipline's tenets, although some assume a defensive 
position regarding the discipline's potential and value to 
the field of education. 6 
When considering curriculum issues, especially for 
introductory courses, there is an escalating debate 
regarding the content, process, and goals of the coursework. 
For example, some recognized experts in the field (e.g., 
Woolfolk, 1995, 1996) encourage the traditional image of the 
field as "foundational" emphasizing mastery of the content 
of the discipline as helping preservice teachers be better 
teachers. Others assert that the discipline is more of a 
6 The optimism which sweeps through claims of the 
effectiveness of the discipline of educational psychology 
exemplifies the metaphor of "promissory note" ( Soyland, 1994). 
This is a rhetorical device frequently used in scientific 
discourse through which the "reader is persuaded of the 
factual status" (Soyland, 1994, p. 37) of the text and a 
proposed reward for "buying into" the particular thesis 
established by the text. Preservice teachers are particularly 
enthusiastic to reap the assurances connected to learning 
educational psychology. 
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"resource" (Blumenfeld & Anderson, 1996) assisting 
preservice teachers in their reflections on the teaching-
learning process. Regardless of this debate educational 
psychology's discourse generally is presented as an 
authoritarian and neutral body of knowledge that can guide 
educational practice and facilitate better learning. This 
discourse forms a metanarrative that seeks modernity's 
transcendent principles of "rationality, linearity, 
progress, and control" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 11). 
Through this dissertation I join the discussion 
regarding the discipline of educational psychology. The 
position I will take is an oppositional stance; it is a 
critique of the discourse, presenting a kind of counter-
discourse7 • Questions are raised concerning the 
discipline's mainstream "dominant discourse 118 as it is 
perceived as both authoritarian and neutral. Through a 
critical reading and analysis of the discourse presented in 
7 Counter-discourses are considered "languages of 
critique, demystification, and agency capable of contesting 
dominant oppressive beliefs and practices" ( Leistyna, Woodrum, 
& Sherblom, 1996, p. 297). 
8 I appreciate that words and expressions like "dominant 
discourse" may be considered jargon to some readers. I am 
caught in a tension here as I want my writing to be accessible 
to, and taken seriously by, a variety of readers; 
simultaneously, I need to use words that are meaningful and 
important in stating my case. This is one of the challenges in 
doing this kind of work, and the issue will be taken up in a 
later section of this chapter. 
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two textbooks nominated as "classic"9 , I argue that the 
technical rationality characteristic of the discourse 
provides both an organizational resource and constraint to 
the discipline. 
From a perspective of technical rationality the crisis 
in education is viewed as a series of technical problems, 
and concerns the narrow view of better preparing children to 
enter the workplace. The metaphor of teacher as "technician" 
must be contrasted with the view of teacher as 
transformative intellectual (Giroux & McLaren, 1986/1996) 
claiming "a critical view of teacher work and authority 
... one consistent with the principles and practice of 
democracy" (p. 305). This more critical perspective allows 
for different types of questions. Questions regarding 
educational crisis and reform need to be connected to a 
"wider discourse of freedom and democratic struggle" (Giroux 
& McLaren, 1989, p.xviii). 
I identify problematic issues around: (1) the 
assurances made by the discourse; (2) the "scientific" 
formulation of disciplinary principles; and, (3) more 
importantly, the everyday practices of schooling that are 
authorized by the discourse. 
Research Within and Against the Discipline 
The work of this research is situated within a critical 
9 An explanation of this category of textbooks is 
presented in Chapter III. 
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educational perspective that asserts the need to question 
accepted truths and assumptions about education and society 
(Weiler, 1992). Implicit in this approach is a commitment to 
and belief that society and its institutions, are historical 
constructions; i.e., society has changed, will change, and 
needs to change (Giroux, 1988/1992). 
The development of a social constructionist perspective 
within the educational psychology community is gaining 
legitimacy with potential linkage to this critical 
perspective. The social constructionist viewpoint is 
espoused as the "contemporary psychological perspective" of 
the educational psychology community (Anderson et al., 
1995). The acknowledgement of learning as socially 
constructed is by no means a new development as many 
concerned with learning have been discussing it for years 
(e.g., Derry, 1992; Goodenow, 1992; Mead, 1934; Mayer, 1992; 
Prawat & Floden, 1994; Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; 
Scarr, 1985). Indeed, Prawat and Floden (1994) remind us 
that "[c]onstructivist learning is based on the now 
commonplace idea that knowledge is actively constructed by 
the learner" (emphasis added, p. 37). 
Accepting this "contemporary psychological perspective" 
of social constructionism has far reaching implications for 
the discipline's knowledge claims. This perspective suggests 
a recognition of the social, cultural, ideological and 
political significance of what is said and done in the name 
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of the discipline. Social constructionism demonstrates a 
"disciplinary or epistemic reflexivity" (Usher & Edwards, 
1994) of research. Such a focus means that 
any piece of research always carries within itself an 
epistemology - a theory about knowing and truth and 
their relationship to the world or 'reality'. This 
epistemology is never 'innocent' because it always 
contains within itself a set of values - which means 
there is always politics in research. (Usher & Edwards, 
1994, p. 149) 
Reflecting this conclusion, two perspectives, critical 
educational theory and social constructionist epistemology, 
come together in this work as a formulation of 
poststructuralist research. 
Poststructuralist Research 
The particular "method 1110 of this research is a 
critical discourse analysis, a form of poststructuralist 
research11 • Poststructuralism is a mode of analysis, a way 
of looking at and asking questions about anything textual 
both in the "narrow conventional sense of written texts and 
in the much broader sense of any discourses, practices, 
institutions ... any structure generally which is productive 
of signification12 " (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 18). The key 
10This method is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter III. 
11Poststructuralism is far from a unified field. I have 
appropriated elements which are helpful in my analysis. See 
Best & Kellner (1991), Cherryholms (1988), Sarup (1993), and 
Weedon (1988) for helpful examinations. 
12
"Signification" is the process through which we make 
sense, how we come to make meaning or designate meaning. See 
Cherryholms (1988) for a more complete analysis. 
aspect of poststructuralism is that it is a means of 
interrogating traditional understandings of: (a) meaning, 
language, discourse: (b) subjectivity; and (c) power 
relationships in knowledge production. These will be 
mentioned briefly here as they are key factors throughout 
the dissertation. 
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Meaning. language. and discourse. Traditionalists see 
meanings in language and discourse as fixed. Meaning in 
language reflects an objective reality: it emanates from the 
interior essence of the object: language is believed to 
function as "simple transmitters of information from writer 
to reader" (Madigan, Johnson, & Linton, 1995, p. 433). 
Poststructuralists, on the other hand, stress that 
language/discourse constitutes reality. Meanings are never 
fixed, they are influenced by the multiplicity of issues 
which form our context. Meaning is understood as exterior to 
the object: it is inscribed and contingent. Concepts can be 
appreciated as "social artifacts" which acquire their 
meaning not from real world referents but from the context 
of their usage" (Gergen, 1985). 
Meaning in a discipline's discourse is not fixed; 
rather meaning is "shaped contextually within institutions 
and by prevailing social practices" (Bensimon, 1995, p. 
597). Gergen (1985) makes the claim that a certain 
understanding is sustained and may prevail through time not 
because of "the empirical validity of the perspective in 
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question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g., 
communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric)" (p. 268). 
Discourses espoused by disciplines are productive, they 
constitute the "reality" which they present. Discourses are 
never independent of history, power, and interests. 
At the same time, counter-discourses arise and come 
into a dialogic relationship with dominant discourses; they 
are able to disrupt commonsense meanings and taken-for-
granted assumptions, and have the potential to lead to a 
limited transformation13 • 
Subjectivity. Persons are traditionally understood as 
autonomous, coherent individuals with certain natural and 
essential characteristics. Individuals are seen as emerging 
through the dynamic interaction of their biological 
development and their self-contained social reality, and 
within their own history. In traditional research studies, 
for example, effort is exerted toward discovering some 
"truth" about the subject or subjects, or the human subject 
in general. 
In contrast, poststructuralists have a very different 
13 I use the word "limited" here for a particular reason. 
Postmodernism critiques totalizing, universal narratives. 
Therefore, it would be "un-postmodern" for me to suggest some 
total solution. Sharon Welch {1990) talks about the appeal of 
working for "final solutions", but she explains responsible 
action does not mean resolving a problem (especially someone 
else's problem) once and for all. Rather, responsible action 
is "participation in a communal work, laying the groundwork 
for the creative response of people in the present and in the 
future ...• It is sustained and enabled by participation in a 
community of resistance" {p. 75). 
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understanding of "subject". Subjects are regarded as 
constituted, and constantly reconstituted (Usher & Edwards, 
1994; Weedon, 1987) by the discursive practices to which 
they are subjected. "Subjectivities" are the product of 
society, a human reality and social construction (Sarup, 
1993). Subjectification is understood as how a subject is 
made an "object". This represents so much of the work of 
educational psychology with its focus on individual 
differences, placement of students along the normal curve, 
and ever increasing categories of differentiation. The 
difference of one subject is often "parasitic" on the 
"other" as is obvious in representations. In other words, 
children are defined by characteristics which differentiate 
them from others, for example, the "normal" versus 
"exceptional" categorization of children. The goal of 
poststructuralist research is not discovering a "truth" 
about the subject, rather the research aims to understand 
the social, historical, and political contexts in which 
subjects are constructed as they are (Prado, 1994; Usher & 
Edwards, 1994). 
Power relations. As was stated above, schooling is 
relational. Power relations pervade the schooling process 
and are discernable in a multiplicity of sites. The 
commonsense understanding of power is that it is a commodity 
that can be possessed. One "has" power, and can exercise it 
in relation to others. Power in this sense is a "power 
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over"; it flows from a centralized source, and from top to 
bottom (Sawicki, 1991). Power is usually considered 
repressive or inhibiting. 
Foucault (1980a, 1988, 1995) discusses another notion 
of power that is especially characteristic of modern power, 
or modern modalities of power. Foucault's notion is that 
power is productive, rather than repressive. Power is not a 
possession, but rather exercised in relations. Power doesn't 
flow from a centralized location, but is "capillary" 
operating at the "lowest extremities of the social body in 
everyday social practices" (Fraser, 1989, p. 18). Foucault 
(1980c) explains, 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is 
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a 
force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much 
more than a negative instance whose function is 
repression. (p. 119) 
Foucault asserts (1980c) that in the period we call 
"modernity" there has been a "veritable technological take-
off in the productivity of power" (p.119). This is not a 
"power over" but a power to name as is found in the human 
sciences14 • Power is productive in that a discipline "makes 
individuals; it is the specific technique of power that 
regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of 
14Foucault's understanding of "human sciences" includes 
what is usually considered the social sciences in this country 
as well as the humanities. 
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its exercise" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 170). 
For Foucault (1980c) scientific disciplines are 
"regimes of truth" in which power and knowledge are 
inextricably related and implicate each other. This is the 
power-knowledge nexus. The "truth" or the knowledge of a 
discipline is not an assembly of facts and techniques that 
have been "discovered" and accepted by the community through 
which we come to know individuals (e.g., learners as 
"motivated" or "gifted"). But rather, the truth of 
educational psychology, for example, needs to be understood 
in terms of its technologies of power, as an "ensemble of 
rules (emphasis added) according to which that which is 
considered true or false are separated" (p. 133). Truth is 
seen as: 
a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of 
statements ••.. [and is] linked in a circular relation 
with systems of power which produce and sustain 
it ... induce and ••• extend it. (1980c, p. 133) 
Through its discourse educational psychology operates 
to provide increasingly complex categories through which 
learners, and teachers, are subjected to ever-increasing 
processes of hyper-differentiation and made objects of 
investigation, categorization, intervention, and regulation 
(Usher, 1993). 
This unconventional manner of looking at how knowledge 
and power implicate each other presents a shift for 
educational psychologists who usually think of the 
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discipline as being "scientifically" produced. It is 
precisely this assurance of knowing "the world 
'scientifically' and 'as it really is' which makes 
[knowledge claims] powerful" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.47). 
Educational psychology claims that through its ever-
increasing technological ability it has the power to see 
students as they really are. Poststructural analysis can 
subvert this understanding and expose how various categories 
are the result of human construction and are never free of 
history, power, and interests. Thus, what is understood as a 
"will to knowledge" can mean a "will to power"; and, to 
interrogate this "regime" clearly is to enter a political 
struggle (Foucault, 1980c). Poststructuralism as a form of 
critique and knowledge production can be helpful in 
identifying areas of struggle in the discipline's discourse 
and ways of developing strategies for change. 
The Importance of Michel Foucault 
Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) ideas are central in this 
work. And, while this dissertation is not about Foucault, I 
accept his invitation to use his ideas as "little toolboxes 
••• [so one can] open them and make use of such and such a 
sentence or idea, of one analysis or another, as they would 
a screwdriver or a monkey wrench" (quoted in Eribon, 1991, 
p. 237). Drawing on Foucault I am interested in the 
political production of educational psychology's claims to 
"truth". 
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The time seems right for this kind of work as 
educational psychologists are increasingly direct in their 
challenge to each other to reflect on what it means to be an 
educational psychologist, an educator of preservice teachers 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 1995; Peterson, et al., 1990; 
Shuell, 1996), and on the legacy of the discipline. 
Locating Myself as Researcher 
A lively debate persists regarding the position of the 
researcher in reporting work. The traditional perspective 
insists that "the persona of the writer [assumes] a low 
profile in the text" (Madigan et al., 1995, p. 433). This 
allows the focus to remain on the object of the study, 
increasing the possibility of "creating the impression of 
neutrality or impersonal detachment •.. that is generally 
characteristic of the empirical disciplines" (Madigan et 
al., 1995, p. 433). The assumption is that "the facts speak 
for themselves." 
This position has been challenged by many feminist and 
critical researchers who criticize the stance which 
separates the observer from the observed in the interest of 
"objectivity". Michelle Fine (1992) contends that this 
detached stance neglects "to discuss why one research 
question or interpretation prevailed over others ... [this 
stance renders] oblique the ways in which we, as 
researchers, construct our analysis and narratives" (p. 
211). Fine (1992) warns feminist researchers that if we do 
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not take "critical, activist, and open stances on our own 
work, then we collude in reproducing social silences through 
the social sciences" (p. 206). Josselson and Lieblich (1996) 
assert the importance of "allowing people to tell the real 
story of their work - to consider their own role" (p. 651) 
in their research projects. 
Issues of location are key to this discussion. Locating 
the researcher is no simple task. Location is not a mere 
"listing of adjectives or labels like race, sex, and 
class .... location is not self-evident" (Haraway, 1996, p. 
440), although these aspects of context are important. 
Location is partial and shifting and has more to do with 
being for some worlds and not others (Haraway, 1996). 
This work is self-consciously political, as I am for 
some worlds and not others. Much of this work is driven by 
the question: "Cui bona?" Who benefits? (Star, 1991). The 
question of power regarding discourse "means basically to 
ask whom does discourse serve" (Foucault, 1980c, p. 115). I 
have to ask myself the questions: Who is it who benefits 
from the work that I do, or the discourse I espouse or 
interrogate? I maintain that the discourse of educational 
psychology primarily supports the knowledge, beliefs, 
values, positions in power relations of the status quo. Van 
Dijk (1993b) reports that, while modest developments have 
occurred in multiethnic societies, learning materials, 
especially u. s. textbooks, 
25 
still overwhelmingly show the perspective and interests 
of white people .... [who are] consistently portrayed in 
neutral or positive terms, whereas minority groups or 
immigrants tend to be associated at least with problems 
and conflicts, if not with deviance and threats. (p. 
237) 
The issue of any viewpoint being partial or incomplete 
needs further discussion. Partiality is accepted as a way I 
come to realize my view, and the view of others, as 
embodied, rather than dis-stanced. I am conscious of a 
particular, and shifting, location as I do this work; I have 
no desire to dis-locate myself from it. In other words, I 
have no interest in doing research about the world from a 
position apart from the world. Recognizing the influence of 
a situated view makes no promise of seeing in a neutral and 
objective way or of "transcendence of all limits and 
responsibility" (Haraway, 1988/1991) as is implied through 
the impersonal detachment of the positivist epistemology. 
Appreciation of the partial view of the researcher tends 
toward the possibility of community15 • Rosaldo {1989/1993) 
explains this notion: 
Each viewpoint is arguably incomplete - a mix of 
insight and blindness, reach and limitations, neither 
omniscience nor a unified master narrative but complex 
understandings of ever-changing, multifaceted social 
realities. {p.128) 
This multiplicity of viewpoints and voices has an important 
place in educational research within a democratic society. 
15
"Communi ty" is an idea with a particular humanist value. 
While it is attractive, the interests of "community" .can be 
used to marginalize and exclude voices from the conversation 
that raise difficult questions or subaltern discourses. 
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The Shifting Role of the Intellectual 
In Truth and Power, Foucault (1980c) speaks of the role 
of the intellectual as having shifted from understanding the 
intellectual as: spokesperson for the universal; having a 
certain mastery of truth and justice; being able to express 
a universal conscience. The shift explained by Foucault is 
toward a much more "specific" activity. Thus, the "specific 
intellectual" addresses problems which are particular to her 
own condition of life or work. These problems are recognized 
through the intellectual's concrete awareness of her own 
particular struggles and her precise location within the 
order of knowledge. 
When one begins to question accepted views one finds 
oneself in a double bind (Hubbard, 1979). If our questions 
appear "too heterodox they disqualify us •.. " (p. 208) from 
endorsement of "the discipline," it is difficult to publish 
and get tenure. 16 However, if we stifle our questions 
"sufficiently deep and long we may stop thinking them and 
emerge from our education as the monolith's true devotees" 
(p. 208). 
Taking a critical, oppositional stance regarding the 
discipline of educational psychology clearly places me 
"against" the discipline in one sense. I have asked myself 
16The example of Henry Giroux at Boston University bears 
this out (Weiler, 1992). See the autobiography of Howard Zinn, 
You Can't Be Neutral on A Moving Train (1995) for another 
illustration. 
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the question: Why can't I just do what I am supposed to do 
within the accepted boundaries of educational research of 
educational psychology? Why not remain within what Said 
(1994) represents as the acceptable and "responsible 
mainstream". The irony is that while I may be characterized 
as an "outsider" in the discipline, or at least be 
considered as being located in that ambiguous position of 
both within and against the discipline, I feel particularly 
committed to this work. 
The mode of research in which I am involved does not 
necessarily ingratiate me in the "profession". Said (1994) 
is helpful here. I appropriate his notion of the work I do 
as being amateurism, i.e., this work is "activity fueled by 
care and affection, rather then by profit and narrow 
specialization" (p. 82). An amateur in this sense is one who 
"considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a 
society one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart 
of even the most technical and professionalized activity ... " 
(Said, 1994, p. 82). I regard the work I do as an attempt at 
"greater democratic participation" (Said, 1994, p. 83) in 
the educational sphere. This dissertation is taken up in the 
spirit of looking to "transform the merely professional 
routine into something much more lively and radical" (Said, 
1994, p. 82). 
Gestures of Displacement 
The feature of language is another issue which presents 
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a particular dilemma. 17 The importance of language has been 
mentioned above, and will be taken up in Chapter III, yet an 
appreciation of the tensions regarding different 
perspectives of language will be helpful here. 18 
First, I am required to follow APA style in this 
dissertation. APA style admittedly advances the core values 
and epistemology of mainstream psychology; in other words, 
APA style is more than a writing genre, it is a model of 
paradigmatic thinking (Madigan et al., 1995). APA style 
espouses a "utilitarian view of language in which words are 
implicitly assumed to function as simple transmitters of 
information from the writer to the reader" (Madigan et al., 
1995, p. 433). In this perspective words are "unimportant 
containers" for ideas and concepts. At the same time there 
are directives regarding words beyond conventions of 
grammar. 
The Publication Manual of the American Psychological 
Association (4th ed. 1995) encourages writers to use 
"[s]hort words and short sentences [which] are easier to 
comprehend than long ones" (p. 26-27), although, the authors 
17I thank Murphy ( 1993) for the notion of "displacement". 
In the following discussion several indications of 
displacement are operative. For example, the privileging of 
APA style serves to disparage other forms of writing in 
research. By my resistance I interrogate this position and 
call for other writing styles to be considered germane to 
various research interests. 
18A complete discussion of this problem is beyond the 
scope of the current work. For a thorough analysis see Giroux 
(1995). 
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of the manual appreciate that a technical term may be more 
exact than "several short words, and technical terms are 
inseparable from scientific reporting" (p. 27). The 
epistemology advanced by APA style encourages the use of 
words which are simple to signify very complex concepts 
(e.g., intelligence). It is ironic that in the interest of 
understanding the word, it may be robbed of complex meaning, 
and the historical and social contingencies of the word are 
ignored. 
The APA style instructs users that unencumbered 
communication requires that technical terminology used in a 
paper needs to be understood by psychologists throughout the 
discipline otherwise it "does not sufficiently contribute to 
the literature" (p. 27). The use of "jargon" is discouraged. 
Jargon is defined as "the continuous use of technical 
vocabulary even in places where that vocabulary is not 
relevant •••. [or] the substitution of a euphemistic phrase 
for a familiar term" (p. 27). Besides ineffective 
communication, jargon is also reported to grate on the 
reader due to its obscurity. 
According to Madigan et al. (1995), the paradigm of 
mainstream psychology has a language which is understood 
throughout the discipline. 19 One could argue that it is not 
clarity of language or ease of communication that is really 
19The assumption of a unified language is problematic to 
many and has also been refuted. See Vipond (1996) and Gergen 
(1985). 
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the issue, but the viability of the theoretical framework 
such language constitutes and promotes (Usher & Edwards, 
1994). Macedo (1994) expresses a similar conviction by 
insisting that the "call for language clarity is an 
ideological issue, not merely a linguistic one" (p. 7). 
Aronowitz & Giroux (1991) call on educators to recognize the 
role that the 'language of clarity' plays in a dominant 
culture that cleverly and powerfully uses 'clear' and 
'simplistic' language to systematically undermine and 
prevent the conditions arising for a public culture to 
engage in rudimentary forms of complex and critical 
thinking. (p. 91) 
The case has been made that different paradigms, in 
particular oppositional paradigms, need and do provide "new 
languages through which it becomes possible to deconstruct 
and challenge" (Giroux, 1995, p.32) the knowledge forms, 
relationships, and beliefs that are considered reasonable in 
traditional paradigms. Often the expression of an 
oppositional paradigm may seem unnecessarily complex to a 
researcher with a more traditional perspective. Parsimony 
and clarity are recognized as values and lauded as 
indicators of sophisticated scholarship in a positivist 
paradigm. Yet, parsimony and clarity are not valued as 
universal and natural values in critical perspective. Giroux 
(1995) describes the insistence on parsimony and clarity as 
a "nee-colonial" imposition. 
The use of "nee-colonial" provides a useful example for 
this discussion. "Nee-colonial" in this instance, could be 
considered "jargon" from within a positivist paradigm. At 
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the same time, demands for simple expression of complex 
issues may expose a particular "neo-colonial" position 
within the epistemology advanced by APA style. The evidence 
comes from the proponents of the APA style themselves. There 
is the claim of a "standardizing force" found in journal 
articles which serve as "benchmark of acceptable writing 
practices for the discipline" (Madigan et al., 1995, p. 
434). Failure to comply with the standard marks "writing as 
the work of an outsider" (Madigan et al. 1995, p. 429). 
It is regarded as particularly important that neophytes 
within a discipline learn the distinctive language of the 
discipline as a way of enculturation. It is stated that 
perhaps newcomers may have to unlearn another language: 
"These students must now learn to inhibit writing practices 
that had previously won them admiration while acquiring new 
techniques" (Madigan et al., 1995, p. 434). Learning to 
write using APA style "is part of an initiation process [the 
student] must undergo to enter a scientific community" 
(Scholes, 1985, p. 132). The case could be made that this is 
an instance of technical control, a "will to power" rather 
than knowledge, in that the student, 
seems to be learning about the subject, but what [s]he 
is truly learning is to give the teacher what he wants. 
He seems to be reporting about a real and solid world 
in a perfectly transparent language, but actually he is 
learning how to produce a specific kind of discourse, 
controlled by a particular scientific paradigm, which 
requires him to be constituted as the subject of that 
discourse in a particular way and to speak through that 
discourse of a world made visible by the same 
controlling paradigm. (Scholes, 1985, pp. 131-132) 
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Doyle and Carter (1996) raise this issue of tension 
regarding what is really going on as "novices become members 
of practitioner communities" (p. 27). Is it learning or 
enculturation? The question of "enculturation" through 
writing style, or correctness and acceptance of writing and 
language usage, is not easily settled, nor need it be. What 
is important is that the tension in these multiple 
perspectives be recognized and appreciated as part of the 
contested terrain of the significance of language and 
epistemology. 
The aim of this dissertation is to apply a critical 
reading and analysis of the mainstream, dominant discourse 
of educational psychology. This is significant as 
educational psychology's mainstream discourse perpetuates 
powerful ways of thinking about students and everyday 
teaching practices; these need to be made explicit and 
interrogated. The chapters that follow take up a discussion 
of these complex issues. 
Overview of Chapters 
A brief overview of the chapters that· formulate this 
dissertation is provided as the final section of this 
chapter. 
Chapter II 
Chapter II gathers examples of counter-discursive 
feminist scholarship. The selection of work highlights the 
metaphors of location, vision, and voice and helps to 
situate the research that follows. Counter-discourses are 
presented as a way of "talking-back" to mainstream 
discourses of literature and science. 
Chapter III 
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There are two aspects of "methods" in research that are 
articulated in Chapter III. First, methodology refers to the 
intellectual means utilized to conduct this research 
activity. I offer an explanation of why the methodologies of 
traditional educational research (particularly that of 
educational psychology), and their respective 
epistemologies, are inappropriate for the current research. 
Second, important strategies that are used in this critical 
discourse analysis are discussed. 
Chapter IV 
This chapter takes up a critical reading and analysis 
of the discourse of educational psychology. Educational 
psychology is based on the modernist ideology of technical 
rationality with its potential to predict and control. This 
rationality is often unexpressed, therefore it needs to be 
exposed and made problematic. There are two sections in this 
chapter: 1) An interrogation of disciplinary principles is 
presented; and, 2) several non-discursive aspects of the 
discipline are discussed. 
Chapter V 
Power, scientific knowledge, and control of bodies come 
together in modern disciplines and give disciplines their 
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productive power. Through "technologies of power" (Foucault, 
1977/1995) that emanate from and support the dominant 
discourse of educational psychology subjects are formed and 
"marked" by docility and utility. These technologies of 
power are evident in the every-day, taken-for-granted 
practices of the discourse; disciplinary technologies create 
the "normalizing gaze" that is explicated and critiqued in 
this chapter. 
Chapter VI 
Although this chapter "concludes" this dissertation it 
does not provide conclusions aimed at proving a thesis or 
substantiating a hypothesis. Postmodern approaches eschew 
totalizing and final dictates. However, this chapter 
proposes how a more critical stance toward the discipline's 
discourse, a serious consideration of the social 
constructionist perspective, and an intertextual reading of 
the discipline's discourse make possible the discipline's 
becoming more reflexive and more socially just. This model 
is a call for a critical literacy regarding the discipline's 
knowledge claims and practices. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE OF TRANSGRESSION 
Introduction 
This dissertation takes up the task of critically 
analyzing the canon of educational psychology found in its 
dominant discourse. In beginning this task feminist 
scholarship offers a guiding framework. My work has been 
influenced by a long tradition of feminist scholars involved 
with philosophy, sociology, and research in the natural and 
social sciences, as well as psychology. The choice of the 
material I have included can be referred to as a literature 
of transgression. 
Texts from both science and literature are included 
which may seem peculiar as writing in fields like science 
and literature is thought to be widely disparate (Madigan et 
al., 1995). However, the case has been made that they are 
not so dissimilar as was once thought (Lyotard, 1993; 
Soyland, 1994). In this instance the choice has been made 
for the examples of counter-discourse that each provides. 
These texts illustrate the importance of positionality, 
vision, and voice in oppositional activity aimed at 
interrogating mainstream paradigms. 
Forms of feminist literary critique, for example, have 
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had the expressed goal of "talking-back" to a discourse that 
sought to contain or silence subaltern voices. Feminist 
writers have claimed positions on the margins that inform 
their perspective. The vision that results from this 
distinct positionality is important to political struggles 
as it enables seeing things differently. 
A feminist critique of science also seeks to present a 
counter-discourse to mainstream science, acknowledging the 
"heteroglossia" that exists within the scientific community. 
The metaphor of location is instructive as it influences 
what is seen, and what may be invisible. This issue of 
location is discussed in terms of "feminist standpoint" 
epistemology (Harding, 1991). 
Feminist Criticism 
Resisting Colonizing Discourse 
Resisting colonizing discourses presents a dilemma for 
feminist authors. Carol Harding (1985) explains "dilemma" as 
a situation that demands "a choice between conflicting 
outcomes" (p. 49) by a person who has the "ability to act 
with intention" (p. 44). Lashgari (1995) characterizes this 
as a "contrary imperative", that is "to be honest, and to be 
heard" (p. 1) while discerning that there are serious costs 
involved in honestly speaking out. 
The predicament is clear in that there are always those 
within the dominant culture who wish to make their 
perspective normative, and who are determined to silence 
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and/or marginalize anyone who exposes the dominating force 
of their discourse, which is a form of nee-colonialism. 
Foucault (1981) states that discourse is violence, and 
feminists have declared discourse that defines them as 
"Other" as a particular form of discursive violence. 
Feminists have resisted and contested this violence while 
recognizing that there are "costs of breaking cultural 
taboos against speaking out" (Lashgari, 1995, p.1). Those 
who lay bare the dominant culture's blindness, contest its 
universalizing "truth", or refuse its judgement, i.e., those 
who speak out or "talk-back" (hooks, 1989), are perceived by 
those they offend as "dangerous", as "transgressing". 
Lashgari (1995) presents four concepts which can be 
considered crucial in understanding such transgressive 
discourse: (a) decentering, (b) heteroglossia, (c) 
dialogics, and (d) trasversia. The first, "decentering", is 
a process in which those on the margins speak, contesting 
their objectification and claiming the position of subject. 
When this happens "those who are marginal to the dominant 
power re-place the center making the margin the new center 
of their own subjectivity" (p.2). In claiming this position 
in which subjects speak for themselves a very different 
narrative is articulated. Through the acting of "naming 
ourselves and ... telling our own stories in our own words" 
(Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. 23) the colonizers get to hear 
a voice other than their own with the possibility of 
releasing them (the colonizers) from their own particular 
blindness (Lashgari, 1995). 
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The effects of this decentering process evoke the 
second concept, "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1981) which 
happens when a "multiplicity of voices enters the discourse, 
when margins talk back to the imperial or neocolonial 
center" (p.3). It is important for the dominant power to 
impose a "monologic definition of truth, and then convince 
its members that any deviation would risk chaos" (Lashgari, 
1995, p.11). According to Lashgari, whenever this imposition 
takes place "there are already numerous voices, subverting, 
transgressing boundaries, working to disrupt" (p.11) its 
centralized certitude. 
Third, "dialogics" is a constructive discourse that 
becomes possible "when polyvocal discourse interrupts the 
dominant monologue" (Lashgari, 1995, p. 3). Lashgari makes a 
very helpful point that because this discourse is often 
confrontational and contradictory it is often perceived as a 
spoiler, as though the confrontational discourse is 
upsetting a peaceful territory. In actuality, the divisions 
and discrepancy are always present although unspoken and 
invisible. 
Fourth, "travesia" is what Lashgari (1995) refers to as 
a "movement toward understanding" (p.3). As we move from one 
narrative to another, from center to margins creating 
multiple centers and perspectives, we participate in a type 
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of transgression of borders. She says that "only by 
violating the boundaries of the familiar and the proper, 
risking conflict, can one reach toward connection" (p.4). It 
is here that coalitions can be forged. 
Teaching as Transgression 
Bell hooks (1994) takes up the notion of 
"transgression", the other side of travesia, as the task of 
teaching. Hooks calls for the celebration of the kind of 
teaching that "enables transgression - a movement against 
and beyond boundaries" (p. 12). In her work, hooks (1994) is 
"urging all of us to open our minds and hearts so that we 
can know beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable, so 
that we can think, and rethink, so that we can create new 
visions" (p.12). Hooks (1990) assures us that transgression 
can mean "pushing against oppressive boundaries set by race, 
sex, and class domination [and is a form of] oppositional 
political struggle" (p. 145).~ Lashgari (1995) advises 
that "[t]o write honestly may mean transgressing, violating 
the literary boundaries of the expected and accepted" (p.2). 
Teaching from the Margins 
Hooks joins Lashgari as she positions herself on/in the 
margins in relation to the central, dominant position. This 
2
° Kate Lenzo ( 1995) refers to a researcher type who 
positions herself "within and against [their] field of study" 
(p. 21) as a "transgressive self." She insists that the 
possibilities for this research in doing doctoral work is 
limited not only by the imagination, but also by "what is 
permissible, acceptable, and communicative in terms of the 
purposes we have in doing our work" (p.23). 
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place is not to be thought of solely as a "site of 
deprivation ... in fact [she] is saying just the opposite, 
that it is also a site of radical possibility, a space of 
resistance" (hooks, 1990, p. 149). The claiming of positions 
in the margins as spaces from which heteroglossia springs 
makes the dialogical process possible, and makes the margins 
central for feminist criticism. The margin is not a place 
one wishes to move away from, "to lose - to give up or 
surrender" (p. 149), rather a marginal position is a chosen 
space "a site one stays in, clings to even, because it 
nourishes one's capacity to resist" (p. 150). Trinh T. Minh-
ha (1991), likewise, claims the margins as "our sites of 
survival, [they] become our fighting grounds and ••. sites for 
pilgrimage" ( p. 17) . 
A position in the margins gives teachers a unique 
viewpoint, as hooks (1991) says, a "radical perspective from 
which to see and create, to imagine alternatives, new 
worlds" (p. 150) with students. However, travesia can be 
disconcerting as we are challenged to not only engage the 
unknown ground of the Other but the "very ground under one's 
own feet" (Lashgari, 1995, p, 4). This can be particularly 
bewildering for those whose thinking has been developed by a 
monologic discourse. 
Audrey Larde (1984) claims her position on the margins 
also as a position which gives her a particular and powerful 
vantage point. She indicates some of the costs as well as 
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the delight in the community found in this position. Lorde 
encourages us to learn "how to stand alone, unpopular and 
sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those 
others identified as outside the structures in order to 
define and seek a world in which we can all flourish" (p. 
112). Lorde assures us that the company we will find in our 
marginal experience, the community we will find, are those 
who have been defined as different by the dominant society. 
As Lorde says "outside the circle of this society's 
definition of acceptable women ••. [are found] those of us 
who have been forged in the crucibles of difference" (Lorde, 
1984, p. 112) including those who are "different" by virtue 
of economic status, "race", sexual orientation, age, and so 
forth. 
Silence Into Voice 
The metaphor of voice, or finding one's voice, has been 
a powerful and formative metaphor for my own work. "Voice" 
here does not ref er to ordinary talk or everyday self-
revelation. In its more radical sense it is the articulation 
of a perspective, an act of freedom and liberation. Bell 
hooks {1989) expresses finding her own voice as a way of 
"talking back" and the "moving from silence into speech" (p. 
9). It is a way of moving from object to subject. Objects 
are voiceless, only spoken about, in that "our beings are 
defined and interpreted by others" (hooks, 1989, p. 12). 
Subjects are able to speak for themselves. "Talking back" 
then is the activity of "the oppressed, the colonized, the 
exploited, and those who stand and struggle side by side 
[as] a gesture of defiance that heals, that makes new life 
and new growth possible" (hooks, 1989, p. 9). 
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Adding one's voice to the dialogical process does have 
its costs, as Lashgari (1995) cautions. Larde (1984) tells 
us that she has been afraid at times; she says, "of course I 
am afraid, because the transformation of silence into 
language and action ••• always seem fraught with danger" 
(p.42). Yet, she shares with us a query regarding "what if 
she had been born mute or maintained an oath of silence" 
during her life for safety sake. In the realization that 
pain and death are inescapable she willingly accepts the 
scrutiny she has undergone by the particular way she has 
entered into "a process of life that is creative and 
continuing, that is growth" (p.43). 
These forms of feminist literary critique have had the 
expressed goal of talking back to a discourse that has 
sought to define and contain counter-discourses. Among the 
most deeply formative of my perspective is the work of 
Gloria Anzaldua (1987). Through a series of autobiographical 
essays, for example, she speaks to attempts to "tame a wild 
tongue" by her family, her church, and her government and 
her struggle to overcome the "tradition of silence" she had 
been taught so well. 
Anzaldua (1987) refers to colonization, in historical 
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and metaphorical terms, and to the internalization of 
acceptable norms of the colonizers. Anzaldua explains, 
Dominant paradigms, predefined concepts that exist as 
unquestionable, unchallengeable, are transmitted to us 
by the culture ..•. [many times] I heard mothers and 
mothers-in-law tell their sons to beat their wives for 
being hociconas (big mouths) •.. for expecting their 
husbands to help with the rearing of children ..• 
(p. 16) 
More powerfully, her story is about resistance, a 
counter-discourse which decenters and disorients a monologic 
perspective of the dominant society, laying bare its 
violence. Anzaldua (1987) exposes a neo-colonial propensity 
in current U.S. social and political discourse. For example 
her works can address the conservative politics in the 
English-only movement: "Wild tongues can't be tamed, they 
can only be cut out" (p.54). Anzaldua's explanation of the 
connection of language and identity resists the 
assimilationist perspectives exemplified in the work of 
writers such as Richard Rodriquez (1983). 
Critigue of Science 
Sandra Harding (1991) has explained that there is a 
building skepticism about the "benefits that the sciences 
and their technologies can bring to society" (p. 1). Harding 
(1991) is forceful in noting that these feminist critiques 
are not isolated voices crying in the wilderness ... but 
are linked thematically and historically to a rising 
tide of critical analysis of the mental life and social 
relations of the modern, androcentric, imperial, 
bourgeois West, including its science and notions of 
knowledge. (p. viii) 
Chris Weedon (1987) also explains that "within the official 
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institutions of science and research, feminists have begun 
to challenge the boundaries of existing knowledge" (p. 14). 
Understandably, the critique comes from several positions 
since there are multiple, and often contradictory, feminist 
views. 21 
I want to make the point that the feminist 
perspective22 that I espouse, is not concerned with 
research which advances the cause of women only. On the 
contrary, feminism, as I relate to it, "encapsulates a 
distinctive value position, but these are truly human 
values, not just those of a 'women's perspective'. And so 
these values should be those of all people" (Stanley & Wise, 
1993, p. 27). Feminists have joined this conversation not as 
a special interest group (Harding, 1991) who appeal a 
hearing for their benefit alone. Women join other feminists 
involved with other movements "as thinkers expressing 
concerns about science and society that are echoed in the 
other 'countercultures' of science - in antiracist and Third 
World movements, in anticapitalist movements, and in ecology 
and peace movements" (p. 50). 
21See Alison M. Jaggar's ( 1983) Feminist Politics and 
Human Nature for a discussion of what she sees as the four 
major contemporary feminisms (e.g. liberal, Marxist, radical, 
and socialist). Chris Weedon's (1987) Feminist practice and 
poststructuralism explains her thesis using explanations of 
liberal, radical, and socialist definitions of feminism. 
22 I am referring here to a socialist perspective of 
feminism (Weedon, 1987) which views various oppressive 
structures (e.g. , capitalism, patriarchy, racism) as 
interrelated. 
45 
Finally, before moving into the three feminist models 
for critiquing science, I will discuss Harding's view of the 
oneness of the hard and soft sciences. Harding (1991) makes 
the point that an "influential tendency in conventional 
thought" (p. 15) is that there is actually one standard for 
all the sciences, or what counts as science, and that is the 
"hard" or natural sciences with physics ranking the highest. 
Social sciences are lower on the scale and many are 
considered "soft" depending on the extent to which their 
methodologies are less quantitative and more qualitative. 
Yet, psychology has a longstanding commitment to a 
positivist, empiricist epistemology and method. The 
influence of this commitment is "so pervasive as to be 
unrecognized by those enmeshed in its web of meaning, [as] 
it informs every aspect of psychology's undertakings" (Moke 
& Bohan, 1992, p. 7). This is no less true for educational 
psychology. Harding insists that the "sciences are 
fundamentally 'one', and the model for that one is physics" 
(p. 15). Therefore, while some of the critiques offered 
below come out of the critiques of natural sciences, they 
have valid applications for the discipline of educational 
psychology as well. 
What is needed, and what Harding (1991) attempts to do, 
is provide a 
critical examination of [science's] origins and 
values ... to figure out just what are the regressive and 
the progressive tendencies brought into play in any 
particular scientific or feminist project, and how to 
advance the progressive and inhibit the regressive 
ones. (pp. 10-11) 
Harding (1991) affirms the progressive themes in modern 
science that have yielded a high standard of living for 
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many, "especially if we are white and middle or upper class" 
(p.2). Harding also points to regressive themes that have 
yielded the atomic bombs, industrial exploitation of water, 
air, land, and, more importantly whole groups of people. To 
take the position that science contains both progressive and 
regressive tendencies is not to maintain that science is 
inherently good, bad, or "value-neutral" and used in only 
progressive and regressive ways. Thus, Harding (1991) takes 
a skeptical position regarding science; she acknowledges 
that this is "a confusing moment" (p. 2) in the relationship 
between science and feminism. 
Harding (1996) takes as an additional focus, what she 
refers to as a "racial economy of science" which she 
explains as: 
The institutions, assumptions, and practices that are 
responsible for disproportionately distributing along 
'racial' lines the benefits of Western sciences to the 
haves, and the bad consequences to the have nots, 
thereby enlarging the gap between them. (p. 2) 
Harding (1996) notes the problem in using the term "racial" 
in this way, realizing that issues of race cannot be 
separated from other issues of class and gender. She states 
that "there is no uncontroversial shorthand to use in 
referring to the complicity of Western sciences in projects 
of racism ... colonialism ... imperialism" (p. 20). "Elite" 
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science educators are indicted as afflicted by a kind of 
scientific "illiteracy" through their failure to understand 
and teach others a "systematic analyses of social origins, 
traditions, meanings, practices, institutions, technologies, 
uses and consequences" (p. 1) of the science they practice 
and teach. 
Three Models of Critigue 
Harding's (1991) models frame the contemporary 
critiques effectively. She acknowledges three models of 
critique of science, shifting from reform to revolution: (a) 
critique of bad-science or feminist empiricism; (b) critique 
of science as a social problem, in and of itself; (c) 
critique of science-as-usual, including what she terms 
feminist standpoint epistemology. The third model 
constitutes the most prevalent model of critique evident in 
the literature. 
Critigue of bad-science. The first model of critique 
maintains the general belief in the positive value of 
science while taking the position that science needs to be 
reformed. This perspective critiques "bad science" (Harding, 
1991). The critique is directed toward that science which 
results, for example, in bias or sexist conclusions. The 
critique is directed toward research in science that is 
flawed in that it does not "follow well-understood 
principles of method and theory" (Harding, 1991, p. 57). 
Those who associate with this perspective assume an 
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Archimedean vantage point is possible, and "support the goal 
of value-neutral objectivity and impartiality for all 
scientific inquiry" (p. 57). Harding refers to the feminist 
form of this conventional theory "as applied to science and 
its procedures for producing knowledge, [as] 'feminist 
empiricism'" (p. 58). 
For example, Longino and Doell (1987) contend that it 
is possible to subvert sexist and androcentric bias in 
research programs through the use of "a variety of tactical 
responses" (p. 186) without denouncing science as an 
enterprise. They claim that the structure of science allows 
for the presentation of alternative accounts that are more 
ingenious and self-conscious. 
Evelyn Fox Keller, historian of science, has been 
offered as an exemplar of this perspective (Haraway, 1991; 
Restivo, 1988). Keller is one who is interested in 
"correct[ing] the gender inequalities in modern science" 
(Restivo, 1988, p. 217) while remaining within the modern 
science perspective. 
Science as a social problem. There is another view of 
science that falls outside the reconstruction of a feminist 
science encouraged by Harding and others. Sal Restivo 
(1988), for example, argues that science itself is a social 
problem. Through his examination of the cultural roots of 
modern science he claims that modern science has been used 
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as a 
tool of the ruling elites ... emerged and developed as 
an alienating and alienated mode of inquiry ... [and 
these roots] are everywhere inseparable from military, 
political, and economic interests and power. (pp. 213-
214) 
Restivo argues that "purity" and "progress" are myths which 
serve only to enhance the power and privilege of modern 
science. What Restivo calls for is a "sociological 
imagination" developed by attention to new questions in the 
sociology of science, for example: what do scientists 
produce and how do they produce it; what good are the 
products of science; in what social context is it valued and 
who values it; what are the goals, visions, and values of 
the work? 
A sociological imagination is not an abstract exercise; 
rather, it is a call to action which challenges prevailing 
social arrangements. Restivo believes that something is 
missing from current critiques, as well as some feminist 
critiques of science. He seeks a specific "blend of 
structural analysis, social criticism, epistemological 
relevance, and an activist orientation toward social change" 
(p. 208). 
Science-as-usual. The third model, a critique of 
"science-as-usual", includes what Harding (1991) refers to 
as "feminist standpoint epistemology". This critique of 
science insists that no Archimedean perspective is possible 
as knowledge is socially situated, "grounded in particular, 
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historical social situations" (Harding, 1991, p.59). Views 
are always partial and distorted. Harding says "I always see 
the world through my own culture's eyes; I think with its 
assumptions" (p.59). Theorists from this perspective use as 
a resource "women's situation in a gender-stratified 
society" to show that research directed toward "social 
values and political agendas can nevertheless produce 
empirically and theoretically preferable results" (p.119). 
This position is in contrast to the critique of "bad 
science" which, in the interest of objectivity, seeks to rid 
methodology of all subjectivity, including gender. 
Harding makes special comment that the unique 
perspective of feminist standpoint epistemology is not 
connected to biological differences between men and women, 
rather, it is the unique position of women in a stratified 
society that gives a particular vantage point. Harding 
(1991) insists that this vantage point designates an 
"objective" location, i.e., women's lives "as the place from 
which feminist research should begin" (p. 123). This is 
considered a particularly trustworthy position as "members 
of oppressed groups have fewer interests in ignorance about 
the social order and few reasons to invest in maintaining or 
justifying the status quo than do dominant groups" (p. 126). 
Collins (1990) offers that situated knowledge, like 
Black feminist thought, "is less likely than the specialized 
knowledge produced by dominant groups to deny the connection 
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between ideas and the vested interest of their creators" (p. 
234). Donna Haraway (1988) has also asserted a preference 
for the vantage point of members of subjugated groups saying 
"there is good reason to believe vision [from this position] 
is better" (p. 583). It is not that there is something 
"innocent" about subjugated knowledges. Indeed, these also 
need to receive a critical examination and deconstruction. 
Rather, subjugated standpoints are preferred "because in 
principle they are least likely to allow denial of the 
critical and interpretive core of all knowledge" (Haraway 
1988, p. 581). 
This model of critique is both an interrogation of 
"objectivity" and at the same time a call for a particular 
objectivity, which seems at first contradictory. Harding and 
others (e.g., Haraway, 1988; Smith, 1987) are calling for a 
program of "strong objectivity". This call comes out of a 
doubt that the scientific method is strong enough "to 
identify and eliminate distorting social interests and 
values" (Harding, 1996, p. 17) which intrude upon and 
distort the results of scientific research. What is needed 
is "causal analyses not just of the micro-processes in the 
laboratory but also the macro tendencies in the social order 
which shape scientific practices" (Harding 1991, p. 149). 
so, in other words, strong objectivity calls for a more 
intent focus on the values and beliefs that makes scientific 
practice possible in the first place: 
52 
Women - and men - cannot understand or explain the 
world we live in or the real choices we have as long as 
the sciences describe and explain the world primarily 
from the perspectives of the lives of dominant groups. 
(Harding, 1991, p. 307) 
Required here, along with strong objectivity, is the 
complementary process of a strong reflexivity whereby a 
researcher examines her own cultural beliefs and values 
through which she views the behaviors, values, and beliefs 
of those who are being studied. Harding (1991) explains that 
this strong reflexivity would require that "objects of 
inquiry be conceptualized as gazing back in all their 
cultural particularity" (p.163); and, the researcher, 
likewise "stand behind them, gazing back at his [sic] own 
socially situated research projects in all its cultural 
particularity" (p. 163). 
Haraway (1996) also calls for a "critical" reflexivity 
as she acknowledges that "[n]othing comes without its world, 
so trying to know these worlds is crucial" (p. 440). She 
believes Harding's notion of strong reflexivity is akin to a 
concept she calls "diffraction", "to make different patterns 
in a more worldly way .••• diffraction patterns record the 
passage of difference, interaction, and interference" 
(Haraway, 1996, p. 429-430). Haraway instructs us that 
tropes are helpful in understanding diffraction. The 
etymological root of trope can be traced to the Greek 
tropos: "tropes [then] are what makes us swerve, what makes 
us notice what we did not already know how to see .•• a kind 
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of aerobics for academics, perhaps ... " (p. 430). 
This ability to "see" differently is emphasized by 
Haraway {1988/1991) through the metaphor of "vision". She 
uses this metaphor in order to foreground the idea that the 
"gaze" of the scientist is embodied, always from somewhere, 
from within someone, even as it appears in mainstream 
scientific writing as a "gaze from nowhere ... [that claims] 
the power to see and not be seen, to represent while 
escaping representation" (p. 188). The "eye" of the one who 
is looking has a growing capacity to see because of 
"visualizing technologies". Through these technologies, 
vision can be "endlessly enhanced .•• [until] all perspective 
gives way to an infinitely mobile vision, which no longer 
seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing 
everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into 
ordinary practice" (p. 189). 
The ability to see endlessly from nowhere is an 
illusion, of course. What Haraway wants to emphasize is the 
potency of the vision we do have. It is the recognition that 
our "only partial perspective promises objective vision" (p. 
190). The "objectivity" that is possible from our particular 
and partial perspective is about a "limited location and 
situated knowledge, not about transcendence ••• [or] 
omniscience." (Haraway, 1988/1991, p. 190). 
What is at issue in this aspect of feminist critique of 
science is more than her concerns regarding particular 
54 
theories, the scientific method, scientific technologies, 
and the institutions in which they are constructed. Harding 
(1991) wants to clarify how deeply "we", "those most at home 
in Western societies" (p.3), are embedded in a Western, 
scientific world-view, so much so that it is difficult to 
see how scientific rationality has infiltrated our belief 
systems and our epistemologies. At the same time it is 
important to realize that "the social origins of science and 
the values it carries suffuse scientific projects •.. what 
science becomes in any historical era depends on what we 
make of it." (p.10). 
Thus, feminist critique of science-as-usual brings the 
study of scientific research to a very different site of 
investigation as the perspective is concerned with the 
process of science itself. Steve Woolgar (1988) remarks that 
it is "only comparatively recently that critical attention 
has been directed towards the 'internal' workings of 
science" (p. 9). Although a variety of disciplines have 
challenged conventional views of science "the practice of 
science is itself the object of critical scrutiny" (p. 9). 
Several members within the science community have taken up 
the interrogation of scientific discourse in a way that 
exposes a remarkable social dynamic and political agenda of 
the discourse where there was thought to be only 
objectivity, neutrality, truth, and progress, following from 
Harding's (1991) model of a critique of science-as-usual. 
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This concern for the internal workings of science, 
especially as it is expressed through scientific discourse, 
is central to my project as I believe it exposes some of 
science's regressive proclivities. I will now give a few 
examples of work exemplifying this critique of science-as-
usual, primarily Hubbard (1989), Hubbard and Wald (1993), 
Namenwirth (1986), and Bleier (1987). 
Ruth Hubbard (1989) is concerned with the "context-
stripping" methodology of science whereby the scientist is 
invisible and the results are represented as objective, 
value-neutral, and apolitical. Hubbard explains that "the 
context-stripping that worked reasonably well for the 
classical physics of falling bodies has become the model for 
how to do every kind of science" (p. 127) even given the 
insight of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle23 • "Science 
is a social process" (p. 119) Hubbard insists, and 
"generating facts is a social enterprise" (p.119). Yet, even 
the language of science reinforces the illusion of facts 
rendered in a vacuum as it "implicitly denies the relevance 
of time, place, social context, authorship, and personal 
responsibility" (p. 125). 
Hubbard (1989) is also concerned with the homogeneity 
of those who do science (i.e., Western European, North 
American, middle/upper class males) as "public 
23This principle states that even the act of observation 
by a scientist will alter the results of an experiment. 
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accountability is not built into the system" (p. 121). She 
points out that "small groups of people with similar 
personal and academic backgrounds" (p. 120) decide who gets 
to be faculty, whose work gets funded, who gets published, 
i.e., who gets rewarded by the system. She complains that 
"science is made ... by the chosen for the chosen" (p. 120). 
In Hubbard and Wald (1993) the focus remains on these social 
and political implications through a description of work 
performed with DNA. Hubbard and Wald's aim in writing their 
book is to demystify some of the language and concepts of 
genetics and biotechnology as they believe that it is 
crucial that we, as citizens, not leave this process in 
the hands of 'experts'. Like other people, scientists 
are interested in seeing their projects flourish, and 
their enthusiasm can blind them to the possible 
negative effects of their work. (p. xiii) 
Hubbard (1989) highlights the political content of 
science and its governing role. She maintains that "Science 
and technology always operate in somebody's interest and 
serve someone or some group of people" (p. 128). Hubbard 
asserts that "[t]o the extent that scientists are 'neutral' 
that merely means that they support the existing 
distribution of interests and power" (p. 128). Elizabeth Fee 
puts this another way by characterizing "objectivity" as: 
merely a code word for the political passivity of those 
scientists who have tacitly agreed to accept a 
privileged social position and freedom of inquiry 
within the laboratory in return for their silence in 
not questioning the social uses of science or the power 
relations that determine its direction. (quoted in 
Harding, 1993, p. 337) 
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Marion Namenwirth (1986), coming from the perspective 
of the biological sciences challenges her readers to make 
personal assessments of "whether the science we practice 
today has not strayed unacceptably far from the science of 
which we would like to take part" (p. 18). She critiques the 
illusion that scientists are able to remove themselves and 
their work from cultural and political influences, and that 
by "cloaking0 their scientific projects in assertions of: 
neutrality, detachment, and objectivity, scientists 
augment the perceived importance of their views, 
absolve themselves of social responsibility for the 
applications of their work, and leave their 
(unconscious) minds wide open to political and cultural 
assumptions. (p. 29) 
Namenwirth wants to make the point that being unconscious of 
the bias or the political agenda of work does not render the 
work neutral or objective. Rather, these "hidden influences 
and biases are particularly insidious in science because the 
cultural heritage of the practitioners is so uniform as to 
make these influences difficult to detect and unlikely to be 
brought to light" (p. 29). 
The metaphor of "cloaking" scientific activity in 
neutrality and objectivity so as to cover particular 
political and social underpinnings of science is 
explicitedly stated in the work of Ruth Bleier (1986). 
Bleir uses the image of "lab coat" to make her point that 
this covering of the scientist and the scientific activity 
denotes a kind of "innocence - of a pristine and aseptic 
neutrality - and gives him .•. a faceless authority that his 
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audience can't challenge" (Bleier, 1986, p.67). Bleier's 
point is to connect this cloaked or coated figure with that 
of the "klansman," another faceless authority. Bleier does 
not shrink from this comparison, rather she emphasizes that 
she considers her work in science as a disruption and a 
subversion to misogynist, racist, regressive tendencies in 
science. 
Many feminist scholars critique science from the point 
of male domination (e.g., Keller, 1986; Sherif, 1987; Star, 
1987; Whatley, 1986). Reasons for this domination have been 
located in the "deep-seated dualisms of Western culture 
[which] have encouraged and maintained a hierarchial 
domination ..•• (Harding & O'Barr, 1981, p. 33). The notion 
of hierarchical dualisms was articulated in ancient Greek 
and Egyptian philosophies. Human persons become fragmented 
through the view that "reality is segmented into spirit and 
matter" (Speight, Myers, Cox, & Highlen, 1991, p. 31). 
Spirit is a "transcendent principle" and is connected with 
activity, autonomy, reason, the mind, the permanent, the 
infinite. In contrast matter is the principle signifying 
immanence which "shows itself in passivity, dependence, 
emotions, the body, the physical, nature, the transitory, 
the finite" (Johnson, 1993, p. 11). In the original 
framework these two, matter and spirit, existed in a 
"harmonious tension of opposites" (p. 11) which gradually 
was separated, graded, and eventually became portrayed as 
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polar opposites in which the differences were maximized. 
Thus, one became valued over the other; spirit is valued 
over matter in Western epistemologies. 
Spirit is connected with the rational mind24 , the 
intellect, and the masculine, while matter is connected to 
the earth, the body, and the feminine. The effect was a 
hierarchy of mind over body, male over female. These 
dualisms are social constructions, and like so many dualisms 
in science, and psychology in particular, are not neutral 
constructions; rather, they have political implications, 
they affect power relationships. such dualisms sanctioned 
women being kept out of institutions of higher learning, out 
of laboratories. When they were able to surmount barriers 
placed in their way their work and their contributions were 
trivialized and/or marginalized.~ 
One of the most widely used dualisms in psychology is 
"nature vs. nurture". The distinction has been around for 
centuries originally expressed as "nature vs. culture" and 
expressed formally over one hundred years ago by Galton who 
introduced the dualism while concerned wtth the heritability 
24! am grateful to my committee members, Suzette Speight 
in particular, for pointing out that the connection of spirit 
with the mind and the masculine is not universally accepted. 
It exemplifies my own embeddedness in a Roman catholic 
tradition. 
25 The case of Rosalind Franklin's contribution to the 
model of DNA presented by James Watson is a perfect example. 
see: A. Sayer (1975), Rosalind Franklin & DNA and J. D. Watson 
(1980), The Double Helix A Personal Account of the Discovery 
of the structure of DNA. 
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of "intelligence" which he was trying to measure. 
Historically, nature-nurture "has been used almost without 
exception, as a weapon to diminish the importance of groups 
derogated by the culture - Blacks, Irish, Jews, women, gays, 
the handicapped, among them" (Kessen, 1993, p. 271). Restivo 
(1988) explains that the "dichotomy between 'nature' and 
'culture' ••• has fostered a dominative, exploitative 
orientation to nature, women, workers, and the underclass in 
general" (p. 219). This dualism which is taken as a 
commonsense notion in current educational psychology 
discourse has been criticized as it "divides what cannot be 
divided and it contrasts what cannot be contrasted" (Kessen, 
1993, p.271). 
Summary 
Many of the counter-discourses offered by the feminist 
scholarship reported in this chapter are challenging current 
social arrangements. Their narrative "reveals and invents 
disruptive images of what could be" (Fine, 1992, p. 221). 
This dissertation joins their work by applying a 
poststructural analysis to the discipline of educational 
psychology so embedded in mainstream science. Like so much 
feminist criticism it highlights the social, cultural, and 
political implications of positionality as it constructs 
what can be seen and what remains hidden in the discipline. 
Research within traditional paradigms will not allow 
the kind of talking back which is called for by feminist 
critique. New research paradigms are required. This is the 
discussion of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
"METHODOLOGY" 
Introduction 
This chapter has a dual purpose in the dissertation. 
First, as I am employing a research approach that is 
critical I want to emphasis how this approach is different 
from traditional methodologies employed in educational 
research. By "methodology" I am referring to the 
"intellectual means" that focuses my research project 
(Stanley & Wise, 1993). Second, I will describe the 
particular methodology, critical discourse analysis, in the 
sense of strategies of analysis that will be utilized in 
this dissertation. 
Call for Critical Educational Research 
There is a growing debate regarding every aspect of 
educational research within the educational community. For 
example, Maxine Greene (1994) describes what she calls a 
"restiveness" that accompanies a rising skepticism regarding 
contemporary educational research. This uneasiness stems 
from interrogations regarding the "normal course of science" 
and "the best scientific research". Greene insists this 
situation has resulted in: 
a growing disenchantment with technicism and bland 
objectivist assumptions separation of research or 
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positive inquiry from moral considerations or ethical 
perplexities ... [as well as] the apparent uselessness of 
research in overcoming 'savage inequalities' (Kozol, 
1991). (1994, p. 424) 
Greene purports that while many researchers do not 
question the uses of science, there are increasing numbers 
of researchers whose work flows from an uneasiness which is, 
in fact, a kind of rebellion against mainstream science. 
Educationalists are encouraged to consider "a number of 
fresh perspectives" (Greene, 1994, p.426) that reject 
"[p]ositivistic and depersonalized approaches to science" 
(p. 437). Thus, Greene reports a shift in research practice. 
This state of educational research which troubles many 
educators is beyond the frequent quantitative/qualitative 
debate (e.g., Eisner, 1992; Erikson, 1992; Maxwell, 1992; 
Peshkin, 1993; Popkewitz, 1992; Schrag, 1992; Smith, 1983). 
Much of the dissatisfaction with current educational 
research is connected to the current social and political 
milieu which has been referred to as a "conservative 
restoration" (Apple, 1993, 1996). It is argued that the 
discourse of education is dominated by conservative 
tendencies regarding questions of "what education is for, 
what and whose knowledge is considered legitimate, and who 
has the right to answer these questions" (Apple, 1996, p.9). 
Greene (1994) articulates a challenge for 
educational research that, while not completely replacing 
work done within the mainstream scientific model, 
interrogates its methods and its results, and creates a 
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space where emancipatory projects may be explicated. She 
tells us that what has become "crucial in the contemporary 
conversation is the contingency of language, along with the 
notion that truth is made rather than found" (p. 444). 
Greene desires that educators join together in a struggle 
"to go in search of those intersections where deficiencies 
exist, where there are calls for justice, where freedom is 
being awaited" (p. 459). Greene (1994) expresses a profound 
sense of hope for more meaningful and transformative kinds 
of educational research. Greene is recognizing the potential 
that a "critical" approach has to offer social science 
research. It is this critical approach to educational 
research that I espouse. 
Employing a critical approach indicates a significant 
shift away from the conventional models of research; it has 
little to do with educational researchers utilizing 
positivist or interpretivist conceptual and methodological 
paradigms. This shift deserves at least a brief explanation 
because it is helpful in locating work done within a 
critical perspective. I will briefly explain how both the 
positivist (or quantitative) and interpretivist (or 
qualitative) approaches are connected to the project of 
modernity, and why these perspectives are unsuitable for 
many critical research interests. An explanation will be 
proposed regarding why a critical, poststructuralist 
perspective is more appropriate, and what this approach has 
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to offer the contemporary research scene. 
Educational Research and the Project of Modernity 
Modernity's26 project was to discover and deliver the 
"truth" about the world. Modernity developed as a response 
to a pre-modern world view in which order, emanating from 
nature and God, was mediated to society through voices of 
authority in the person of the sovereign and/or the 
religious leader. Modernity offered the promise of releasing 
people from "the bonds of ignorance associated with stagnant 
traditions, narrow religions, and meager educations" 
(Bloland, 1995, p. 2). Modernity was committed to the 
liberation of "the world from the chains of superstition, 
ignorance, and suffering" (Giroux, 1983, p. 11). 
Modernity's aim was to replace pre-modern fantasy, 
faith, and superstition with scientific knowledge. Usher and 
Edwards (1994) remind us: 
Science becomes the guarantor and route to truth and 
emancipation. The emancipation of humanity thus 
requires that people are given access to scientific 
knowledge, since the condition of their emancipation is 
that they live subject to the 'laws' uncovered by 
science. (p. 172) 
This emancipation would occur as "reason" became 
"deified" (Kincheloe, 1993) as the authority. Reason was 
26
"Moderni ty" is a term which allows no simple, 
uncontested definition. See Best and Kellner (1991); Giroux 
(1992); Sarup (1993); Usher and Edwards (1994) for helpful 
discussions. I appropriate Sarup's definition that modernity 
is used as "a summary term, referring to that cluster of 
social, economic and political systems brought into being in 
the West from somewhere around the eighteenth century onwards" 
(1993, p. 130). 
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hailed as the "source of progress in knowledge and society, 
as well as the privileged locus of truth and the foundation 
of systematic knowledge" (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 2). For 
some philosophers, modernity marks the beginning "of a 
developmental process resulting from technological progress, 
liberated needs and the triumph of the Spirit .... [which 
makes] science, rather than God, central to society" 
(Touraine, 1995, p. 9). Modernity has been identified "with 
the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational 
planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of 
knowledge as production" (Sarup, 1996, p. 94). Order is 
established through the discovery of universal, impersonal 
laws; in this meaning-making system chaos seems to be the 
only alternative to order (Bauman, 1991). 
Positivist Educational Research 
Positivism27 is the modernist method, logic, and 
pathway to truth and order (Slife & Williams, 1997) and 
enjoys a privileged position among other epistemologies 
(Fenstermacher, 1994). Educational research has long been 
conceptualized as primarily a positivistic undertaking 
(Schrag, 1992) that appropriates the concepts and 
methodologies of the natural sciences to arrive at 
27The etymology of this word is very complex beginning 
with Comte's doctrine that only that which is accessible 
through the senses is positively knowable. Contemporary 
understanding of positivism links coming to know something 
objectively and truthfully through the utilization of the 
scientific method (Slife & Williams, 1997). See Giroux ·(1981) 
for a thorough critique. 
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knowledge. Giroux (1981) refers to the "positivist culture" 
in which educational research is embedded. When social 
sciences adopt this positivist perspective there are two 
assumptions which are implied (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). The 
first being that the aims, concepts, and methods employed by 
the natural sciences are appropriate to social science 
questions. Second, the natural science model of explanation 
"provides the logical standards by which the explanations of 
the social sciences can be assessed" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, 
p. 62). 
Educational research from a positivist perspective 
exemplifies distinct characteristics. For instance, in a 
positivist perspective there exists a confidence in a 
particular methodology following from a specific 
epistemological orientation. A positivist perspective also 
maintains certain assumptions about language. There exists a 
particular relationship between researcher and researched as 
well as theory and practice. These will be discussed 
briefly. 
Method, i.e. the hypothetico-deductive scientific 
method, is of critical importance because it is understood 
as the way to access an "accurate reflection or measurement 
of an independently existing object" (Smith, 1983, p. 9). 
Method is a pivotal aspect of any scientific undertaking as 
fidelity to a series of procedures from within an 
established program ensures the "journey to the factsrr 
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(Smith, 1983, p. 10). To the degree that the methodology is 
"sound" and allows for a neutral, objective investigation of 
the variables under examination the results can be trusted. 
The source of knowledge in a positivist perspective is 
events in the real world. Knowledge and truth are based on a 
correspondence supposition, i.e., what is true is what 
corresponds to reality {Gergen, 1985; Smith, 1983). Science 
is purported to be able to yield pure and objective 
knowledge, a mirror image, about this world {Gergen, 1985; 
smith, 1983) through empirical investigations. 
concepts under study are considered existing a priori 
in the real world, apart and distinct from the researcher, 
and regardless of researcher interest. There is an accepted 
view of language used to ref er to and describe these 
concepts that is utilitarian. In this view words are 
"implicitly assumed to function as simple transmitters of 
information from the writer to the reader ...• [words are a] 
somewhat unimportant container for information about 
phenomena, data, and theories ••• " (Madigan et al., 1995, pp. 
433-434). Therefore, the meanings of the words that are used 
are considered transparent, unambiguous, and fixed 
(Popkewitz, 1992). 
The definition of concepts is determined within the 
rules and relationships of the particular discourse 
community which uses them. Gage and Berliner {1991), for 
example, illustrate this approach in referring to the 
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development of the concept of "intelligence" within the 
educational psychology community: 
A concept is the organized information we have 
(emphasis added) about an entity .... The meaning, 
boundaries, and relationships connected with a concept 
are derived from everything we know (emphasis added) 
about that concept .•.. What we mean (emphasis added) by 
a concept is partly a matter of definition and partly a 
matter of the methods of studying the concept .... for 
example, the meaning of the concept of intelligence 
depends in part on how we define (emphasis added) 
intelligence. (emphasis original). (pp. 12-13) 
It is this understanding that allows Herrnstein and Murray 
(1994) in their controversial book, The Bell Curve. to make 
the statement: "the word intelligence (emphasis original) 
describes something real" (p. 1). This power to define 
abstract concepts as actual entities is a very central 
function of positivist science in its construction of order. 
Abstract concepts considered to have "real" material 
existence points to the linguistic problem of reif ication 
(Gergen, 1985). These constructs are used as "variables" in 
empirical investigations. Reification is a common occurrence 
within a positivist framework. As Smith (1983) points out: 
Because the subjects studied in educational research, 
such as aptitude and motivation, admittedly do not have 
a material existence, how can it be implied that they 
are like physical objects? •••• What is important is not 
the nature of the objects, but how they are treated ... 
(p. 9) 
The meanings of terms in this perspective, are considered 
unimportant for educational researchers. However, it is the 
treatment of these terms which is important, i.e., abstract 
concepts are treated as though they exist. 
The position of the researcher is a significant 
characteristic of this perspective. The researcher is 
presented as detached from that which is under study and 
insignificant, almost receding into the background as the 
importance of the data takes center stage. The language of 
the scientific method itself gives the "impression 
of .•• impersonal detachment [of the researcher] ••.. keeping 
the focus on the phenomena under study" (Madigan et al., 
1995, p. 431). The data set is allowed to "speak" for 
itself. 
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Finally, the relationship of theory and practice has a 
pivotal position within this viewpoint. Educationalists 
espousing a positivist perspective assume that the schooling 
process is enhanced and improved to the extent that teachers 
utilized the knowledge accessed through the scientific 
method. Practice based on scientific principles and laws are 
believed to be able to off er certainty and rational 
solutions to educational questions which are understood as 
"technical" in nature. Popkewitz (1992) explains that this 
vlew puts the "researcher in the position of doing the 
enhancing and producing the progress, and defining the 
individuals who would be affected" (p. 14). This particular, 
one-way account (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) of the relation of 
theory and practice indicates a metaphor of researcher as 
"social engineer" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Smith, 1983). 
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Educational Psychology as Expression of Positivist Science 
Educational psychology has espoused a positivistic 
perspective from the beginning of its becoming formalized as 
a discipline. In the early part of this century Edward L. 
Thorndike contended that "[t]he profession of teaching will 
improve in proportion as its members direct their daily work 
by the scientific method" (Quoted in Carr & Kemmis 1986, p. 
56). It is important to note that this movement toward a 
more science-based practice was simultaneously a movement 
away from a more traditional philosophical perspective. 
Professional schools began to aspire to a more prestigious 
position within the university. Teacher education as a field 
sought higher status by positioning itself as closely as 
possible to "the rigor of science-based knowledge" (Schon, 
1987, p. 9). The belief followed that as teachers utilized 
an educational theory based on the methodology of the 
natural sciences, their practice would take on a "more 
rational basis ..•• purged of its metaphysical, ideological 
and normative elements" (Carr & Kemmis, p. 62). 
This is a particular irony in this situation. As 
education became an increasingly "professionalized" field 
educators believed that interference by "outsiders" would be 
minimized through the use of the increasingly prestigious 
scientific method. It seems paradoxical that "science", once 
considered the means of "democratizing knowledge" (Gordon, 
Miller, & Rollock, 1990) in response to the control of the 
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political and religious aristocracy of premodern times, 
would itself become a means of elite control of knowledge 
through its positivist epistemology and technical language. 
This situation has been referred to as the "paradox of the 
scientific method" (Gordon et al., 1990) in that 
"rationalism, positivism, and logical empiricism represent 
major advances in humans' pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding •... [and at the same time] carries [sic] the 
potential for tyranny" (p. 15). Gergen (1994) notes the 
irony as well in that "'science talk' [has become] as 
totalizing as that of the demagogy that science has sought 
to replace" (p. 413). This "science talk" pervades all 
aspects of our lives and claims "its own monopoly on the 
truth" (Rosenau, 1992, p. 9). 
The confidence in the relationship between positivist 
science and teaching is clearly evidenced in the 
contemporary educational scene (Berliner, 1987; Gage, 1985; 
Gage & Berliner, 1991; Wittrock, 1986; Woolfolk, 1995). It 
certainly is not the only type of knowledge utilized in 
teaching. Fenstermacher (1994) notes the "radically 
disjunctive conceptions of science" (p. 35) that are coming 
to the fore including the practical knowledge of teachers 
themselves. Yet, the resilience of the positivist paradigm 
is obvious today despite attacks leveled against it (Schrag, 
1992). Although this epistemological perspective with its 
approach to research is pervasive and robust, it is also 
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vulnerable on several counts discussed below. 
Interpretivist Educational Research 
As quantitative methods and epistemology proved 
unsatisfactory or inadequate for addressing particular 
educational questions and issues, alternative research 
methodologies began to be recognized and explored. New 
epistemologies were recognized and appropriate methods 
sought. The most popular approach (Carr & Kemmis, 1986), 
described as a kind of countermovement (Smith, 1983), is 
characterized as an interpretive model utilizing qualitative 
methods. 
The positivist perspective views society (or the 
teaching-learning situation in education) as "an 
'independent system' maintained through the relationship of 
factors external to its members" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 
84). Contrastingly, educational researchers espousing an 
interpretivist or qualitative perspective view social 
reality as possessing an "intrinsic meaning structure" (Carr 
& Kemmis, 1986) generated by social actors. Hence the term 
"new sociology" is often used to described this perspective. 
The aim of research is not empirical generalizations, the 
production of law-like statements, nor the establishment of 
functional relationships (van Manen, 1990). Rather, what is 
sought is understanding and meaning of situations, i.e., 
Verstehen. As a result the social actor is able to act more 
"thoughtfully and tactfully" (van Manen, 1990). When social 
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actions are understood more deeply, when the significance of 
the actions are "enlightened or illuminated," practical 
change is possible (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). This signifies a 
dynamic relationship between theory and practice. Carr & 
Kemmis (1986) express this dynamic cogently: 
The account of the theory-practice relationship of 
interpretive social science is thus two-way traffic of 
ideas into action; of practice from theoretical 
principles. The traffic is two way: practical 
deliberation is informed not only by ideas but also by 
the practical exigencies of situations; it also 
requires critical appraisal and mediation by the 
judgement of the actor. (p. 93) 
In educational research the focus of this approach is 
on "understanding" the dynamic nature of the culture of the 
school organization or the classroom, rather than 
"discovering" an a priori "objective" form of knowledge of 
the positivist viewpoint. 
The interpretivist perspective finds its source in a 
distinct epistemological orientation just as the positivist 
view espouses a particular model of knowledge. Gergen (1985) 
refers to this model as the "endogenic" model of the 
"origins of knowledge .... [and] depends on processes 
(sometimes viewed as innate) endemic to the organism" 
(Gergen, 1985, p. 269). Humans strive to make sense of their 
world cognitively, and meaning is negotiated and 
renegotiated (Giroux, 1983b) in social situations. The focus 
has shifted from an impersonal objectivity, an "exogenic" 
model (Gergen, 1985), toward a deeper understanding of the 
notion that "through the use of language and thought human 
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beings constantly produce meanings as well as interpret the 
world in which they find themselves" (Giroux, 1983, p.184). 
"Objectivity" and "reality" are designated by the social 
actors themselves "in the process of interpreting their 
social world, [as they] externalize and objectify it" (Carr 
& Kemmis, 1986, p. 84). 
Qualitative research continues to be committed to the 
pursuit of "objective knowledge" in that the "investigator 
claims to achieve an accurate representation of the world" 
(Gergen, 1985, p. 269). Researchers continue to assume the 
role of generally detached observers, investigators, and 
descriptions of the groups or activity being researched. The 
results are thought to be reflections or representations of 
what is really there (Stanley & Wise, 1993). Thus, this 
research paradigm comfortably finds a place in the project 
of modernity as well because modernity is "characterized by 
a hermeneutic search for an underlying and unified truth and 
certainty that can render the world, experiences and 
events, ... coherent and meaningful" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, 
p. 12) . 
There are several criticisms of this interpretivist 
approach. One line comes from the positivist orientation 
asserting that this approach is unable to make 
generalizations or "to provide 'objective' standards for 
verifying or refuting theoretical accounts" (Carr & Kemmis, 
1986, p. 94). Another line of criticism asserts that "the 
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core of the new sociology lacks an adequate theory of social 
change and consciousness" (Giroux, 1988, p. 25). The focus 
remains at the micro-level of the school or classroom, and 
the social and political structures which influence what is 
understood and regarded as "knowledge" and meaning are never 
exposed. Knowledge is "treated as a specific social act with 
its underlying social relationships" (Giroux, 1983, p. 185). 
However, this epistemology is particularly problematic as it 
never moves beyond a relativistic view of knowledge. The 
negotiated meanings of social actors do affect the social 
structure, yet there is no consideration given to how the 
social structure impacts and constrains the meaning systems 
of the actors (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Giroux, 1983, 1988). 
The qualitative approach is gaining popularity in 
educational research particularly with the rise of 
ethnographic studies. However, it is not likely to gain 
prevalence in educational research. This appears to be 
because the positivist perspective "forms the 
metatheoretical basis of science itself" (Gergen, 1985, p. 
269). 
A Critical Research Perspective 
A critical approach to educational research begins from 
the position that both the positivist and the interpretivist 
models are inadequate in their view of educational practice 
and their attempts at reform. The positivist aim of 
technical prediction and control, and the interpretivist aim 
of practical understanding can never lead to the kind of 
reform and transformation that is necessary to ameliorate 
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the injustice that provokes the current educational crisis. 
What is needed is a way of looking at education and 
educational research that allows questioning beyond the 
search for objective certitudes. The postmodern critique 
holds such a possibility. 
Postmodern Critigue 
I am using the term "postmodernism" 28 in the sense of 
critique, a kind of "oppositional attitude" as employed by 
Foucault (Usher & Edwards, 1994). It is a way of looking at 
modernity's master narratives of science with their promise 
and project of progress, universality, and neutrality of 
scientific method and knowledge claims (Usher & Edwards, 
1994). Postmodernist critique rejects the notion that 
scientific theory can ever mirror nature; at best it is a 
"partial perspective" (Best & Kellner, 1991). Its "knowledge 
claims are themselves partial, local, and specific rather 
than universal and ahistorical" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 
10). 
Just as the authority in pre-modern times held by the 
28
"Postmodernism" as a term defies definition; thought to 
be at "once fashionable and elusive" (Sarup, 1993, p. 129), it 
is marked by a wide variety of interpretations (Aronowitz & 
Giroux, 1991). Usher and Edwards (1994) refer to postmodernism 
as a "loose umbrella term under whose broad cover can be 
encompassed at one and the same time, a condition, a set of 
practices, a cultural discourse, an attitude, a mode of 
analysis" (p. 7). See Best and Kellner (1991) for an 
explication of postmodern theory's historical development. 
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priest and king was displaced by reason's claim to truth and 
certainty, postmodern critique and analysis interrupts power 
relationships which have been so effective in establishing 
the "truth" of the social sciences in the modern epoch29 • 
This rejection of the scientific discourse is a 
confrontation with authority. 
Scientific activity has shown itself vulnerable on many 
counts. Since truth is a "thing of this world" (Foucault, 
1980c, p. 131) it is made in history and culture; knowledge 
considered as "truth" is the result of a social activity 
(Gergen, 1985). That "science" does not recognize itself as 
a human project is the major flaw in science's discourse 
(Rosenau, 1992; Usher & Edwards, 1994). Science claims that 
its truth can be somehow separate and distant, objective, 
and not "encumbered" with values and ideologies. A common 
metaphor for these assertions is the idea that language can 
be wrapped in the "cloak" of objectivity and neutrality 
(Bleir, 1986; Namenwirth, 1986; Usher & Edwards, 1994). 
Thus, postmodern analysis is a critique of "logocentrism," 
the "possibility of knowing the world in a direct and 
unmediated way - as it really is" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 
19). 
As the positivistic and interpretivistic research 
29Foucault actually sees a postmodern critique as not 
contained in one epoch or another. Since power is 
"everywhere" so are disruptions to power-relationships. 
Discourse is always an incitement to discourse. 
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paradigms have a particular epistemoligical stance, so does 
a critical approach. Social constructionism30 {Gergen, 
1983, 1985) challenges the concept of knowledge as mental 
representation. Knowledge, including scientific knowledge, 
is a social construction {Scarr, 1985). In other words, 
knowledge is what passes for knowledge, the result of 
"negotiated intelligibility" {Gergen, 1985). The locus of 
human knowing shifts from the "interior regions of the mind 
(to the] processes and structures of human interaction" 
(Gergen, 1985, p.271). Gergen (1995) stresses the 
"negotiated" aspect of understanding which takes place among 
"complex networks of writers and readers [who comprise a] 
discourse community" {Madigan et al., 1995, p.429), 
supporters of a particular paradigm (Kuhn, 1970), or 
"epistemic community" (Usher & Edwards, 1994). The members 
of these groups share a distinctive world view, beliefs, and 
language. 
Seen from this perspective, then, the "grand narratives 
of science, truth, and progress are discourses - 'realities' 
we have created by and for ourselves. Stories we tell 
ourselves about the real or, more likely stories told by 
'powerful' others on our behalf" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 
28). Critical postmodern traditions recognize the political 
30Gergen {1985) alerts readers to the interchangeable use 
of social "constructivism" and social constructionism. He 
points out the Piagetian origins of the former, as well as the 
farmer's use in reference to twentieth century art. In order 
to avoid these confusions I will use the latter form. 
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underpinnings of knowledge production. Those concerned with 
this line of research engage in visioning and revisioning 
relations of power within the society (Popkewitz, 1995) so 
as to be able to move toward action. Giroux (1988) explains: 
Inherent in this [critical] perspective is an 
intersection of theory, ideology, and social practice 
.•.. The cutting edge of this perspective is its 
insistence on connecting macro forces in the larger 
society to micro analysis such as classroom studies. 
(p.27) 
For example, a critical analysis of the discourse of 
educational psychology is aimed at understanding and 
explicating how the discourse of this discipline, while 
considered a particular discourse community's expression of 
the "truth", is implicated in a larger struggle between 
dominant and subordinate discourses (Giroux & Aronowitz, 
1991). The texts of educational psychology are part of 
larger social texts (Scholes, 1985). Critical research in 
the social sciences is a political activity and value-laden 
work. Research in this perspective takes as its aim not the 
furthering of the discipline's discourse but, rather to make 
assumptions of educational psychology explicit and subvert 
their claims (Rosenau, 1992) which "give some groups or 
individuals unfair advantage to the disadvantage of other" 
(Thomas, 1993, p.5). 
Critical Discourse Analysis and Educational Psychology 
Three points will be addressed in this section: (a) the 
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arrival of critical discourse31 analysis (CDA) on the 
educational research scene; {b) relevancy of critical 
discourse analysis; (c) the salience of language. 
Arrival of CDA in educational research. Critical 
discourse analysis has had a relatively recent arrival onto 
the educational research scene and has been described as a 
"new wave" of research (Burman & Parker, 1993). It has been 
noted that "educational researchers would have been hard 
pressed to turn up many theses, research papers, and 
monographs that used discourse-analytic theories and 
methods" (Luke, 1995, p.7) prior to the 1980's. However, the 
fact that CDA is gaining legitimacy is evidenced in the 
1995-1996 edition of Review of Research in Education (Apple, 
1995) in which it is reviewed in the first chapter. Apple 
states that the purpose of the editorial board of this 
publication is to "give a greater voice to "newer" forms of 
research methodologies and theories" (p. xi); the editors 
want to encourage readers to "think socially" (p. xiii). 
The research reviewed in this yearbook has a common 
purpose, i.e. to place educational institutions in context, 
to make clear the importance of recognizing that 
"[e]ducational institutions do not stand alone, somehow 
distanced from the cultural, economic, and political 
relations and tensions of the larger society" (p. xii). 
31Issues regarding "discourse" are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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Issues regarding education, the institutions, practices, and 
discourses which education employs, need to be viewed as 
part of a more general, social, and complex problematic. The 
section of the book on CDA, for example, expresses a deep 
concern regarding "the connections between discourse and 
power in education ... [and the implications with] the 
cultural and socioeconomic transformations now going on in 
the larger society" (p. xvi). 
Relevancy of CDA. Critical discourse analysis is 
particularly relevant during these times of educational 
"crisis" and "reform." Luke (1995) cites two demographic and 
socioeconomic transformations that have emphasized the need 
for CDA as issues of language, discourse, and difference 
have taken center stage on the educational agenda. One 
transformation is the recognition of educational 
entitlements, the "enfranchisement of cultural and 
linguistic minorities into mainstream public discourses and 
institutions" (p.4). Failure to address this issue and the 
concomitant sociocultural changes and conflicts "could pose 
serious limitations in the capacity of educators to address 
what remains a political issue of access and equity" (p. 5). 
The second transformation is connected to the shift 
from an industrialized to a service-based and information-
based economy (Luke, 1995; Usher & Edwards, 1994) which has 
given rise to "new forms of language and information based 
work" (Luke, 1995, p.5). In this environment spoken and 
83 
written language is "the principal medium of commercial 
exchange. Texts, images, and representations have become 
both the means and objects of processes of commodif ication" 
(p. 5). It is within this context that issues of 
representation and subjectivity are of paramount importance 
as schools are called upon to insure access and equity to an 
increasingly diverse student population. Luke (1995) 
emphasizes that "different kinds of children are, in turn, 
affiliated with differing kinds of power and capital in 
discourse communities and economic institutions" (p. 38). In 
this "educational context •.• the tensions between official 
discourses and minority discourses should be principle 
focuses for educational research" (p.38). 
Salience of language. In research the salience of 
language is increasingly recognized within various 
approaches to discourse analysis (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 
1994). Luke (1995) explains three approaches frequently used 
in educational research: psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic, 
and poststructuralist analysis. Psycholinguistics 
understands the creative, developing child as a "language 
user" whose growing competence accounts for the complexity 
of language development. Sociolinguistics takes as its focus 
the social nature of language and language development as 
connected to socialization. The third approach, and the 
approach which impacts this work, is concerned with a 
poststructuralist analysis where the constructing character 
of language is central. This approach comes out of the 
tradition of continental philosophy and cultural analysis 
especially impacted by the work of Michel Foucault. 
"Method" in Critical Piscourse Analysis 
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There is a need to be clear when talking about critical 
discourse analysis in terms of "method". The category of 
method "comes from a discourse developed for quantitative, 
positivist mythologies such as experiments and surveys" 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.101). Within the positivist 
framework "sound" methodology leads to a degree of 
"authority" with which outcomes of the research seem 
justified. Gergen (1985) insists that the "sciences have 
been enchanted by the myth that the assiduous application of 
rigorous method will yield sound fact" (p. 273). No such 
confidence in "method" exists in a critical research 
paradigm. 
Discourse analysis is more of a "craft skill ... not easy 
to render or describe in an explicit or codified manner" 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1994, p. 55). As a person becomes more 
skilled at the craft explaining exactly what discrete 
procedures are used becomes more difficult. Although there 
are specific "analytic considerations", the accent is on the 
craft, developing a skill, cultivating a "more conscious and 
theorized understanding of how to be a cultural member" 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.104). The fruitfulness of CDA 
is clearly on becoming a better craftsperson, or a cultural 
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worker in Giroux's sense, rather than performing a 
particular set of mechanical procedures (Potter & Wetherell, 
1994). 
In short, there is not a set mechanics for "doing" 
critical discourse analysis, and this is problematic as it 
may appear "as an improvisation .. [I]ndeed, from a 
functionalist point of view it hardly appears to be a 
methodology at all" (Gotlieb, 1987, p. 276). The critical 
discourse analyst views his/her work "as an art achieved 
through practice. There is no determinate method ..• in the 
sense of explicit rules that are to be followed" 
(Bernstein, 1983, quoted in Gotlieb, 1987, p. 278). Critical 
discourse analysis is a way of looking at things and 
articulating a type of "heteroglossic expression" which 
brings into play "various discursive resources with which to 
read, interpret, and make sense .•. " (Luke, 1995, p. 39). 
Discourse 
Discourse is an important element in postmodern -
poststructuralist analysis. An understanding of what is 
meant by discourse needs to be presented. From a positivist-
empiricist perspective discourse might be interpreted as 
that which "refers to what is said and written and passes 
for more or less orderly thought and exchange of ideas" 
(Cherryholms, 1988, p.2). In general, discourse means the 
text and the talk (van Dijk, 1993) of a particular 
community. 
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Yet, discourses do not simply express or reflect ideas 
and paradigms; they play an active role as well. Gotlieb 
(1987) insists that discourse, rather than being a mere 
"tool for transferring meaning and intention," actively 
"shapes what is thought and done" (p.279). Sarup (1993) 
states that discourses "are perhaps best understood as 
practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak" (p.64). Luke (1995) explains this as the constructing 
character of discourse. There is a "social and ideological 
'work' that language does in producing, reproducing or 
transforming social structures, relations and identities" 
(Fairclough, 1995, pp. 209-210). Marshall (1992) defines 
discourse as "a regulated system of statements which can be 
analyzed not solely in terms of its internal rules of 
formation, but also as a set of practices within a social 
milieu" (p.99). Woolgar (1988) tells us that the specific 
discourse of science "is to be understood as [that which] 
structures and sustains a particular moral order of 
relationships between the agents of representation, 
technologies of representation and their respective 
'objects'" (p. 14). 
Foucault (1972) makes the point that "discourse is not 
a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a 
reality and a language (langue), the intrication of a 
lexicon and an experience" (p. 48). Rather, Foucault {1972) 
takes as his task explicating discourse as "practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak" 
(emphasis added, p.49). In examining discourse Foucault is 
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not interested in an explication of the "objective reality" 
of the subject under study; rather, Foucault is interested 
in "how texts are constructive of social formations, 
communities, and individual's social identities" (Luke, 
1995, p.9). As subjects become objectified through discourse 
a type of knowledge-power relationship is formulated. 
Discourse is the power/knowledge nexus. In short, discourses 
and the discursive practices which give voice to them are 
social constructions rather than transparent images of 
reality; as such they have an active and social function. 
In addition to the constructive character of discourse 
Ball (1990) explains that 
Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but 
also about who can speak, when, and with what 
authority. Discourses embody meaning and social 
relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and 
power relationships. (p.2) 
When discourse is considered in this critical way 
issues of dominance emerge. Teun van Dijk (1993) defines 
dominance as "the exercise of social power by elites, 
institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, 
including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and 
gender inequality" (p. 249-250). It is important to note 
that power is not a unilateral relationship although in this 
definition of dominance emphasis is on a "top-down" relation 
(van Dijk, 1993b). There is also a "bottom-up" expression of 
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power in the form of resistance, complicity, and compliance. 
However, "our critical approach prefers to focus on the 
elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance 
of inequality" (van Dijk, 1993b, p.250). Broader issues of 
power will be handled in Chapters IV and v. 
categories and constructs found generally in discourse, 
and those found in educational psychology's discourse in 
particular, are ascribed a degree of "truth": they are 
understood as a reflection of reality. Disciplines construct 
and are constructed by discourses which are accepted as 
"truth" by various communities. Indeed Foucault (1980) 
assures us that "[e]ach society has its regime of truth, its 
general politics of truth: that is the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true" (p.131). 
Presently, as has been the case historically, there are a 
multiplicity of discourses within the field of educational 
psychology (Ball, 1984: Constas & Ripple, 1987: Glover & 
Ronning, 1987: Scheurman, Heeringa, Rocklin, & Lohman, 1993: 
Yee, 1970) each expressing a degree of variation. Despite 
this disagreement, educational psychology is considered a 
coherent discipline "with its own goals, research agenda, 
and infrastructure" (Glover & Ronning, 1987 p.3). It is the 
dominant discourse of the discipline that is the focus of 
this dissertation. 
Textbooks 
Since the aim of this dissertation is to apply a 
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critical analysis to the mainstream, dominant discourse of 
educational psychology textbooks are chosen as a valuable 
area for analysis. The choice of textbooks is based on 
several issues: (1) textbooks enjoy of long history of use 
in the discipline and form a genre of discourse; (2) they 
are considered an authoritarian source of the discipline's 
content; (3) textbooks are used to "pass on" the discipline 
to future generations of educational psychologists; (4) they 
present particular problematics; (5) they need to be 
recognized as social artifacts with multiple constraints. 
Each of these reasons for focusing on textbooks will be 
discussed briefly. 
First, educational psychology textbooks, beginning with 
the publication of Edward L. Thorndike's Educational 
Psychology in 1903, are marked by a prolific history, and 
are part of the discourse of educational psychology in 
particular. Textbooks are "primary resources for many 
educational psychology courses" (Anderson, et al., 1995). 
Westbury (1990) states as "truism" the fact that "textbooks 
are the central tools and the central objects of attention 
in all modern forms of schooling" (p. 1). DeCastell, Luke, 
and Luke (1989) point to the distinctive status of the 
textbook as the "primary medium of formal education" 
(p.viii). Textbooks are accepted as being "an enduring and 
influential part of schooling ••. they define much of what 
teachers teach and students learn" (Elliott & Woodward, 
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1990, p. viii). 32 Squire and Morgan (1990) characterize 
textbooks as the "bed rock" tool for instruction "since they 
have demonstrated their convenience and cost effectiveness" 
(p.123). In short, textbooks form a particular genre of 
discourse in and of themselves. 
Second, textbooks are perceived to be authoritative 
sources of a discipline's content. Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
explains that textbooks "address themselves to an already 
articulated body of problems, data, and theory" and 
explicate a particular "set of paradigms" to which a 
scientific community" (p. 36) is committed at a particular 
time and place. Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) advise that 
textbooks are "important artifacts" in defining whose 
culture is taught, whose knowledge is recognized as 
legitimate and "true". Textbooks signify "particular 
constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and 
organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge" (p.3). 
Educational psychology textbooks have been ref erred to as 
"virtual cornucopias of knowledge bases" (Houtz & Lewis, 
1994, p.5) and they "tend to be written from a consensus 
perspective and, therefore, serve as a valid indicator of 
what professionals generally regard as important for an 
undergraduate survey" (Scheurman et al., 1993, p.100). Olson 
(1989) explains that written texts "serve an important 
32What is actually taught or learned in intro~uctory 
educational psychology courses is not the issue here. However, 
the potential of textbooks to define the field is the issue. 
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archival functioning in preserving what the society takes to 
be 'true' and 'valid' knowledge" and when knowledge is 
stored in this written form it "carries great authority 
because it appears to originate in a transcendental source" 
(p.241). A. Graham Down of the Council of Basic Education 
(quoted in Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991) relates that 
"(t]extbooks, for better or worse, dominate what students 
learn. They set the curriculum and often the facts learned, 
in most subjects •••• The public regards textbooks as 
authoritative, accurate and necessary" (p. 5). 
Third, textbooks are the principal means by which the 
science is transmitted to future generations and, as such, 
may be considered "pedagogic vehicles" (Kuhn, 1970, p.137). 
Textbooks fulfill a need to "acquaint the student with what 
the contemporary scientific community thinks it knows" 
(p.140). Apple (1989) asserts that it is the textbook that 
"often defines what is elite and legitimate culture to pass 
on" (p. 81). Van Dijk (1993a) suggests that both textbooks 
and the introductory classes in which they are used be 
regarded as the initial encounter students have with the 
"goals, concepts, ideas and theories of their discipline ... 
therefore, textbooks not only express the scholarly views of 
their authors, but obviously shape those of their student-
readers" (van Dijk, 1993a, p. 165). Thus, introductory 
textbooks in education have been characterized as providing 
a kind of "grammar" (Luke, 1995) for introducing preservice 
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teachers into the profession of teaching. 
Fourth, there is a need to investigate textbooks 
because they are problematic in several areas. Textbooks are 
critiqued on the level of genre for becoming "increasingly 
bland, simplistic, inaccurate, and obsolete" (Webb, 1995, 
p.1). They have been characterized as "slow in responding to 
paradigm shifts, changes in research foci, and challenges to 
time-honored theories" (Scheurman, et al., 1993 p. 100). Yet 
because of their ubiquity and longevity in the American 
educational system they are perceived to be a basic, 
fundamental, necessary, and neutral element in the teaching-
learning process. However, this view is flawed as textbooks 
despite their blandness are powerful. They carry the 
discourse of the discipline and, therefore, play a social 
role. This social role is significant and complex. Herein 
lies the deeper need to examine and interrogate the specific 
sort of discourse found in textbooks, particularly 
introductory educational psychology textbooks. 
Fifth, the issue of constraints needs to be addressed. 
While textbooks can be thought of as "collections of 
statements that make authoritative knowledge claims" 
(emphasis added, Cherryholms, 1988, p. 52), textbooks need 
to be appreciated as not just a compilation and articulation 
of "facts". Textbooks are "conceived, designed, and adhered 
to by real people with real interests" (Apple, 1991, p.2) 
who contend with real constraints, and who participate in 
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real relations of power. Even when we appreciate the 
"evolution" of textbooks as developed and adopted by members 
of the educational psychology community, it is naive to 
think of them in their origin, production, or use as 
neutral. Cherryholms (1989) has insisted that "Foucault 
shows textbooks to be political, material products that 
represent a privileged way of seeing things, privileged by 
means of power, position, tradition, and so forth" (p.61). 
At the heart of Foucault's insight regarding truth as 
"relational" are the constraints related to the production, 
sale, and use of textbooks. 
Constraints experienced by authors, manufacturers, and 
consumers are multiple; these constraints are economical, 
political, ideological, and personal. The witness of Naomi 
Silverman (1991), who has worked for years as an acquiring 
editor for a textbook publishing company, can assist our 
understanding. Silverman states that "textbooks are products 
that are manufactured and sold for the purpose of making a 
profit" (p.163). While other factors play a constraining 
role, such as interests of the author (Spring, 1991), 
research advances (Chall & Conard, 1990), course curricula, 
and trends. The "bottom line remains constant: Will the book 
make a profit for the company?" (Silverman, 1991, p.163). 
Silverman further argues that differences of opinion 
arise between author and editor over issues impacting 
marketability. This is not a new phenomenon rather it is a 
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recurring dilemma. She quotes from a 1936 book Are Teachers 
Free? to make her point regarding the continuing tension, 
"'He [sic] wants to tell the truth, and have his authors do 
the same. Yet he must sell books'" (quoted in Silverman, 
1991, p. 174). Young (1990) has the same focal point 
regarding economic constraints of textbooks when she asks, 
"How can you trust a profit-making industry to do what is 
best to create textbooks" (p. 72). Joel Spring (1991) 
recounts his experience of the "political and economic 
forces shaping textbooks" which he refers to as an aspect of 
"ideological management" (p. 186). Profit-making is not the 
only concern of textbook publishers, but it certainly is a 
major driving concern. 
The application of a critical analysis to the dominant 
discourse of educational psychology found in its textbooks 
springs not only from the fact that textbooks are important 
"pedagogic vehicles," but also that textbooks supply a 
succinct compilation of what the discipline considers to be 
its "heart". More importantly, critical discourse analysis 
must be applied because of the political, economic, and 
ideological nature of textbooks. Without this analysis the 
societal role of textbooks could remain invisible, and 
therefore, considered normative, neutral, objective, and 
"true" in the absolute sense. 
Critical Literacy and Intertextual Reading 
Literacy occupies a position of central importance in 
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this dissertation. Literacy is connected to reading and 
writing. However, there are several ways to look at these 
activities. Reading is sometimes understood in the 
mechanical sense of decoding sounds and words as one 
develops a skill that facilitates finding meaning in the 
text. The image of consumption is frequently connected with 
reading (Freire & Macedo, 1987). Readers are assigned the 
position of consumers of the text: readers "chew" and 
"swallow" (sometimes whole) the words and ideas of the 
textbooks; they struggle to digest the ideas; readers are 
encouraged to internalize what they have read, to make it 
part of them (Woolfolk, 1995). This is what is understood as 
functional literacy. Literacy in this view "very often 
becomes a matter of mastering technical skills, information 
or an elite notion of high-status knowledge" (Aronowitz & 
Giroux, 1991, p. 98). 
Teachers, from this perspective, simply serve as guides 
to students toward the proper interpretation and 
implementation of the text, as Scholes (1985) says, "so that 
the truth might stand revealed" (p. 13). If this is what it 
means to "read" then the text is given a reverential 
position as though it were "a vehicle for eternal truth" 
(Scholes, 1985, p. 13). 
This is a limited sense of reading and text, one that 
fits easily into a transmission model or banking notion of 
education (Freire, 1970/1995). This type of reading ha_s been 
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implicated in educational psychology textbooks as they are 
presented as authoritative texts, regarded as containing the 
paradigms around which the discipline is organized. There is 
a promise extended to students of the discipline that by 
learning, internalizing, and utilizing the material therein, 
they can become better teachers. However, Scholes insists 
that the worst thing teachers can do is to foster an 
attitude of reverence before texts as if the text were a 
vehicle for abiding truth. 
A critical discourse analysis takes up another sense of 
literacy. Textbooks are understood as social artifacts 
(Apple, 1991, 1993; Giroux & Aronowitz, 1991) connected to 
political, historical, economic, social con-texts in which 
they are located. In other words any text is involved in a 
web of other texts. Scholes (1985) expresses this view as 
intertextuality. There must be an examination of these other 
texts, of intertextuality. If the intertextuality is ignored 
or suppressed than the power of the text as a final 
authority is magnified. What results is a form of 
illiteracy. 33 
The perspective of this dissertation is that as 
33Harding (1996) makes a similar point in charging that 
if scientists and members of the dominant groups fail to read 
even natural science intertextually, as a text within contexts 
(e.g., racist and imperialist discourses) than a scientific 
illiteracy will continue to pervade the social order. 
Harding's (1996) volume is an example of counter-text 
exposing, contesting, recasting the mainstream scientific 
discourse. 
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educational psychologists we have to change the way we 
consider our work, i.e., teaching educational psychology. 
What this dissertation reflects is considering the teacher's 
work as analyzing and helping students to analyze the 
intertextuality of educational psychology. The focus needs 
to shift from the power of the text in isolation to 
recognizing that the discourses contained in educational 
psychology texts are connected to other texts, e.g., con-
texts, pre-texts. Necessarily then, the discourse presented 
by the text is a site of social struggle. Texts are meant to 
be engaged and criticized rather than consumed. 
Therefore, I am using reading as it has been identified 
as an active process (Freire, 1985, 1987; Scholes, 1985) of 
textual power. It is "a productive activity, the making of 
meaning, in which one is guided by the text one reads .•. but 
not simply manipulated by it (Scholes, 1985, p. 8). The 
position of the reader is understood as the one who makes 
meaning (Freire, 1985) of the word through a critical 
reading of the world. 
There is a pedagogy of textual power explained by 
Scholes (1985) that impacts what I learn and teach. Textual 
power has three forms of process. Initially, texts have 
power over students (and teachers), a power that is 
palpable. In the story that opens Chapter I the text we 
studied contained the discursive practice around which my 
student felt such constraint; she was limited by that which 
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empowered me. There is a stage of submission to the power of 
the text; this is obvious in my use of the text. I located 
myself within the text; I shared a semantic and syntactic 
field with the text; I understood and accepted the 
particular codes of the text (Scholes ,1985). These were 
what I was intent on introducing my students to throughout 
the course of educational psychology. 
The process of interpretation follows. This entails 
reading a text along with possible explanations. For 
example, the student who questioned the practice of pop-
quizzes subverted the surface power of the text by offering 
another interpretation. It could be argued that she did not 
know the codes; I tried to explain them to her. Another 
interpretation on what was happening in the exchange is 
available: i.e., she was exposing a "division of 
purpose ••. the return of the repressed" (Scholes, 1985, 
p.40). The "student" 34 was responding to the text from her 
own context, a beginning of intertextuality. The reader's 
own position forms an important context for reading. 
What I was learning was that there are many texts 
contained in and connected to the particular disciplinary 
text I was teaching, e.g., political. economic, historical 
con-texts; these produce various interpretations. They 
become obvious in the codes presented by the text. And this 
34Again, the use of quotes indicates my understanding of 
irony. Clear definitions of "student" and "teacher" ar~ often 
blurred. 
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is the point of the dissertation and my teaching, i.e., "to 
study the intertextual system of relations that connects one 
text to others" (Scholes, 1985, p. 31). 
The third phase of textual power is criticism. Scholes 
(1985) explains criticism as text against text; criticism 
"provides important opportunities to break with dominant 
readings and interpretations" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 158). 
criticism is possible with the differentiation of "the 
subjectivity of the critic from that of the author, [it is] 
an assertion of another textual power against that of the 
primary text" (Scholes, 1985, p. 40). Through the act of 
writing criticism presents a counter-text, a talking-back 
discussed in Chapter II. Scholes notes that criticism 
"begins with the recognition of textual power and ends in 
the attempt to exercise it" (p. 41) through writing. 
Teaching students how to recognize the codes of a 
particular text, to analyze them intertextually and present 
criticism, seems a more appropriate task for teachers. A 
more complex understanding of learning entails the ability 
to break with oppressive and unjust systems, and a language 
of hope and possibility becomes a critical aspect of the 
learning situation. Teachers can help students access the 
skills "they will need in order to define and shape the 
modern world, rather than simply serve in it" (Aronwitz & 
Giroux, 1991, p. 108). 
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Choice of "Classic" Textbooks 
In order to perform the process of critical discourse 
analysis it is important to read the dominant or mainstream 
discourse of the discipline. This dominant discourse is 
found in mainstream texts, those held in high regard and 
used frequently by those who are involved in teaching the 
discipline. 
In the Spring of 1995 a survey (see Appendix A) was 
sent to a random sample of 210 members of the American 
Psychological Association - Division 15, Educational 
Psychology. The purpose of the survey was to have members of 
the educational psychology community nominate textbooks used 
in introductory classes considered to contain the mainstream 
discourse of the field. The intention in asking this 
particular group for information was to gather an "emic" 
perspective, an insider's view (Foster, 1994), of the field. 
A return rate of 63% of the surveys was realized. The 
two textbooks receiving the most nominations were chosen for 
the critical discourse analysis. They are: Educational 
Psychology (1995, 6th ed.) by Anita Woolfolk and Educational 
Psychology (1991, 5th ed.) by Nathan L. Gage and David L. 
Berliner. The complete survey results appear in Appendix B. 
CHAPTER IV 
TOWARD A POSTSTRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The work of this dissertation began with a questioning 
of the discipline of educational psychology as I encountered 
it in teaching introductory courses to preservice teachers. 
What I had accepted as "real", "stable", "true", and 
"neutral" within the discipline's knowledge-base I gradually 
began to read as a "reflection of conventions" (Kincheloe, 
1993) imbued with political interests. As I became more 
aware of the way power and knowledge implicate each other I 
began to critique educational psychology's mainstream 
discourse as a "regime of truth" (Foucault, 1980c). 
This chapter describes a critical reading and analysis 
of the mainstream discourse of the discipline of educational 
psychology. Through the survey described in Chapter III two 
educational psychology textbooks, Educational Psychology by 
Gage and Berliner (1991, 5th edition) and Educational 
Psychology by Woolfolk (1995, 6th edition), were nominated 
by the educational psychology community as the "classic" 
texts of the field. These texts supplied the dominant 
discourse analyzed in this chapter and the next. 
Two aspects of the discipline of educational psychology 
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were examined in the course of the critical discourse 
analysis: (1) the disciplinary principles that form the 
internal features and particular rationality of educational 
psychology's discourse; and, (2) the non-discursive aspects 
of the discipline including the political and social 
networks in which the discourse is embedded (Welch, 1985). 
These aspects are described briefly in this introduction. 
Disciplinary Principles 
Disciplinary principles are apparent in the particular 
rationality, i.e., technical rationality, of the discipline. 
Technical rationality is evident in the rules, relations, 
and regularities which lie just below the surface of the 
discourse. Technical rationality provides the meaning-making 
system, a kind of internal regulation (Foucault, 1972), of 
the discipline of educational psychology. This internal 
regulation is generally considered a resource of the 
discipline as it provides a "grounding" for the discipline's 
perspective. It is powerful in that it influences thought 
and by extension the knowledge and practice of the 
discipline itself. 
However, while the internal system of the discourse may 
be considered a resource from a particular standpoint, it 
also presents problematics when read critically. 
Problematics can remain invisible if the technical 
rationality of the discipline is "taken-for-granted" and 
becomes transparent or invisible, or is considered 
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"natural". Usher (1993) aptly describes educational 
psychologists as "enfolded (emphasis added) in an implicit 
conception of disciplines as neutral bodies of knowledge" 
(p. 17). It is possible that educational psychologists are 
caught in our own unself-reflexive scientism. Educational 
psychologists remain prisoners of the discourse unless we 
gain access to its constitutive forces. 
Through a critical reading and analysis disciplinary 
principles and problematics can be made explicit and 
interrogated. Viewed from a critical perspective the science 
of the discipline in general as well as its truth claims do 
not cease to exist; instead, "they become representations 
that need to be problematized rather than accepted as 
received truths" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 75). 
This section of the chapter is an appropriation of 
Foucault's (1972) notion of archeology, i.e., an 
investigation of the human sciences as systems of knowledge. 
Archaeology has been described as a "critical investigation 
of disciplinary systems of knowledge with the goal of 
understanding the discursive practices that produce those 
systems of knowledge" (Prado, 1995, p. 25). Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1983) emphasize that Foucault's aim was "to 
rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became 
possible" (p. 17). Once this is understood it is possible to 
begin to think differently, and to understand "what what we 
do does" (Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 
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187). 
Non-Discursive Aspects 
The non-discursive aspects of the discipline are 
discussed in the second section of the chapter. Non-
discursive aspects pertain to the "background practices" 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983), the human activity and 
institutional processes operating within the discipline 
(Foucault, 1972) as well as those within which the 
discipline operates. These include the social, political, 
economic, and historical contexts and contingencies of the 
discipline that are prior to the "truth" of the discipline 
and are potent in the hegemonic35 construction of the 
discourse. For example, educational psychologists persevere 
in the belief that the discourse is developed and controlled 
through rigorous scientific activity (Cherryholms, 1988) 
that yields a body of knowledge able to be put to 
progressive use in education. Yet this commonsense 
assumption can "work behind our backs in powerful and 
35This term has a complex etymology. It is used here in 
the sense of Antonio Gramsci (1971) to explain the dynamic of 
how some groups come to rule over other groups. static and 
passive subordination is not the form of domination implied by 
this term. Rather, it "presupposes an active and practical 
involvement of the hegemonized groups" (Forgacis, 1988, 
p.424). In other words, an important aspect of dominant groups 
maintaining their control and privilege is through the consent 
and support of other members of the society (Leistyna, et al., 
1996). Van Dijk (1993) defines the term thus: "If the minds of 
the dominated can be influenced in such a way that they accept 
dominance, and act in the interest of the powerful but of 
their own free will, we use the term hegemony" (emphasis 
original, p. 255). 
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constraining ways" (Gitlin, 1990, p. 444). By ignoring the 
various power relationships in which the discipline is 
embedded, the relationships that enable and facilitate the 
discipline's discourse and practices (Cherryholms, 1988), it 
is possible to take as natural and necessary, as 
transcendental truth, that which is actually of our own 
making. As Gergen (1985) insists, "a given understanding 
that prevails ... is not fundamentally dependent on the 
empirical validity of the perspective in question, but on 
the viscidities of social processes" (p. 268). All the 
things that are said through the discipline's dominant 
discourse, what metaphors and values are endorsed, what 
remains unsaid, and what is marginalized are actually the 
result of social negotiations and power relationships more 
than rigorous scientific activity. As Thomas (1997) points 
out what is considered knowledge is "what is agreed to be 
correct rather than the product of compelling 
justifications" (p. 92). 
The analysis presented in this chapter and the next is 
meant to be illustrative of a critical poststructuralist 
analysis. As reflected in discussions in the preceding 
chapters this analysis is facilitated by an oppositional 
reading, necessarily partial, and coming from a particular 
social and political location, i.e., it assumes and 
acknowledges a situated knowledge (Haraway, 1991/1988; 
Harding, 1991; Collins, 1990). It is by no means exhaustive. 
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It is meant as a counter-discourse, and serves to "talk-
back" to and.de-naturalize the dominant discourse of 
educational psychology. It represents a sample, not a 
synopsis of all possible critiques (Murphy, 1993). 
Disciplinary Principles 
What Is A "Discipline"? 
"Disciplines"36 are generally considered "neutral, 
scientifically validated bodies of knowledge whose ..• effects 
are enlightening and empowering and which thus enable 
effective action" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 48). David 
Berliner (Berliner & Rosenshine, 1987) a preeminent 
educational psychologist and co-author of a "classic" 
textbook37 , expresses confidence in the discourse of the 
discipline as a body of knowledge marked with an empowering 
character. He asserts: 
I think that in the past few years we have come closer 
than ever before to providing direct scientific 
underpinnings for the art of teaching. In some cases, 
the need for highly inventive, creative minds has been 
lessened, as research provides ideas and technology 
that are almost directly applicable to classroom life. 
(emphasis original, 1987, p. 3) 
He continues: 
We now have something that an ordinary person does not 
have - a knowledge-base consisting of facts, concepts, 
and technology that can transform our profession .... 
Knowledge is clearly power, a kind of social power. 
36This is one sense of the word "discipline", another 
understanding of the word is addressed in Chapter v. 
37Ref erence to a "classic" text indicates one of the two 
texts introduced in Chapter III, Gage & Berliner, 1991 or 
Woolfolk, 1995. 
107 
(p. 31) 
These quotations of Berliner represent the discipline 
as producing a body of systematized knowledge which is 
cumulative, is produced through the scientific practice of a 
specific group of persons, and is marked by a faith that it 
is able to be applied in positive ways to the practice of 
teaching. These tenets are implicated throughout the classic 
texts of the discipline of educational psychology. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) have stated in the preface 
that the purpose of the textbook is: 
to give prospective and practicing educators ... an 
introduction to what educational psychology can provide 
by way of facts, concepts, principles, and research 
methods that will be both theoretically enlightening 
and practically useful. We want our students to take 
what we present as theory and put it into use in their 
classrooms. (p. xvii) 
Woolfolk (1995) similarly tells readers that: 
the major goal of this book is to provide you with the 
best and the most useful theories for teaching - those 
that have solid evidence behind them ...• [these 
theories] are ways of understanding the challenges that 
teachers face. (pp. 16-17) 
Discourses As Sites of Struggle 
Textbooks typically present the mainstream discourse of 
disciplines (explained in Chapter III). A discourse is 
important in poststructuralist research but for reasons 
other than those traditionally stated. Poststructuralists 
are skeptical that knowledge can be systematized as 
knowledge claims are considered local, partial, and always 
permeated with power and normative interests (Usher & 
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Edwards, 1994); claims of neutrality are always suspect as 
discourses, even scientific ones, act in the interests of 
some over others. Therefore, the work of discourse analysis 
is undertaken not because discourses are understood as 
delivering "truth"; rather, they are engaged because their 
"truth" is seen as relational, situated, and partial (Gore & 
Luke, 1992), and needs to be exposed and critiqued as such. 
Thus, discourses are sites of encounter and struggle. 
McNay (1994) explains: 
Discourses and meaning are the site of social struggle. 
The process through which hegemonic social relations 
are achieved and maintained often involves the 
stabilization of discursive relations and the fixation 
of meaning .... Similarly, resistance to hegemonic 
meaning entails the contestation and disruption of 
naturalized forms of discourse. (emphasis added, p. 75) 
The discourse of educational psychology is recognized as a 
site of social struggle; it is with this recognition that 
one is able to enter the dialogue, 38 to debate, and offer 
criticism which "provides important opportunities to break 
with dominant readings and interpretations" (Cherryholms, 
1988, p. 158). 
38Freire (1970/1992) insists that education that is 
liberatory must also be dialogic, thus "dialogue becomes a 
continuing aspect of liberating acting" (p. 134). The dialogue 
he is ref erring to is very different from everyday talk or 
conversation; it is "a process of learning and knowing [that] 
must always involve a political project with the objective of 
dismantling oppressive structures and mechanisms prevalent 
both in education and society" (Freire & Macedo, 1995/1996, p. 
203). 
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Rationality of a Discipline: Ideology 
Chapter III states that a hallmark of modernity is 
entrusting "reason" as the way to know the "truth", 
ascertaining universal laws through which order may be 
maintained. Reason was/is understood as "the source of 
progress in knowledge and society, as well as the privileged 
locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge" 
(Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 2). Rationality is evident in the 
particular views of knowledge, set of interests, beliefs, 
expectations, meanings, and methodological forms of inquiry 
that are held by a person or group (Giroux, 1983a). 
Rationality is the means by which a person or group puts the 
world in order. In other words, rationality is the sense-
making activity of a particular community evidenced in the 
community's discursive formation. The dominant discourse of 
educational psychology has a particular rationality as do 
other examples of discourse39 • 
Ideology as sense-making activity. This sense-making 
function of rationality is akin to a meaning of "ideology". 
Yet, words like "ideology" are seldom part of the 
discussions regarding disciplines in the social sciences 
such as educational psychology. The assumed neutrality of 
the science eschews words like ideology often considered in 
a pejorative sense; it is something another group subscribes 
39The feminist standpoint epistemology discussed in 
Chapter II provides a helpful example. 
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to, while "we" have, or at least search objectively for, the 
truth (Burbules, 1995). The way it forms specific 
perspectives, influences work and relationships, or its 
usefulness is easily overlooked. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter, another possible reason 
educational psychologists rarely consider the ideology of 
the discipline is that we are so embedded in it that we take 
the sense-making activity of the discipline as "natural". 
The ideology to which I am ref erring is that which 
permeates social life, it is something in which we all 
participate (Giroux, 1983a). It is evidenced in "the 
production and representation of ideas, values, and beliefs 
and the manner in which they are expressed and lived out by 
both individuals and groups" (McLaren, 1989, p.176). Van 
Dijk (1993) explains ideologies as "the fundamental social 
cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values 
of groups" (p. 258). This "sense making" characteristic of 
ideology is important as it is involved in the "production, 
consumption, and representation of meaning" (Giroux, 1983b, 
p.16). This is the sense of "ideology" I am concerned with 
here, rather than with specific political ideologies, such 
as of socialism, communism, or conservatism (Giroux, 1983b). 
Ideology and struggle. There is another characteristic 
of ideology that gives it significance as well; ideology's 
potency only "becomes clear when it is linked to the 
concepts of struggle" (Giroux, 1983b, p. 16). A critique of 
111 
ideology, therefore, serves to present the interests of some 
persons in dialectical relationship to the advantage of 
others. This is why a critique is "useful and necessary ... 
because it helps identify the struggles that are central" 
(Sarup, 1996, p. 70). 
The dynamic of the struggle to be considered along with 
rationality is expressed through the "problematic" (Giroux, 
1981, 1983a). The problematic represents a questioning of an 
assumption or belief communicated in the discourse. 
Problematics have the added dimension in that they also 
raise questions regarding what is not expressed in the 
discourse, or what has been silenced by the discourse. In 
this way problematics reveal "the ideological source that 
lies beneath the choice of what is considered important and 
unimportant in a mode of thinking" (Giroux, 1981, p. 9). 
That is, the way things are understood impacts the kind of 
questions that seem intelligible or important, and, at the 
same time, puts other questions outside the realm of 
comprehension or reasonableness. These unfathomable 
questions if taken seriously could transform our basic 
assumptions {Giroux, 1983a); they form a counter-discourse 
to the dominant ideology. Therefore, problematics are raised 
and seriously considered in this dissertation. 
The Rationality of Educational Psychology 
A particular rationality "grounds" the dominant 
discourse of the discipline of educational psychology found 
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in the classic texts. This can be explained as a technical 
rationality that is obvious from a close reading of the 
codes found in the texts of the discourse. Technical 
rationality is understood as "an epistemology of practice 
derived from positivist philosophy" (Schon, 1987, p. 3). It 
has been described as indicative of embeddedness in a 
"culture of positivism" by Giroux (1981) as it is based 
"upon the logic of scientific methodology with its interest 
in explanation, prediction, and technical control •.. " (p. 
42). As the natural sciences provide the model for its 
theoretical development (Giroux, 1983a), it is 
understandably explained as a "normal-science version of 
social science" (Schon, 1995); it allows for a kind of 
"scientific management" (Kincheloe, 1993) of education. 
Technical rationality rests in modernist need to 
control and bring order to an objective world. It operates 
through interrelated assumptions expressed by Giroux 
(1983a): (1) Control is the goal of technical rationality 
(and therefore, educational psychology's goal), and is made 
possible through the application of educational theory, or 
law-like propositions, derived from empirical research; (2) 
discovery of causation is possible and makes credible the 
possibility of prediction and control; (3) the knowledge 
derived from this inquiry is value-free and represents 
neutral, objective reality; (4) since knowledge is reduced 
from data that are value-free, educators using its knowledge 
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act in a value-free manner. 
Technical rationality is evidenced not only in the 
discourse of the texts; it is built into the structures and 
practices of modern educational activity, and educational 
institutions themselves (Boland, 1995; Schon, 1995; Usher & 
Edwards, 1994). In the following discussion: 1) evidence 
will be presented to show how technical rationality pervades 
the discourse of educational psychology (Giroux, 1981) as 
expressed in its classic texts; and 2) the problematics 
provoked by this perspective will be presented. 
Control and the Possibility of Causation 
The purpose of gaining control of the educational 
experience is central to educational psychology's discourse 
found in classic textbooks (i.e., Gage & Berliner, 1991; 
Woolfolk, 1995). Gage and Berliner (1991) explain that the 
"objectives of educational psychology, like those of any 
science, are to explain, predict, and control the phenomena 
with which it is concerned" (p. 16). Hence, educational 
psychology is intent on controlling the processes of 
teaching and learning. Scientific research is the means by 
which control of educational settings is thought possible. 
The primacy of scientific research. The fundamental 
position of scientific research and theory building is clear 
throughout both classic texts; several examples are 
presented. 
Both texts provide a defense against the position that 
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educational psychology is merely an exercise in 
"commonsense". This defense operates to answer the 
historical critique that educational psychology is "putting 
what everybody knows in language which nobody can 
understand" (Welton, 1912, quoted in Grinder, 1970, p. 4). 
Gage and Berliner (1991) assert that research in educational 
psychology, like research in the social sciences in general, 
is of high quality. Despite popular belief to the 
contrary, the consistency of results compares favorably 
with that of the physical sciences .••. The relationship 
between variables often are even stronger than those on 
which some medical practice is based. (p. 28) 
In a similar manner, Woolfolk (1995) highlights the 
research of educational psychology in contrast to 
commonsense. She comments that "frequently the principles 
set forth by educational psychologists - after spending much 
thought, research, and money - sound pathetically obvious. 
People are tempted to say ••• 'Everyone knows that!'" (p. 11). 
She alerts readers that there is a "danger" in thinking that 
"educational psychologists spend a lot of time discovering 
the obvious .••. When a principle is stated in simple terms it 
can sound simplistic" (p.13). Readers are warned that it is 
not a case of what "sounds sensible" but "what is 
demonstrated when the principle is put to the test" (Gage, 
1991, quoted in Woolfolk, 1995, p. 13). 
It is interesting to note that despite the attempt to 
differentiate and privilege "scientific research" over 
commonsense theorizing there appears a contradiction in that 
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commonsense is called upon frequently to witness to a shared 
understanding: e.g., "Everyone knows what intelligence is." 
(Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 51); "Everyone knows what 
motivation is, how it makes a difference between resentful 
boredom at one extreme and ravenous interest at the other" 
(p.326). Commonsense understandings are an important 
characteristic of hegemony. Even as the scientific basis of 
the discipline is defended, it is imperative that at some 
point the knowledge claims of educational psychology appear 
"so correct that to reject them would be unnatural, a 
violation of commonsense" (McLaren, 1989, p.175). Hegemony 
takes hold when that which appeals to commonsense is 
accepted as universal truth (Giroux & Purpel, 1983). 
Woolfolk (1995) notes that "research is the primary 
tool" (p. 16) for understanding teaching and learning. 
Toward this end 
descriptive studies and experimental research can 
provide valuable information to teachers. Correlations 
allow you to predict events that are likely to occur in 
the classroom; experimental studies can help indicate 
cause-and-effect relationships and should help you to 
implement useful changes. (p. 20) 
This confidence in scientific method is reiterated in an 
appendix titled "Research in Educational Psychology" which 
is provided because students "must know how information in 
the field is created" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 588). 
There are limitations placed on what may be said and 
not said through the discipline by privileging scientific 
research over other forms of knowledge. For example, the 
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possibility of a complaint by some "parents in low-income 
areas, whose children often tend to do poorly on 
intelligence tests" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 72) is 
recognized. Gage and Berliner (1991) explain that these 
parents may "believe that teachers and school systems hold 
hereditarian views [regarding intelligence]. And they [the 
parents] believe these views lead educators to stop trying 
to help their children" (p. 72). 
The perspective that parents offer as the result of 
their own personal knowledge is discounted by citing a 1967 
survey reporting that only "6% of American adults, and only 
1 and 2 percent of students and teachers believed that 
intelligence tests measure only inborn intelligence" (Gage & 
Berliner, 1991, p. 72). The evidence of this 1967 research 
study is used to nullify the possibility of merit in an 
argument coming from personal knowledge of a group. The 
issue of a twenty-five year old piece of research used to 
quell contemporary dissatisfaction is but one issue of 
critique and will be addressed in the problematics section. 
"Neutral" Knowledge 
In a discourse based on technical rationality, 
knowledge is treated as value-free, representing neutral, 
objective reality. This is an indispensable tenet of the 
scientific method. Understandably, then it follows that 
teachers using the discipline's knowledge are judged as 
acting in neutral and objective ways. 
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Gage and Berliner (1991) are clear in stating that the 
act of teaching, in general, is not value-free as "teachers 
must combine insights from educational psychology with 
ethical thinking about what is good for their students and 
for society" (p. 7). However, they also emphasize that 
ethical discussions are not the concern of their text: 
But educational psychology, and hence this book, is 
most concerned with the teaching and learning processes 
in classrooms. More precisely, we deal primarily with 
the problems that arise in carrying out the tasks of 
teaching. (p. 7) 
They explain that the style of writing found in this 
textbook, "like most textbooks is •.. neutral and 
dispassionate" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 7). 
Similarly, Woolfolk (1996) reflecting on her purpose in 
writing textbooks, contends that while other educational 
psychologists have course goals which include deepening 
students' "social and ethical understandings •.• [or] capacity 
to be planful and reflective" (p.41) she has other goals 
which she considers the "heart" of the course. For Woolfolk 
the "main goal •.• is to help perspective teachers understand, 
value, and use the knowledge and processes of educational 
psychology" (p. 41). 
An assurance is expressed that better teaching can 
result through learning and applying educational psychology. 
Woolfolk (1995) states: "If you can become a more expert 
learner by applying the knowledge from this text ..• then you 
will be a better teacher as well" (p. 10). Woolfolk (1995) 
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explains that expert teachers, "like expert dancers or 
gymnasts, have mastered a number of moves or routines that 
they can perform easily, almost without thinking (emphasis 
added, p. 5). Consider Berliner's quote at the beginning of 
this section, "In some cases, the need for highly inventive, 
creative minds has been lessened ..• " (Berliner, 1987, p. 3). 
The teacher's role is to "orchestrate (emphasis added) 
materials, tasks, environments, conversations, and 
explorations •.. " (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 17). 
Problematics 
The discussion of technical rationality has the purpose 
of exposing the sense-making activity of the discourse of 
the discipline, understood as its particular rationality. 
Because discourses are recognized as sites of social 
struggle they need to be interrogated. This interrogation is 
necessary not just to argue or clarify on the level of 
ideas, but because theoretical choice has implications for 
practice40 (Luke & Gore, 1992). Problematics will now be 
posed regarding: (1) the relationship of theory and 
practice; (2) a reductionist focus of the discipline; (3) 
teachers' role; (4) the limitation of questions and 
behaviorism; (5) the possibility of neutral, value-free 
knowledge. 
40A direct analysis and critique of educational 
psychology's practices is the theme of Chapter v. 
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Relationship of Theory and Practice 
There is an implicit understanding that the theory 
generated in the name of educational research is able to be 
applied directly to the practice of education. This is 
especially clear in each of the classic textbooks in that 
disciplinary knowledge is placed in a foundational position 
to the practice of teaching. "We have presented a view of 
educational psychology as a foundation discipline that helps 
to accomplish the tasks of teaching" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, 
P. 47); "My goal in writing this book .... so you will have 
the foundation for becoming an expert" (Wookfolk, 1995, 
p.18). Thus, both the vital role that disciplinary knowledge 
plays (Giroux, 1981), and the one-way relationship of 
theory-to-practice (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) are highlighted in 
these classic textbooks. 
Many of the criticisms of the foundational 
understanding of the relationship of theory and practice 
regard the decontextualized learning of theories and 
concepts applying them directly to practice (Anderson, et 
al., 1995). The theoretical knowledge is sometimes judged to 
be inaccessible and too "scientific" for practitioners. Yet, 
the foundational model has proved to be resistant to 
arguments leveled against it. 41 Despite criticisms it has 
41This understanding of educational psychology as 
"foundational" has been the subject of much debate with the 
educational psychological community. See, for example,. Doyle 
(1990). From outside educational psychology Schon (1983, 1987) 
has presented an interrogation of the foundational model. 
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been difficult to disassociate from the "formative power" 
psychology has had on education (Usher & Edwards, 1994). 
What is it that the foundational model provides that keeps 
it viable in the midst of so much criticism? 
The foundational metaphor is meant to convey a sense of 
security in that "grounding our thinking about practice on a 
simplified and scientifically accurate foundation should 
make it more comprehensible and reliable" (Doyle & Carter, 
1996, p. 24). The need for security is heightened as the 
practice of teaching is recognized as a serious and complex 
enterprise. This is the optimistic message expressed in both 
classic textbooks and the dominant discourse of the 
discipline in general. 
The foundational way of thinking about the knowledge of 
the discipline also serves to establish a certain 
hierarchial order within the discipline. A foundational 
approach distances those who do research from those who 
teach it and from those who learn it and eventually apply it 
to practice. By privileging theoretical knowledge over the 
practical knowledge of teachers, students, and parents the 
conventional power arrangements within the educational 
process are supported (Cherryholms, 1988). Also supported 
are the inequalities constructed by its knowledge claims in 
a way "so powerful it is almost invisible" (Cherryholms, 
1988, p. 98). These issues will be taken up in Chapter v. 
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Reductionist Focus 
Technical rationality's objective to gain control 
through mastery of theory is advanced when variables are 
understood as being able to be manipulated in the interest 
of bringing about "a certain state of affairs or to prevent 
its occurrence" (Giroux, 1981, p. 43). In order to complete 
experimental activities through which theories and 
principles can be formulated, variables needed to be reduced 
to simplest terms. Reductionism is to "simplify a particular 
phenomenon so as to mask its complexity" (Leistyna et al., 
1996, p. 36). Necessarily, this directs attention toward the 
"trivial - on that which can be easily measured by empirical 
instruments" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 129). The "illusion" of 
certainty in practice is supported, but as Kincheloe (1993) 
remarks, "[r]arely do the most significant questions of 
human affairs lend themselves to empirical quantification 
and the pseudocertainty that often accompanies numbers" (p. 
129). 
A plain example of reductionist thinking is found in 
the material regarding writing objectives that are 
categorized as cognitive, affective, or psychomotor. Both 
texts recognize the impossibility of separating these areas 
from each other: "none of these kinds of activities is 
isolated from the others •••. the three types of objectives 
are intertwined" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, pp. 42-43); "In 
real life, of course, behaviors from these three domains 
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occur simultaneously" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 447). However, 
they are separated in these texts, because "it often is 
useful to focus on one at a time" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 
43). Useful? For whom? This distinction, "devised by a group 
of educational measurement experts" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, 
p. 43), is a "fiction that we tell to make our lives as 
educators simpler" (Apple, 1994, p. x). These distinct 
categories have made their way into the realm of commonsense 
understanding of educational psychology, and they are 
examples of simplistic ways to understand very complex 
phenomena. 
An important issue in this criticism is the emphasis on 
the efficiency of action, or the "means", by which the 
control is produced, not on the value of the goal of the 
practice itself. This implies a separation of factual 
information intended to facilitate teaching from questions 
of values that is indicative of technical rationality's 
objective in gaining control through mastery of theory. The 
concern is with how to do things, and how to do them more 
efficiently, not with what should be done (Sarup, 1993) as 
teachers internalize the logic of efficiency. 
Teachers As Functional Problem-Solvers 
Teachers-as-problem-solvers is a favorite role of 
teachers expressed in classic texts: 
Whatever your situation, the tasks you must accomplish 
raise problems that teachers have always had to face. 
And these problems arise in some form from the first 
day and every day you teach •••• Educational psychology 
serves teachers ... by helping them deal with these 
problems. (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p.7) 
Woolfolk (1995) highlights this bias by playing off 
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Schon's (1983) call for a more "reflective practitioner". As 
Woolfolk is discussing the "artistry" of teaching and the 
need of teachers to be reflective, inventive, and creative 
she suggests that her readers might find this discussion "a 
bit idealistic and abstract" (p. 9). She then submits that 
"[r]ight now, you may have other, more down to earth, 
concerns about becoming a teacher. You are not alone!" (p. 
9). The more pertinent concerns of beginning teachers 
include: "maintaining classroom discipline, motivating 
students, accommodating differences among students, 
evaluating students' work, dealing with parents" (p. 10). 
And these are the issues of educational psychology. Students 
of the discipline are told that "by applying the knowledge 
from this text ... you will be a better teacher" (p. 10). 
Anything that keeps teachers from their task of efficiently 
solving technical problems is apparently considered 
superfluous. 
Two important themes can be inferred from Woolfolk's 
(1995) discussion. First, the "real" concerns of teachers 
are defined and delimited by those who write the texts. 
These are the issues in which educational psychology can be 
useful to teachers; these are the problems and solutions 
addressed in the text that are to be learned and 
internalized by readers. Second, focus is directed away from 
the need of teachers to be reflective about the work that 
they do and the ends for which teachers teach. The focus 
becomes the means of problem solving. 
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Kincheloe (1993) refers to the "how-to" emphasis as an 
example of "crude practicality" that characterizes so many 
technically oriented teacher education programs. Cherryholms 
(1988) alerts us to a "vulgar pragmatism" which is 
"instrumentally and functionally reproducing accepted 
meanings and conventional organizations, institutions, and 
ways of doing things for good or ill" (p. 151). Teachers in 
this perspective are seen primarily as instrumental problem-
solvers (Schon, 1987) who "select technical means best 
suited to a particular purpose" (p. 3). This image of 
teachers constructs a specific view by which a "technical 
ethos is created which eventuates in .•• a constricted view of 
teacher cognition, which reduces the act of teaching to 
merely a technique" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 10). 
It is ironic (outrageous) that through an enculturation 
into the discipline, through internalizing the mindset of 
educational psychology, teachers could become complicitous 
in their own de-skilling (Apple, 1993; Giroux, 1983a; 
Kincheloe, 1993; Macedo, 1994). Teachers do not have to 
become so "malleable and powerless that they submit to their 
own victimization" (Giroux & Purpel, 1983). People do have 
and can be encouraged to develop a sense of the social, 
political, and historical contexts in considering the 
mainstream discourse of this discipline. Teachers can be 
self-reflexive and realize that there are multiple texts 
that support and facilitate (or contest and interrogate) 
particular meaning-making systems. 
Limiting of Questions 
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Technical rationality limits the kind of questions that 
may be considered legitimate within the discipline. 
Questions are confined to those that have a specifically 
technical solution, those that can be addressed through 
scientific research. Questions about these "problems" that 
teachers face have to be handled within an empiricist 
tradition and, therefore, need to be reduced to variables 
that are treated in isolation. This manner of thinking 
"creates a form of tunnel vision in which only a small 
segment of social reality is open to examination" (Giroux, 
1981, p. 46). Ignoring complexities is in sync with Edward 
L. Thorndike's (1910) recommendation in an early educational 
psychology textbook. He stated in a discussion of laws of 
learning that, "The complexities of human learning will in 
the end be best understood if at first we avoid them" (p. 
6). 
Beside limiting questions to those that can have 
technical solutions, questions are also transformed or 
recast as problems with technical solutions. Thus, issues 
regarding the social, cultural, and political situations 
that arise in educational institutions and classroom life 
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are explained through "neutral" scientific means. This 
allows for a very subtle entrenchment of hegemony as 
scientific justification provides for the ideal solution to 
ideological problems (Apple, 1990). 
Problems dealing with diversity in tracking, for 
example, are managed as scientific issues. Through the use 
of scientific technologies of testing of "intelligence" 
the differential control of access to high status knowledge 
is not seen as a power play of agents of the dominant 
culture, but rather rationalized as the commonsense dealing 
with the varying abilities of students. Some of these points 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Behaviorism as exemplar. Behaviorism is so effective in 
advancing the empiricist perspective of technical 
rationality in that it is concerned with efficiently 
controlling the environment through the manipulation of 
discrete (and often minute) variables. A commitment to a 
behavioral perspective is presented as a commitment to 
efficiency and effectiveness, but it can also express a 
commitment to control, manipulation, and vulgar pragmatism 
(Cherryholms, 1988). 
Classic texts manifest their behavioral proclivities in 
the perspective they present in several areas. Although 
theories other than behavioral ones are covered to some 
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extent, 42 the preponderance of space and endorsement is 
afforded to the behavioral perspective. A small sampling 
communicates this bias. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) provide a good illustration in 
their definition of "learning", "a process whereby an 
organism changes behavior as a result of experience" (p. 
225). They go on to state that 
it is the overt behaviors of talking, writing, moving 
and the like that allow us to study the cognitive 
behaviors that interest us - thinking, feeling, 
wanting, remembering ••.• The overt behaviors of the 
organism - pigeon or school-age child, dog or teacher 
are always our starting point. (p.225) 
Social interactions between teacher and students are 
described as "two or more people stimulating and responding 
to one another" (p. 503). The handling of a category of 
behavior described simply as "too much", "calls for 
extinction or punishment" (p. 511); behavior of the "too 
little" variety "calls for reinforcement, which strengthens 
behavior" (p. 512). 
Personality is described as "a concept derived from 
behavior. We see only behavior. But we create names43 for 
that behavior to talk about the different kinds of behavior 
42Most textbooks prepared for introductory courses do try 
to present a review of the various perspectives in the field. 
The bias of the author/s is sometimes stated explicitedly, 
i.e., Sprinthall and Sprinthall (1990) present "a 
developmental approach". Other textbooks have a more implicit 
bias. 
43The reif ication of social constructs will be addressed 
below. 
we notice" (p. 147). Gage and Berliner (1991) go on to 
explain that "we need to emphasize more that behavior is 
controlled, to a large degree, by the way rewards and 
punishments occur in the environment" (p. 148). 
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In the discussion of "motivation" the authors explain 
that their text explores "the operant-conditioning approach 
to the understanding and improvement. This approach 
concentrates on the environment - particularly the 
reinforcement contingencies in the environment" (p. 327). 
Despite a reliance on behaviorist psychology, Skinner is 
mentioned only in citations in Gage and Berliner (1991). The 
knowledge claims and practices of this perspective appear 
ahistorical or transhistorical with no mention of the social 
or political context that influenced its popularity in the 
40's and 50's in the United States. The role of teacher as 
"social engineer", which characterizes Skinner's theoretical 
perspective (Sprinthall & Sprinthall, 1990), might be 
unpalatable to teachers yet that is the implication of the 
behavioral approach. Although teachers should be able to 
evaluate and question theories, this is difficult to do 
because of the assumption of neutrality and objectivity, the 
authoritative tenor of the text, the limiting of questions, 
and the emphasis on problem-solving. 
The Question of Texts as Neutral and Value-Free 
Giroux (1981) comments that generally, values are-
dismissed as inappropriate for discussion from a perspective 
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of technical rationality. Questions of value must be 
eschewed within a technocratic worldview as values are 
thought to weaken the scientific process. Giroux (1981) 
explains: 
Information or 'data' taken from the subjective world 
of intuition, insight, philosophy and nonscientific 
theoretical frameworks is not acknowledged as being 
relevant. Values, then, appear as the nemeses of 
'facts', and are viewed at best, as interesting, and at 
worst, as irrational and subjective emotional 
responses. (p. 44) 
Although classic texts claim a stance of value-free 
neutrality they can be read as expressing very clear values, 
i.e., the values of the dominant culture. These values are 
presented as normative and natural. Value statements appear 
so frequently that their authors subvert their own claim 
(Cherryholms, 1988) to neutrality. Two examples are 
discussed below. 
Cost-effectiveness as value. Values are revealed in 
what is included and what is excluded from texts, and the 
type of rhetoric connected with issues. For example, Gage 
and Berliner (1991) expound on the effectiveness of small 
class size and cite studies supporting this assertion. They 
proceed to add another value factor, cost-effectiveness, to 
the discussion. They conclude: "Knowing that smaller classes 
are more effective and creating them are two different 
things. A major problem is cost" (p. 502). They report that 
it would cost $34.5 million to reduce class size by one, 
from 30 to 29. Readers are presented with the conclusion 
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that "reducing class size at all grade levels from 30 to 15, 
to obtain substantial improvement in education, would 
increase the cost even more" {p. 502). The unreported 
message is that this cost is more than "we" would want to 
pay. This position displays a stark comparison to the 
critique of the "savage inequalities" in funding educational 
resources exposed by Kozel (1991). It also assigns cost-
effectiveness as a premier value in education, over quality 
and equality. This value-laden assertion ignores the 
political issues related to the fact that some school 
districts can and some cannot "afford" small class size. In 
accepting as a matter of course that small class size is 
just not "feasible" inequality becomes "naturalized". The 
issue of how discourse can naturalize situations and 
qualities will be returned to later in the chapter. 
Differential treatment of students. Another example of 
values being very much an aspect of purportedly neutral 
texts is obvious in the discourse expressing the 
differential treatment of students. It is the discourse of 
scientifically solving problems, so characteristic of 
technical rationality, that allows discussions like the 
following to be viewed as acceptable within "neutral" 
discourses. 
Woolfolk {1995), for example, presents a discussion of 
between-class ability grouping as a way to make teaching 
"more appropriate for students" (emphasis added, p. 118). 
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However, the text states that there are several "problems" 
with the practice of ability grouping. Problems include: 
Lower ability classes seem to receive lower-quality 
instruction in general. Teachers tend to focus on 
lower-level objectives and routine procedures. There 
are more management problems. Teacher enthusiasm and 
enjoyment are less in the lower-ability classes .•.. 
[therefore] lower expectations are communicated to 
students. student self-esteem suffers almost as soon as 
the assignment to 'dummy' English or math is made. 
Attendance may drop along with self-esteem. The lower-
tracks often have a disproportionate number of 
minority-group and economically disadvantaged students, 
so ability grouping, in effect, becomes resegregation 
in school. (pp. 118-119) 
The problems connected with ability grouping are attributed 
to "difference in instruction and/or the teachers' negative 
attitudes" (p. 119). These problems are attributed to 
technical difficulties. Even with the listing of problems of 
such a profound nature, the practice of ability grouping 
itself is represented as neutral and remains unproblematic. 
The real violence done to students seems invisible or 
trivialized as this method of instruction is conceptualized 
as more appropriate. 
The importance of this issue is further minimized by 
lack of attention (it takes a single paragraph to report 
these negative effects) in examining the consequences of 
this grouping on students' daily lived experience of 
schooling. The complexities of the social struggles that 
produced the current configuration of practices and how 
these practices fit relations of ruling in the wider society 
(Rizvi, 1993) remains obscured. 
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Only if the instructor chooses to present the 
information in the background section located in the margins 
and printed in light blue (available only in the teacher's 
edition), is the educational psychology class offered a 
brief summary of a well known and important research 
program, Keeping Track: How Schools structure Ineguality. 
Originally published in 1985 by Jeannie Oakes44 , this 
research discusses the deleterious effects of ability-
grouping and tracking, and, more importantly, places the 
issue within its historical and social context. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) address the issue of ability 
grouping in a section titled "Coping with Individual 
Differences" (emphasis added, p. 449). The situation of 
individual differences among students is reported to have 
"complicated" the teacher's task (Gage & Berliner, 1991). 
The discourse presents certain individual differences as a 
"problem" to students of educational psychology, something 
that will need coping with and an issue that will complicate 
their life as a teacher. 
Again, a technical solution to the "problem" of 
individual differences is presented, and it is based on the 
44This work (Oakes, 1985) is itself problematic in that 
it uncritically theorizes from within a social reproductionist 
framework (see the discussion in Giroux & McLaren, 1988); 
still, it has the potential of opening the debate regarding 
tracking. The example is presented here to illustrate how 
research that voices objections to mainstream perspectives can 
be marginalized and/or used in unintended ways, yet at the 
same time included in the text. 
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assumption of innate ability: "to set each student to work 
on tasks appropriate to his or her particular abilities and 
interests .••. appropriate to the student's temperament .... to 
move each individual ahead at his or her own rate" (pp. 449-
450). Ability-grouping is presented as a step toward 
individualized instruction. The idea behind this method of 
instruction is that "teaching is more effective with 
students of similar ability" (emphasis added, p. 450); yet, 
it is noted that conflicting results have been reported 
regarding "achievement, self-concept, attitudes toward 
others, and behavior" (p. 450) in employing this teaching 
strategy. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) refer to the findings of the 
Oakes (1985) research (mentioned above). The text states in 
reference to this study that "ability grouping has been 
suspected, and often found guilty, of fostering social-class 
discrimination: Lower-income students wind up in one group; 
higher-income students in another" (p. 450). The assignment 
to low-track is even characterized as a "life sentence" 
(Gage & Berliner, 1991). Yet again, the procedure of 
ability-grouping of students itself remains unproblematic; 
it is characterized as a "plausible" way of coping "with 
individual differences in stable characteristics •.• ([e.g.,] 
scholastic abilities, interests)" (emphasis original, p. 
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450). 45 How is it that the discourse can reconcile this 
admission of negative effects as more effective? 
Contrastingly, another group of students receives quite 
a different presentation: 
Gifted and talented students contribute greatly to 
society and should be considered a precious human 
resource. Our investment in identifying and developing 
these students should at least rival - in interest, 
time, and money - the investment we make in gifted 
athletes. (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 217) 
Woolfolk (1995), like Gage and Berliner (1991), asserts the 
importance of providing for the special educational needs of 
"gifted" children". The characterization of gifted 
students by a former secretary of education as "our most 
neglected students" is repeated. Gifted programs formulate 
yet another "track" allocated for students who "contribute 
greatly to society and should be considered a precious human 
resource" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 217). These "remarkable 
individuals" (Woolfolk, 1995) are represented as a scarce 
commodity which must be developed for our national security 
and well-being (Sapon-Shevin, 1991). 
Through the discourse of educational psychology such 
differential treatment and valuing of children is authorized 
45Gage and Berliner (1991) provide research studies that 
they interpret as meaning: "for most people intelligence 
begins to be stable by age 7. By age 12, intelligence is very 
stable. The rank order of individuals in intelligence at age 
12 is much the same as their rank order at any subsequent age" 
( p. 58) • 
"See Sapon-Shevin (1993) for a critical analysis of the 
educational, political, and justice issues in which the 
category "gifted student" is embedded. 
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and perpetuated despite conflicting scientific results: 
i.e., ability- grouping does not work (Slavin, 1987), is not 
fair (Oakes, 1985), and is undemocratic (Giroux & McLaren, 
1988). Yet, the practice of ability grouping continues to 
appear reasonable and is accepted as tolerable from within 
the meaning-making system of the discipline. General 
acceptance of this practice as a commonsense way to organize 
schooling experiences is achieved through the work of the 
discourse. 
The discourse must construct the situation in such a 
way that the semblance of neutrality and meritocracy is 
upheld. 47 This understanding is promoted by assigning 
children to ability groups on the basis of the assumption of 
the biological reality 48 of innate ability, i.e., 
"intelligence""· Since innate ability can be determined 
through the use of "neutral" standardized tests the social 
stratification that results from this differential access to 
curriculums appears efficient, reasonable, and becomes 
"naturalized". The historical, social, and political 
47Deevers (1995) has made the point of the necessity of 
turning to an examination of the discourse in order to 
understand why tracking procedures persist despite their 
harmful effects to students. 
48See Haymes ( 1996) for a helpful discussion of how 
psychology and biology are conflated so that regressive social 
cognitions can be perpetuated. 
4911 Intelligence" as a social construct that has been 
reified, and thus treated as an entity that exists a priori, 
is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter v. 
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contexts in which students' access to curriculums is sorted 
and selected is cast as scientific and value-free. 
An uncritical reading of the dominant discourse 
contained in classic texts does not engage the complexity of 
meaning or examine the value-laden aspects of issues that 
are seen, at first glance, as "neutral" and acceptable. 
In contrast to the traditional understanding of the 
discipline's discourse as a neutral body of information a 
critical reading presents the discourse of educational 
psychology as a site of struggle. Meanings in the discourse 
can be contested and struggled over, and they are. Yet, the 
dominant discourse prevails. To more fully understand why 
the discourse exists as it does it is necessary to look 
beyond disciplinary principles to the "effects of power 
[that] shape a discursive practice" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 
59). The effects of power are infused in the non-discursive 
background practices, that precede the text and talk of 
educational psychology. They are the human, social, 
institutional activities that make the discipline possible 
in the first place (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). These non-
discursive practices are presented in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
Non-Discursive Practices of Educational Psychology 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces 
regular effects of power. Each society has its regime 
of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as 
true ..• (Foucault, 1980c, p. 131) 
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Understanding the discipline of educational psychology 
as a "regime of truth" contrasts the view of the discourse 
of the discipline as a neutral body of scientifically 
validated knowledge. In discussing the discourse as a 
"regime of truth" it is important to foreground and 
interrogate those social, political, economic, and 
institutional networks in which the discipline is embedded. 
Discussions need to be taken up concerning: (1) the 
relationship of power and knowledge; (2) the social 
construction of knowledge; (3) the impossibility of 
neutrality of knowledge; (4) the division of labor in 
knowledge production highlighting a power hierarchy 
regarding who controls knowledge production and whose 
meanings are legitimated. 
Power/Knowledge 
Understanding that "knowledge is power" is very 
different from within a traditional perspective of 
educational psychology and what Foucault means in the quote 
above. The traditional contention is that the development of 
the knowledge of the discipline (i.e., the discipline's 
"truth") has given educational psychologists power. The 
relationship is understood as causal: knowledge causes 
power. The "direct scientific underpinnings •••• the knowledge 
base consisting of facts, concepts, and technology" 
(Berliner, 1987, p. xvii) give educational psychologists 
power. Power follows from the technical knowledge of the 
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discipline. 
For Foucault (1977/1995) the relationship of power and 
knowledge is correlational: 
... power and knowledge directly imply one another: ..• 
there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations. (p. 27) 
Foucault, therefore, always refers to power and knowledge 
together, i.e., power/knowledge, a "solidus [suggesting] 
that for his purposes power and knowledge are not to be 
studied separately" (Sarup, 1996, p. 72). They are "immanent 
in one another, each a condition for the possibility of the 
other" (Usher & Edwards 1994, p. 87). 
Power relations pervade the knowledge-making activity, 
affecting the one who knows, that which is known, and the 
mode and practice of knowing (Foucault, 1977/1995). The 
implication of this relationship of power/knowledge for the 
human sciences is that the "truth" expressed by the 
discipline is both produced and confined by the power 
relationships of the discipline. In other words, "truth" is 
what the discipline says is "truth". As Usher and Edwards 
(1994) point out, knowledge "does not simply represent the 
truth of what is, but, rather, constitutes what is taken to 
be true ••.. it's what counts as true that is important" 
(emphasis added, p. 87). 
Aronowitz (1988) pushes this power/knowledge dynamic a 
step farther in insisting that: "The power of science 
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consists, in the first place, in its conflation of knowledge 
and truth" (p. vii). 50 The truth that is being produced by 
the specific scientific manipulations of the discipline is a 
specialized knowledge that has been conflated with truth. 
When the understanding of how power and knowledge 
implicate each other is recognized a radically different 
perception of knowledge follows. What counts as knowledge is 
considered the "truth" of the discipline. However, this 
truth is also understood as the product of social activity 
imbued with power relations. There is always a political 
struggle over knowledge, and it is not something that 
resides solely in the realm of ideas. Rather it is a matter 
of mechanisms of power which are prior to discourse and 
often unspoken. These mechanisms decide who may speak, when, 
and what may be said; this is a "general politics of truth" 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) that pervades the discipline. Thus, 
the knowledge of any discipline can never be received as 
neutral; it is always situated, contingent, and partial and 
the result of social struggle. 
The Social Construction of Knowledge 
The way the world is known and explained is the result 
of "historically situated interchanges among people" 
50Perspectives outside the discipline do provide helpful 
segues into such questions through their models of critique. 
Feminist intellectuals were among the first to expose the 
power dimensions in science (Gergen, 1985). Several of these 
significant scholars were presented in Chapter II. Critical 
educational theorists also insist that the implication of 
power/knowledge be interrogated. 
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(Gergen, 1985, p. 267). This pertains to scientific 
knowledge. Scarr (1985) insists that "[w]e should not be 
disturbed that science is constructed knowledge. Rather, the 
recognition of our own role in scientific knowledge should 
make more modest our claim to truth" (p. 500). Yet, those 
who do science have consistently failed to examine the 
social practice of producing knowledge and the historical, 
economic, and political context which give it meaning in the 
first place (Giroux, 1981; Usher & Edwards, 1994). It seems 
as though at times educational psychologists have forgotten 
that they have "invented the knowledge they apply •..• they do 
not discover, they invent" (Caputo & Yount, 1993, p. 7). 
The dominant discourse contained in classic texts may 
not be recognize by the mainstream educational psychology 
community as being socially constructed. A textual style of 
narrative realism and the appearance of consensus lend the 
discourse the ambience of objective knowledge. 
Narrative realism. Textbooks are usually written 
through a textual strategy of narrative realism (Usher & 
Edwards, 1994) that accentuates the "reporting of already 
existing ready-made reality" (p. 150). Using this genre the 
text is understood as a "neutral medium for conveying pre-
existing facts about the world •••• [its] neutrality exempts 
it from consideration as a species of social/cultural 
activity (Woolgar, 1991, p. 28, quoted in Usher & Edwards, 
1994). This strategy also allows the text to appear as an 
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authoritarian source of what the discursive community 
considers the truth of the discipline (Kuhn, 1970). Rizvi 
(1993) describes this as a type of "rhetorical appeal that 
is by its very nature uncritical" (p. 137). 
Narrative realism is effected frequently by statements 
made in a matter-of-fact style. Gage and Berliner (1991), 
for example, state "It became possible during the twentieth 
century to measure individual differences in intelligence" 
(p. 50). This simple statement masks the historical and 
political context and struggle in which the statement is 
made (see, for example, Gould, 1981; Mensh & Mensh, 1991). 
Ambience of consensus. The argument might be made that 
there is some evidence in the mainstream discourse that the 
knowledge of the discipline is recognized as the result of 
negotiated understandings within the educational psychology 
community. This is because the pronoun "we" is used 
throughout both textbooks. For example, Gage and Berliner 
(1991) explain that: 
A concept is the organized information we have 
(emphasis added) about an entity •••• The meaning, 
boundaries, and relationships connected with a concept 
are derived from everything we know (emphasis added) 
about that concept •... What we mean (emphasis added) by 
a concept is partly a matter of definition and partly a 
matter of the methods of studying the concept •••• for 
example, the meaning of the concept of intelligence 
depends in part how we define (emphasis added) 
intelligence (emphasis original). (p. 12-13) 
The "we" of this discussion could be ref erring to the 
educational psychology community, Gage and Berliner being 
"author-ized" (Usher & Edwards, 1994) to speak in its name. 
142 
However, it is more likely that it is the editorial "we" 
that is reflected here and throughout the text. This makes 
it difficult to know to whom the text is referring. Contrary 
to Gage and Berliner's assertion, there is not universal 
agreement among educational psychologists about a construct 
as complex and politically charged as "intelligence"fil let 
alone other educationalists or the general public. Yet, 
their use of the pronoun "we" builds the impression that 
there is universal agreement. Apple (1993) remarks "the very 
use of the pronoun 'we' simplifies matters all too much" (p. 
49). 
The continual use of "we" serves to create the 
illusion of consensus around an "objective" discourse of 
educational psychology. There is an attempt to build what 
Rizvi (1993) calls a "collective phenomenon". Van Dijk 
(1993b) points out that consensus building is a major 
function of any dominant discourse. In a climate of 
consensus acceptance and legitimacy of knowledge allows a 
particular discourse to dominate and achieve hegemonic 
control. 
51A complete critique of how the construct of 
"intelligence" is developed in the mainstream discourse is 
important yet beyond the scope of this dissertation. Many of 
the arguments regarding intelligence (i.e., able to be 
expressed as a single trait or "g", highly heritable, fixed, 
individuals can be ranked numerically) support the material in 
The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), including a 
defense of the fraudulent research practices of Cyril Burt. 
For a critique applicable to both texts see Fraser, · 1995; 
Gould, 1981, 1995; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Gresson, 1996; 
and Mensh & Mensh, 1991. 
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Textbooks and the discourse they support need to be 
understood as important artifacts of culture (Gergen, 1985) 
that "signify through their content and form, particular 
constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and 
organizing the vast universe of possible knowledge" 
(emphasis added, Apple, 1993, p. 49). At any time there are 
competing discourses, competing paradigms (Kuhn, 1970), and 
their respective proponents can be imagined as "practic[ing] 
their trades in different worlds ••.. [they] see different 
things when they look at the same point in the same 
direction" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 150). 
Gage and Berliner (1991), for example, recognize that 
deliberations related to the construct of intelligence are 
connected with "different social and political ideologies" 
(p. 51). They are clear in presenting the definition that 
they support, characterized as "traditional", i.e., 
"Intelligence= what tests measure" (p. 51). Readers are 
told that this definition stems from "the intellectual 
tradition of the developed nations" (p. 53). Gage and 
Berliner (1991) explain that this tradition is 
only one approach to human learning and instruction -
namely, that appropriate to a middle-class segment of 
an industrialized society in which learning takes place 
in a certain kind of classroom in an institution called 
school. If our society were different .•• we would 
probably have to redefine intelligence. (emphasis 
added, p. 53) 
Even while both texts acknowledge that there is no agreement 
on what intelligence really is (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 
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52; Woolfolk, 1995, p. 114), their perspective on 
intelligence is utilized as the standard perspective. 52 
This traditional psychometric perspective is privileged as 
it is presented as neutral, normative, and unproblematic. 
There seems to be no recognition of the psychometric 
perspective's alignment with any social and political 
ideology through which students are included, excluded, or 
marginalized in schools and in society on the basis of such 
measurements. 
In summary, although there is a growing acceptance of 
knowledge as a social construction (e.g., Gergen 1985; 
Kincheloe, 1993; Scarr, 1985) it is questionable whether 
traditionally educational psychologists have recognized the 
knowledge claims of the discipline as socially constructed. 
The genre of narrative realism generates the appearance of 
consensus and neutrality in textbooks. These can be 
considered a "pre-text" (Usher & Edwards, 1994) that needs 
to be interrogated and subverted as there is a "hidden 
politics of neutrality" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 42). It is the 
impossibility of neutrality of knowledge that is discussed 
next. 
The Impossibility of the Neutrality of Knowledge 
The claim of neutrality of knowledge needs to be 
52For example, both texts present 
"multiple intelligences" and Sternberg's 
theory. 
Gardner's ,( 1983) 
{1990) "triarchic 
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problematized. 53 Neutrality can be used as a "cloak" 
(Bleier, 1986; Namewirth, 1986) covering scientific 
research. As long as knowledge is considered neutral it can 
claim a place separate from human interests, biases, and 
power. 
That knowledge can never be neutral is an assertion 
that crosses disciplinary lines and epistemological stances. 
Those who offer a feminist critique of science (e.g., 
Bleier, 1987; Harding, 1991; Hubbard, 1989; Namenwirth, 
1986) join critical educational theorists (e.g., Apple, 
1993; Freire, 1970; Giroux, 1981, 1983; Kincheloe, 1993; 
McLaren, 1989), and feminist poststructuralists (Luke & 
Gore, 1992) in this assertion. McLaren (1989), for example, 
challenges traditional ideas regarding the neutrality of 
knowledge: 
Knowledge acquired in school - or anywhere, for that 
matter - is never neutral or objective but is ordered 
and structured in particular ways; its emphasis and 
exclusions partake of a silent logic. Knowledge is a 
social construction (emphasis original) deeply rooted 
in a nexus of power relations. (p. 169) 
Yet, the claim of "neutrality" is a strong and 
important condition for the human sciences. It is the 
representation of the knowledge of a discipline as neutral 
and objective that facilitates an assumption of certainty 
and generalizability. In this way the knowledge of 
53Caputo and Yount (1993) reminds us of Foucault's notion 
of the problematic, i.e., developing something that is 
accepted, a "given", into a question. 
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educational psychology is able to function as a foundation 
on which to base practice or as a resource which informs 
practice. But, as Giroux (1981) explains, that view of 
knowledge 
not only undermines reflective thinking, it does this 
and more. It is also a form of legitimation that 
obscures the relationship between "valued" knowledge 
and the constellation of economic, political, and 
social interests that such knowledge supports. (p. 53) 
When the acceptance of the neutrality of knowledge is 
subverted a whole new discernment is required. If knowledge 
cannot be accepted as neutral a demand follows to know more 
about the political implications that permeate it. New 
questions surf ace concerning whose interests does the 
knowledge serve? Whose experience is legitimated or 
marginalized? Who profits through this knowledge? 
Many critical educational theorists have written 
persuasively on this subject. Banks (1993) has explained 
that "knowledge that people create is heavily influenced by 
their interpretations of their experiences and their 
positions within particular social, economic, and political 
systems and structures of a society" (p. 5). Apple (1993) 
asserts that "what counts as legitimate knowledge is the 
result of complex power struggles among class, race, gender, 
religious groups" (p. 46). It is not of question of what 
knowledge is of most worth, rather it is whose knowledge 
(Apple, 1993, 1996) is privileged and made to appear 
"natural", "normal". 
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The question of "whose" knowledge is normative is 
addressed by Alison Dewar (1987). She explains succinctly: 
The knowledge we teach in our educational system has a 
white, middle class, androcentric bias. More 
importantly, this bias is not presented as one possible 
version of reality, but more often is taught as the 
only, legitimate and therefore, representative version 
of reality. (p. 265, quoted in Lewis, 1992, p. 42) 
This white, middle class, androcentric knowledge is the 
knowledge that counts (Sleeter & Grant, 1994), and this is 
the knowledge that "provides formal justification for and 
legitimation of prevailing institutional arrangements" 
(Anyon, 1978, p.40, quoted in Giroux, 1981, p. 53). 
Generally this is the knowledge found in textbooks54 
(Banks, 1993; Van Dijk, 1993a). 
It is possible to discern whose knowledge gets 
privileged in the dominant discourse of educational 
psychology. There are a plethora of examples in educational 
psychology's mainstream discourse. One example is obvious, 
again using the psychometric understanding of intelligence. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) admit that 
A society will always have a problem testing the 
intelligence of minority-group members because, by 
definition, they do not belong in important ways to the 
majority culture that usually develops the tests. (p. 
54) 
In the very next sentence these authors state simply: "We 
measure intelligence with tests" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 
55). Later in the chapter Gage and Berliner (1991) state 
54Poli tical, social, economic constraints of textbook 
production are discussed in Chapter III. 
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that "Because minority-group and poor children less often do 
well on these tests, their parents have a right to worry 
about how the information from the tests are used" (p. 74). 
Indeed, assignment to a "slow group early on can be like a 
life sentence with no likelihood of parole (emphasis added)" 
(p. 74). Children who belong to minority groups and the poor 
are essentialized in these groups and seem almost alien 
(Rizvi, 1993). This kind of representation also presents the 
dominant group as homogenized. There is a clear admission 
that this normative practice of the discipline (i.e., 
psychometric testing) benefits those in the dominant 
culture. 
This situation is naturalized by being represented as 
"the way things are", (note Gage and Berliner's (1991) 
assertion: "A society will always have a problem testing 
certain groups of children"). The assumption is that it 
could not be otherwise (Rizvi, 1993). Thus, this purportedly 
neutral discourse functions to sustain the power relations 
of the status quo. More importantly, it trivializes the 
violence done to children (e.g., calling it a life 
sentence). What Sharon Welch (1985) says of traditional 
theology applies to mainstream educational psychology, i.e., 
"it has tended to leave the concrete reality of oppression 
and destruction unchallenged" (p. 28).~ 
~r do not want to give the impression that there is a 
lack of resistance to the dominance of mainstream ideology. 
There is great resistance. There are regular interrogations by 
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The Division of Labor in Knowledge Production 
Implied in the above discussion is the existence of a 
hierarchy of power (Van Dijk, 1993b) in the production of 
the knowledge of the discipline. There are some who speak 
with authority; they are "author-ized" to speak, while 
others must listen (Usher & Edwards. 1994). Van Dijk (1993b) 
refers to the former group as the "power elites" who have 
"special access to discourse; they are literally the ones 
who have the most to say" (p. 255). The elites of the 
discourse have a particular social power. 
Social power could be understood as involving control 
of one group over others regarding acts (limiting freedom) 
or cognition (how people think) (Van Dijk, 1993). The social 
power referred to here is primarily concerned with the 
cognitive aspects of power that involves knowledge 
production, or "managing the minds of others ••• a function of 
text and talk" (Van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). Although the idea 
of "managing minds" may be startling it is the latent 
purpose of the dominant discourse of educational psychology. 
The dominant discourse is aimed at initiating novices into a 
particular meaning system, i.e., "facts, concepts, 
principles, and research methods that will be both 
theoretically enlightening and practically useful" (Gage & 
Berliner, 1991, p. xvii). 
critical educational theorists and local resistances as well. 
The mainstream discourse, however is unyielding to change. 
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"Meanings" and hegemonic discourses. Those who are 
considered authorities purport to clarify meaning. Meanings 
that are accepted generally are understood as social 
cognitions (Van Dijk, 1993). These social cognitions 
influence "beliefs, understandings, attitudes, ideologies, 
norms and values" (Van Dijk, 1993, p 257). Clearly, classic 
textbooks take this as a goal, i.e., reproducing social 
cognitions by supplying meanings and definitions for various 
concepts. 
Teachers of educational psychology may accept their 
task as "transmitting" (Freire, 1970/1992; Macedo, 1994) the 
meaning of the discourse to students. students are, in a 
sense, positioned as receivers of knowledge, "consumers" of 
the dominant discourse presented in textbooks. Of course, 
the teaching-learning process is more complex than simply 
determined by the reproductive metaphor. On the one hand, 
students of educational psychology are active participants 
in their own learning, and their learning could never be 
determined by these texts. However, on the other hand, the 
rationality of the dominant discourse does steer them in the 
direction of particular interpretations. 
As the discussion on narrative realism pointed out 
meanings in textbooks often appear to be fixed; they are 
presented as objective and static. "Textual" features are 
used to reinforce these meanings. The Gage and Berliner 
(1991) text supplies a glossary "providing brief definitions 
of key terms appears at the end of the text" (p. xx) and 
marginal notes "highlighting important points .•. in the 
margins of each page •.. quick guides to key ideas and 
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. " issues ... (p. xix). Woolfolk (1995) furnishes readers with 
a margin glossary that "defines terms of the text to provide 
easy access (emphasis added) to the terms and their relevant 
examples as the student studies" (p. IS-ix). 
A poststructuralist analysis makes the idea of meanings 
as fixed problematic. What is necessary is recognizing how 
power infiltrates language (Cherryholms, 1988) constructing 
social cognitions. Cherryholms insists 
Culturally sanctioned, positive, and authoritative 
knowledge is incomplete, interest-bound, tied up with 
existing power arrangements, and cloaked in certainty. 
As the illusion of certainty is dispelled, it becomes 
possible to uncover the origins and commitments of our 
structures and the effects of power that led to their 
production. (p. 70) 
Modern textbooks bear the effects of power and 
represent a privileged view of the material they present. 
The school knowledge they contain "reveals which groups have 
power •••• [and] which groups are not empowered by the 
economic and social patterns in the society" (Anyon, 1983, 
p. 49). These become obvious in omissions, stereotypes, and 
distortions that are found even in updated versions of 
textbooks (Anyon, 1983). Consider the following examples of 
stereotypes regarding American Indian cultures: 
Some place high value on the skills required in 
weaving. Some of them depend on spearfishing for much 
of their food. If industrial society valued these 
skills in the same way, our educational system would 
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focus on them and our definition of intelligence would 
give them greater importance. (Gage & Berliner, 1991, 
p. 53-54) 
At least two assumptions in this statement are problematic; 
one is that all members of given groups "share the same 
cultural and behavioral patterns" (Sleeter & Grant, 1993, p. 
76). This refers not only to the minority groups, but the 
assumption pertains to the dominant groups as well. Another 
implication is that the minority group is deficient in 
comparison to the dominant culture. Both assumptions though 
erroneous serve to reinforce stereotypes, perpetuate social 
cognitions, and disguise oppression or power relations. 
Meanings attributed to "race" are especially noxious 
and significant. Gage and Berliner (1991) note that "race" 
"typically should refer solely to such psychologically 
unimportant characteristics as skin color, eye shape, and 
facial configurations" (p. 79). Woolfolk (1995) defines 
"race" as: "A group of people who share common biological 
traits that are seen as self-defining by the people of the 
group" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 165). 
The essentializing of race as a stable and biological 
characteristic persists in both texts although this 
representation is generally considered anachronistic within 
the scientific community (Harding, 1996). It continues to be 
used in some discourse communities despite the fact that all 
scientific attempts to show any biological definition have 
been exposed as untenable (Hall, 1996). The reason this 
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representation persists is because it serves a discursive 
function as it codes race as fixed (Harding, 1996; Hall, 
1996). This has a naturalizing effect as it constitutes 
social, cultural, political differences among people as if 
they function according to the logic of nature (Hall, 1996). 
Through a professed "disinterest" in "race" the 
understanding of meritocracy that is based on individual 
merit, hard work, and achievement (Haymes, 1996) can be 
preserved. 
How is it that stereotypes and incorrect information 
continue to be presented in current textbooks? The 
possibility of the effects of power relations must be 
considered. Some individuals may dominate a field, not 
because of their arguments but "because of their positional 
authority" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 89). What is important to 
recognize is that often those considered the "elites" of the 
discourse (van Dijk, 1993b} may "enact, sustain, legitimate, 
condone, or ignore social inequality or injustice" (van 
Dijk, 1993, p. 252) supported by the official knowledge of 
the discipline. Thus, knowledge in a dominant discourse 
needs to be interrogated as the "property of an elite 
establishment working to maintain its power" (Usher & 
Edwards, 1994, p. 198). When this is understood it 
facilitates a critical position in both teachers and 
students. 
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Summary 
The work of this chapter focused on beginning an 
interrogation of the dominant discourse of the discipline of 
educational psychology using two classic textbooks. The 
first part of the chapter discussed disciplinary principles 
understood in terms of technical rationality. These 
principles, although supplying a grounding of the 
discipline, are rarely examined. In addition to providing a 
resource, they constrain the discipline and, therefore, are 
problematic and need to be interrogated. The remaining 
portion of the chapter considered the non-discursive aspects 
of the discipline that include the social and political 
contingencies in which the discipline is embedded. 
This discussion is important not solely on the level of 
ideas. The meaning-making system and power relations of the 
discipline are important because they affect the everyday 
discursive practices of schooling and the material 
conditions of children's lives. These practices are the 
focus of Chapter V. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCIPLINING THE DISCIPLINE 
Introduction 
This chapter56 takes as its focus an examination of 
the practices sanctioned by educational psychology's 
dominant discourse and the effects of these practices. The 
discussion of Chapter IV regarding the disciplinary 
principles and the non-discursive power/knowledge 
relationships of the discipline facilitates the turn to this 
focus. This turn is imperative as the ideas generated by the 
meaning-making structure evident in the discursive 
principles of educational psychology "gain strength and are 
a form of power [because] ••• they take concrete shape in the 
actions of our daily lives" (Freire & Faundez, 1992, p. 26). 
The argument presented in this chapter is that the 
mainstream discourse of the discipline relies on and 
perpetuates a static and mechanistic view of the world 
(Freire, 1970/1992). Through a process of education, often 
well-intentioned, students are "socialized" so as to adapt 
to this world. Students are judged, labeled, sorted, and 
~The sense of the word "disciplining" in the chapter 
title was inspired by the title of Jana Sawicki's (1991) book, 
Disciplining Foucault. It is used here to highlight a major 
focus of the chapter, that is, to subject the discipline to 
scrutiny. 
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selected according to how well they adapt. They are 
frequently viewed as "abstract, isolated, independent, and 
unattached to the world" (Freire, 1970/1992, p. 69), thus, 
made "objects" of a system of domination. Through its 
knowledge base and practices the discipline claims to 
explain characteristics of the student and the teacher; the 
assertion of the discipline is "to know those objects 
truthfully ..•• [by their] 'natural characteristics" (Usher, 
1993, p. 18). 
Using the perspective of Foucault a different view is 
proposed. Foucault is skeptical regarding modern disciplines 
especially those connected with education (Ball, 1990). 
Foucault's contention is that knowledge of the modern 
disciplines is organized around the power to define and name 
others (Sarup, 1993); especially to define persons as normal 
and as abnormal. Human beings are formed and made subjects 
of the society through the process of normalization. 57 The 
knowledge and the practices of the human sciences are 
central to this process because through their specific 
knowledge-claims and practices human beings are formed and 
constituted. These specialized knowledges produce a new 
57Foucault wants to disrupt the commonsense positive idea 
usually attributed to socialization. His explanation of 
normalization is akin to Freire's idea of education's naming 
and positioning learners as "object". 
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subject, a subject58 of a particular kind (Marshall, 1990), 
i.e., subjects who are docile and useful. Foucault's 
contention is that every modern discipline is "a general 
formula of domination" (1995, p. 137). Thus, the knowledge 
of modern discipline "ceases to be a liberation and becomes 
a mode of surveillance, regulation, discipline" (Sarup, 
1993, p. 67). The specific disciplinary practices derived 
from the knowledge claims of educational psychology are 
implicated and inter-related in the processes whereby 
societies control and discipline their populations (Philip, 
1985). 
I begin this chapter by taking up Foucault's idea of 
the meaning of the human sciences as "disciplines". The 
contemporary understanding is tied to the former meaning of 
discipline, i.e., it is concerned with the control of 
bodies. The understanding of "trope" helps illuminate this 
connection. Next, the formation of the discipline is 
presented. The discussion begins with Foucault's concept of 
genealogy through which he explicates how every historical 
era has sought control over populations; changing only the 
strategies through which control is achieved. The human 
sciences are the current means through which control is 
gained. Next, three disciplinary technologies are presented 
58While Freire ( 1972) refers to "objects" Foucault _( 1995) 
refers to "subjects" of a "particular kind", i.e., docile and 
useful. There is irony here in that both words can convey 
similar meaning. 
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that Foucault suggests form the basis of the disciplinary 
practice, i.e., hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgement, and examination. These disciplinary practices are 
utilized by disciplines to normalize students and are 
located in the everyday activities of school life. Finally, 
I use these disciplinary technologies to inform my critical 
reading of the dominant discourse of educational psychology 
expressed in two classic textbooks. 
A thorough examination of these various points is 
important in order to render visible what has been taken-
f or-granted, i.e., to make the familiar strange (Foucault, 
1977/1995). The presentation of the everyday practices can 
and must be looked at differently because "as soon as one 
can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, 
transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and 
quite possible" (Foucault, 1988, quoted in Dales, 1992, p. 
83) • 
Discipline: Control of Bodies 
"Discipline" as Trope 
One meaning of "discipline" was taken up in Chapter IV. 
"Disciplines" were discussed as they are usually considered, 
i.e., "neutral, scientifically validated bodies of knowledge 
whose only effects are enlightening and empowering and which 
thus enable effective action" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 
48). However, this chapter takes up a different meaning of 
discipline. The word "discipline" can be understood more 
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fully through a consideration of "trope". Tropes are words 
where new meanings contain residues of former uses of the 
word; new meanings are understandable in connection to the 
original sense of the word (Briscoe, 1993). Tropes help us 
notice what could have been missed without their 
recognition; they make us swerve (Haraway, 1996) and see 
things differently. 
In thinking about "discipline" as a trope it is helpful 
to consider its various lexical meanings: 
1. Training expected to produce a specific pattern of 
behavior •... 2. Controlled behavior resulting from 
disciplinary training. 3. A systematic method to obtain 
obedience. 4. A state of order based on submission to 
rules and authority. 5. Punishment intended to train or 
correct. 6. A set of methods or rules [that regulate] 
practice .••• 7. A branch of knowledge or of teaching. 
(Soukhanov, 1984, p. 383) 
It is not until the sixth and seventh meanings that a match 
is found for our commonsense understanding of the word 
"discipline" used in the context of a body of knowledge. 
Educational psychology, for example, as a discipline and 
branch of psychology includes laws and principles, theory, 
and practice aimed at improving teaching and learning. 
However, recognizing discipline as trope helps one to 
appreciate Foucault's meaning of disciplinary power; it is 
important to see the connection with the other meanings 
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listed for the word "discipline".~ The discipline, the 
human science of educational psychology, is connected with 
managing and controlling the bodies of students, i.e., 
behavior. The recognition of the dynamic relationship among 
power, knowledge of the discipline, and the control of 
bodies is necessary to understanding the practices of the 
discipline. 
Disciplines and Bio-Power 
In Discipline and Punish Foucault {1977/1995) connects 
the control of the body and the growth of the scientific 
knowledge of disciplines since the seventeenth century. 
Foucault studies the spread of "disciplinary mechanisms ..• 
[as] techniques through which modern societies train and 
regulate individuals" {Sarup, 1996, p. 72). In modernity, as 
the "objective" science developed so did "a radically new 
regime of power/knowledge" {Fraser, 1989, p.22) through the 
discipline's discourse. This shift in regimes of power from 
the classical age through modern times will be discussed 
later in the chapter, however, it is important to emphasize 
here that the aim of the disciplinary technologies remains 
the same, the control of the bodies of human persons. 
Foucault explains two manifestations of power over the 
59Shumway {1989) notes that this double meaning of 
"discipline" is sometimes considered as nothing more than an 
elaborate pun. However, Dreyfus and Rabinow {1983) explain 
that it is far from a "rhetorical convergence" as Foucault 
asserts that "the very self definition of the human science as 
scholarly 'disciplines' ••. is closely linked to the spread of 
disciplinary technologies" (p. 160). 
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body. One manifestation is "bio-power", a "modern form of 
power ... characterized by increasing organization of 
population and welfare for the sake of increased force and 
productivity" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 7-8). Dreyfus and 
Rabinow explain that bio-power is so ubiquitous that it 
appears as a "strategy, with no one directing it and 
everyone increasingly enmeshed in it, whose only end is the 
increase of power and order itself" (p. xxvi). This modern 
form of power is a control and regulation of the masses, a 
kind of macro-politics. However, it did not emerge as a 
coherent management process. It was preceded by Foucault's 
other manifestation of power, micropolitics. 
Micropolitics developed as administrators in various 
institutions were faced with the daily government of large 
numbers of people. The historical process of growing and 
shifting populations, for example, was connected to the 
formation of the disciplines (Smart, 1985). In order to 
manage and control the growing number of those in their 
charge "a variety of 'microtechniques' were perfected by 
obscure doctors, wardens, and schoolmasters in obscure 
hospitals, prisons, and schools ••.• only later were these 
techniques and practices taken up and integrated" (Fraser, 
1989, p. 22). In other words, specific tactics were 
"invented and organized from the starting points of local 
conditions and particular needs .•.• in piecemeal fashion" 
(Foucault, 1980b, p.159). Only later were these procedures 
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gathered to form a coherent discourse. 
An example of the development of the local conditions 
generating specific practices can be found in writings about 
the history of educational psychology. Hilgard (1996), for 
example, notes that in the later part of the 19th century 
before educational theory and teacher education became 
"centered in the universities, most of the adaptions of 
education ••• were made by .•• school administrators" (p. 992). 
To make his point Hilgard recounts the work of William 
Torrey Harris (1835-1909). Harris was superintendent of the 
st. Louis, Missouri school district as the Civil War was 
ending, a time of increased industrialization and 
immigration to the area. Hilgard (1996) explains the need 
for specific procedures to manage the burgeoning numbers of 
children in the schools of st. Louis: 
The problems of school buildings, school management, 
and teacher training loomed large as the heterogeneous 
population expanded, and Harris took seriously his 
efforts to provide universal education on an efficient 
and effective basis. He did this by adopting the graded 
school so that the curriculum could be planned 
according to the movement of pupils through school, 
with careful records of attendance, of ages at leaving 
school, and of the progress of learning. (Hilgard, 
1996, p. 992) 
The specific procedures, or micropolitics, utilized by 
Harris (i.e., graded classes, records of attendance and 
progress of students) imposed an "order" or governmentality 
on the schooling of children in a particular time and 
locale. Only later would these practices and others would be 
gathered and generalized into a discourse. 
163 
Another notable example of the development of a tactic 
of micropolitics is the development of the first so called 
"intelligence" tests by Alfred Binet (1857-1911) and his 
student Theodore Simon (1873-1961). Universal education 
mandated in France in the nineteenth century meant that all 
French children be given several years of public education 
(Fancher, 1985). It is noted that for the first time 
"retarded [sic] children [were included], who in earlier 
years would have dropped out early or never attended school 
at all" (Fancher, 1985, p. 69). A diagnostic tool was 
thought to be needed to identify children who "could not 
profit from instruction in the regular public schools in 
Paris" (Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984/1996). 
In 1904 Binet and Simon responded to this local need 
and formulated an intelligence scale. Binet's original 
intention was to "construct an instrument for classifying 
unsuccessful school performers" (Mensh & Mensh, 1990, p. 23) 
into different groups: idiots, imbeciles, and "debiles" or 
"weak ones" (translated to "moron" in America, see Fancher, 
1985). Sorting students and bringing "order" to the 
educational system of the time was a function of the tests 
that were developed. Gage and Berliner (1991) report that 
these terms are no longer adequate or acceptable. However, 
three categories are still used: "Although definitions vary 
by state, many federally funded programs are designed with 
three levels of mental retardation in mind ••.• severely and 
profoundly mentally retarded ••• trainable mentally 
retarded .•• educable mentally retarded" (p. 209-210). 
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Later, the scales of Binet and Simon were appropriated 
for a variety of uses in the United States. For example, the 
army used variations of the test during World War I "not 
primarily for the exclusion of intellectual defectives ... but 
rather for the classification of men in order that they may 
be properly placed in the military service" (Yerkes, quoted 
in Fancher, 1985, pp. 117-118). Post-war analysis of the 
results helped frame the rationale of the Immigration Act of 
1924 defining immigrant groups thought suitable to become u. 
S. citizens. The testing movement is also linked to the 
passage of a series of sterilization laws beginning in 1907 
and declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1927 
(Lewontin, et al., 1984/1996). 
Not long after these applications educational 
institutions adopted these tests as a tool for studying 
individual differences in order to make "formal schooling a 
successful and rewarding experience for the whole school-age 
population" (emphasis added, Jensen, 1987, p. 61). According 
to students' "ranking" in tests they could be sorted into 
"appropriated instructional programs .•• [that] can make it 
possible for the vast majority of children to attain at 
least the basic scholastic skills during their years in 
school" (Jensen, 1987, p. 86.). The intelligence test, 
designed for specific locations, has gradually grown into a 
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still burgeoning market-driven industry (Sternberg, 1992). 
The point that needs to be clear is that the discourse 
of the discipline of educational psychology did not emerge 
self-contained and coherent. The shift in demographics led 
to the need to govern growing student populations. 
Gradually, the implementation of the practices of management 
were established. Of particular importance were the 
practices of sorting students; this was deemed necessary to 
bring order to local school situations. This demographic 
shift was accompanied by the shift toward industrialization 
and growth of capitalism and formed a particular historical 
conjuncture with an emphasis on increased production and 
efficiency. 
There is another historical process occurring at the 
same time, referred to as a juridico-political process 
(Smart, 1985). The juridico-political historical process 
refers to the formal and legal structures of societies that 
were established around the existing power relations of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century simultaneous to the 
demographic shifts that were occurring. This process of 
modern law-making took over the power of the sovereign of 
pre-modern times. The juridico-political process that 
developed guarded the status of the group wielding political 
power. An example of this historical process can be found in 
the contradiction of the framers of the U.S. Constitution. 
At the same time that freedom was guaranteed to all, 
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provisions recognizing and protecting slavery were also 
included (Bell, 1997). Myriad examples are found in the 
history of United States. 60 
This is the milieu in which the growth of scientific 
knowledge gains importance. The scientific historical 
process refers to the increasing complex relationship 
between the formation of knowledge and the exercise of 
power. 
The Formation of Disciplinary Practices 
Genealogy 
••. the goal of my work over the past twenty years ... has 
been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. 
(Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983 p. 208) 
Foucault is skeptical about the ability of human 
sciences, or any totalizing discourse, to create a utopian 
dream of progress. He bases his skepticism on the 
"historical evidence •.. that what looks like a change for the 
better may have undesirable consequences ••. " (Sawicki, 1991, 
p. 27). Foucault offers the genealogy as a way to critique 
totalizing discourses (Sarup, 1993; Smart, 1985). The 
genealogist "is a diagnostician who concentrates on the 
relations of power, knowledge, and the body in modern 
6
°Foucault explains that it is possible to see how power 
operates by looking at where there is resistance. To see how 
power operates in a juridico-political process in U.S. history 
we can look at the civil rights movement. Brown vs. the Board 
of Education is a pertinent example. 
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society" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 105). The genealogy 
that Foucault presents is a particular history, clearly not 
"history" in the usual sense. Foucault (1980c) asks us to 
see a genealogy as a 
kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledge from 
that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of 
opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a 
theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. 
(p. 85) 
Sawicki (1991) explains genealogy as "resistance" 
which "involves the use of history to give voice to the 
marginal and submerged voices that lie 'a little beneath 
history' - the voices of the mad, the delinquent, the 
abnormal, the disempowered" (p. 28). The purpose of 
highlighting these subjugated and disqualified knowledges is 
both "modest and profound .•. to disrupt commonly held 
conceptions about events and social practices rather than to 
proffer, from on high, proposals for reform" (p. 62).n 
Genealogy of the Prison 
The genealogy of the prison presented by Foucault 
(1995) in Discipline and Punish62 has influenced the way I 
look at the discipline of educational psychology. Foucault 
believes that the prison is the "most characteristic of 
61Michelle Fine (1991) presents a helpful example in her 
work Framing Dropouts. The voices of "dropouts" speak for 
themselves about their educational experiences. Their critical 
voices are juxtaposed against the bureaucratic discourse that 
both silences them and excludes them from the educational 
system. 
62This book is considered by some to be Foucault's 
masterpiece (Sarup, 1993). 
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disciplinary institutions, one which schools, factories, and 
hospitals all come to resemble" (Shumway, 1989, p. 133). It 
is Foucault's intention that his "history" of "the birth of 
the prison" can, or "must serve as a historical background 
to various studies of the power of normalization and the 
formation of knowledge in modern society" (p. 308). 
Normalization and a particular knowledge of each student are 
key aspects around which educational psychology is 
organized. 
Foucault (1995) explains that every society had its 
means of control of the body. He describes this control 
within the historical recounting of the "birth of the 
prisons" beginning with the classical age, through the 
reform era, and arriving at the formation of the modern 
penal system. It is beneficial to present a sketch here. 
In the classical age Foucault recounts the torture of 
Robert Francois Damiens, accused of trying to assassinate 
Louis XV, in 1757. The story delineates torture as a means 
whereby the sovereign is able to reinstate his authority; 
public torture being a kind of political ritual (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983). The brutality of the torture is fierce. The 
punishment leaves its marks, literally, on the body of the 
condemned, the subject of the sovereign. The retelling of 
this torment, however, is meant as an exercise in 
defamiliarization (Shumway, 1989); the cruel torture is 
obviously of another era. One finds oneself thinking, "We've 
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come a long way from such barbarism!" 
Foucault continues with a review of the eighteenth 
century reforms for the punishment of crimes and criminals. 
In this era of reform torture decreases, but the person of 
the wrongdoer continues to be visible to the public. The 
accent in this system is on restoring the social contract, 
with penalties meted out according to the crime committed 
(i.e., the punishment for murder was death; arrogance was 
punished by humiliation; the lazy person was sentenced to 
hard labor). The "corrections" notion was put in place as 
each "punishment would function as a deterrent, a recompense 
to society, and a lesson, all immediately intelligible to 
criminal and society" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 148). The 
body in this era was marked, but marked differently than in 
the classical age. The body bears the representation of the 
evil of the crime (Shumway, 1989). 63 
Describing the crime accurately was of utmost 
importance in this era of reform. Only in knowing the crime 
exactly could the proper punishment be given, and the 
correct ordering/reordering of social life made possible. 
Precise knowledge of the crime and the criminal allowed for 
"reformers ••. to construct a comprehensive table of knowledge 
in which each crime and its appropriate punishment would 
find its exact place" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 149). 
63The wearing of the scarlet letter by Hester Prynn, a 
character in Hawthorne's novel The Scarlet Letter. provides a 
helpful example. 
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Foucault reports that the model for this kind of 
individualization was taking place in natural history of the 
late eighteenth century. He refers to the prison reforms as 
a "Linnaeus1164 of crimes and punishments, so that each 
particular offense and each punishable individual might 
come, without slightest risk of any arbitrary action, within 
the provision of a general law" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 
99). Knowing the crime and the criminal exactly emphasized 
the importance of the practice of representation. The marks 
on the body of the classical model are replaced by "signs, 
coded sets of representation" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 130) 
in the reform period. 
The third development within the penal system, the 
modern model, was referred to as "the gentle way" (Foucault, 
1977/1995) where "power must act while concealing itself 
beneath the gentle force of nature" (p. 106). This 
development is characterized by the appearance of the 
physical building, the prison, where economy and morality 
were combined (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) in the methodical 
use of time (e.g., timetables were enforced and strict 
horaria were kept) and space (e.g., isolation in cells). 
Prisoners were isolated from the rest of society as 
they were to be feared by society and more easily controlled 
64A reference to Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) the Swedish 
botanist who originated binomial taxonomic classification. A 
statue in his tribute graces the entrance to the visitors 
center at the Chicago Botanical Gardens. 
171 
behind the prison walls. Solitary confinement within the 
prison was added to the confinement as well, so as to 
facilitate meditation by the prisoner of his transgression. 
All activities of the prisoners' day, including the work 
which was required for economic purposes, were under strict 
surveillance. The acquiring of exact knowledge of the 
prisoner was very important and made possible through 
"dividing practices": separating prisoners from society, and 
often, from each other; separating the person of the 
prisoner into segments, i.e., the crime, intention, 
psychological state of the prisoner. In this way reform was 
sought to effect the "soul" of the prisoner in the re-
socializing effort. 
Distinct breaks appear with the reforms of the previous 
era in this third model of punishment. The focus is on the 
modification of the prisoner's behavior, rather than public 
representation of a violation and punishment. The primary 
aim becomes the reform the soul. The body in this era is 
like a machine (Shumway, 1989), and the success of the 
incarceration depended on the training and production of a 
"docile" and useful body (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). But, it 
was really the soul that was being formed and re-formed. 
Instead of the commonsense understanding of the soul as the 
prisoner of the body, what Foucault wants to emphasize is 
that the body is actually the prisoner of the soul. The 
control of bodies remains the primary goal of state control; 
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the means is the "gentle way", through forming the soul. 
Summary. In Discipline and Punish Foucault explains how 
in modern times the focus has shifted from the overt control 
of the body, exemplified by monarchial power (Sarup, 1993). 
The shift to a modern form of control is of a different 
order (Smart, 1985) although still focused on the control of 
the body. This shift is characterized by an exercise of 
power over the body which is covert; it is constant, 
regular, efficient, and unseen. It is characterized by 
Foucault (1995) as the "gentle way" of control, yet it is 
every bit as potent as the control of former eras. 
Disciplinary Technologies 
Foucault's major concern is the way modern forms of 
power constitute individuals (Ball, 1990). The normalizing 
power of institutions, often characterized as a socializing 
effort, is key in this process and is produced through the 
disciplines of the human sciences. Foucault (1980) 
understands disciplines as systems of power with particular 
"structures and hierarchies .•• inspections, exercises and 
methods of training and conditioning" (p. 158) that have 
been "developed, refined, and used to shape individuals" 
(Marshall, 1990, p. 15). Disciplines of educational 
institutions, not unlike the prisons described by Foucault, 
exercise a kind of bio-power, a modern form of power. This 
is accomplished in the "increasing ordering of all realms 
under the guise of improving the welfare of the individual 
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and the population ••.• a strategy, with no one directing it 
and everyone increasingly enmeshed in it" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983, p. xxvi). 
Foucault's "gentle way" is an apt description of this 
control through a discipline's normalization of students as 
they are rendered docile and useful. The dominant discourse 
of educational psychology, although using other words, seems 
to concur with normalization as the goal of the discipline 
as it is stated: 
Because education is aimed at causing (emphasis 
original) wanted changes in people - in their 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes - the discovery of 
ways to cause these changes has great practical 
importance. {Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 14) 
This perspective of causing "wanted" change echoes what 
Thorndike (1910) asserted as the discipline was developing 
in the beginning of the twentieth century: 
The aim of education is .... changing [the student] for 
the better - to produce in him the information, habits, 
powers, interests and ideas which are desirable. 65 
( p. 4) 
The "way" to cause these "changes" is the stuff of 
educational psychology, its knowledge-claims and practices. 
The normalizing practices of the discipline are utilized to 
render bodies "docile" as the individual is "subjected to 
habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised 
continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow 
65This quote takes on added meaning when it is connected 
to Thorndike's leadership in the eugenics movement {Fancher, 
1985; Karier, 1972). 
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to function automatically in him" (Foucault, 1977/1995, pp. 
128-129). This also describes what Freire (1992) means by 
"banking" education: 
••• the educated man is the adapted man, because he is 
better 'fit' for the world •.•. the purposes of the 
oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit 
the world the oppressors have created, and how little 
they question it. (p. 63) 
Foucault (1995) specifies disciplinary practices as the 
technologies of: hierarchial observation; normalizing 
judgement; and, the examination. These major disciplinary 
"technologies" are understood as the "methods which made 
possible the meticulous control of the operations of the 
body that assured the constant subjection of its forces and 
imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility" (Foucault, 
1977/1995, p. 137). Yet they are very simple instruments, 
perhaps that is the reason they are so effective (Foucault, 
1977/1995). 
Each of the three disciplinary technologies will be 
presented next. A discussion of the way these disciplinary 
technologies pervade the discipline of educational 
psychology follows. 
Hierarchial Observation 
Hierarchial observation is the disciplinary technology 
understood as a kind of "optics of power" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983). It signifies the alliance between visibility 
and power (Smart, 1985). It is both a literal and a 
figurative observation. The purpose of requiring that 
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individuals be visible is to make it possible to know them; 
when people are known they can be changed, thus controlled 
and rendered docile. First in importance is determining the 
"nature" of the person, or seeing the individual as s/he 
really is. 
Foucault· (1995) explains the importance of 
understanding the significance of architecture to this 
optics of power. The palace, for example, was built to be 
seen, a symbol of the sovereign ruler; the fortress was 
built to observe the space external to it. However, the 
school (as well as the prison) was constructed "to render 
visible those who are inside it •..• to act on those it 
shelters •••. to make it possible to know them, to alter them" 
(p. 172). The schoolhouse, then, became figuratively and 
literally an apparatus of observation, a kind of "microscope 
of conduct" (Foucault, 1977/1995). Through observation, 
knowing, and training the normalization of students can take 
place. 
The ideal situation is a single eye of authority seeing 
everything constantly (Smart, 1985). However, as numbers 
grew it became increasingly difficult for a "single eye" to 
supervise all students. A division of the work of the optics 
of power, or a system of "supervision", developed as a 
"disciplinary gaze" that took the form of a hierarchy of 
continuous and functional surveillance (Smart, 1985). The 
example discussed earlier of William Torrey Harris 
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initiating the graded schoolhouse is a useful reference for 
this system of supervision. As the one room schoolhouse was 
no longer practical because of growing numbers, students 
were separated into the graded school. 
The disciplinary gaze developed as an analytic of 
observation (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) that separates 
individuals into categories and distinguishes them "by an 
almost infinite number of means" (Shumway, 1989, p. 127). 
Hierarchical observation in schooling aims to see students 
(figuratively and literally) more clearly and thus know them 
more correctly, and aimed at eventually being able to alter 
and control students. Foucault (1995) refers to hierarchical 
observation as the "uninterrupted play of calculated gazes". 
Surveillance is an important aspect of hierarchical 
observation. Foucault (1977/1995) introduces the image of 
the panopticon to demonstrate the potency of surveillance 
used in prisons. The panopticon of Jeremy Bentham66 was 
meant to produce the effect of "the state of consciousness 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power" (p. 201). Bentham's model called for a 
central watch-tower surrounded by tiered rows of cells. 
Light from windows in each cell and a open space facing the 
center tower allowed for prisoners to be in the constant 
view of the "super-visor". 
66Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the English philosopher and 
reformer. 
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The economy of this mechanism is a major feature of the 
panopticon's usefulness. It allowed for the constant 
surveillance of each prisoner and, at the same time, did not 
require constant surveillance of each prisoner. Although 
prisoners knew that they could be watched at any time they 
never could be sure when they were being watched. The 
economy and effectiveness of this model was exacerbated as 
the prisoners began to internalize the gaze of the 
supervisor; that is, they watched themselves. 
Foucault (1995) tells us that this mechanism, a form of 
hierarchal observation sets up a 
network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a 
certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this 
network 'holds' the whole together and traverses it in 
its entirety with effects of power that derive from one 
another: supervisors, perpetually supervised .•• 
(pp. 176-177) 
The internalization of the gaze of the supervisor is 
extremely significant in the formation of the subject. This 
internalization has implications for teachers as well as 
students. Teachers know that they are under the watchful eye 
of administrators as well as the public. Teachers, too, 
internalize the gaze of those in authority and of the 
dominant culture; they learn to watch themselves. To be 
effective and economical the complicity of those who are 
watched must be enlisted. 
Normalizing Judgement 
Hierarchical observation allows for judgement and 
evaluation, and the basis of judgement is the norm (Jones, 
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1990). The technology of normalizing judgement is said to be 
at the heart of any system of disciplinary power (Foucault, 
1977/1995; Smart, 1985). Disciplinary practices need 
standards around which its operations can be organized so 
individuals and groups are assessed by "comparisons with a 
favored paradigm real or imagined" (Prado, 1995, p. 61). 
Normalizing judgement has the simultaneous action which 
marks its power, that is, it assumes and imposes homogeneity 
and introduces individuality: 
The power of normalization imposes homogeneity, but it 
individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, 
to determine levels, fix specialties and to render 
differences useful by fitting them into one another. It 
is easy to understand how the power of the norm 
functions within a system of formal equality, since 
within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm 
introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of 
measurement, all the shading of individual differences. 
(Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 184) 
Any behavior can be quantified and ranked as it falls 
on a field between two poles, good and bad (e.g., grades on 
tests, effective and ineffective teachers). Foucault tells 
us that it has become possible through the modern sciences 
to "quantify this field and work out an arithmetic economy 
based on it" (1995, p, 180). That is, "an objective 
hierarchy can be established by which the distribution of 
individuals is justified, legitimated and made more 
efficient" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 158). 
A system of penalties and rewards is effective in 
establishing and supporting normalization. Punishments· are 
exacted for the slightest deviation from the norm, referred 
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to as micro-penalties. Micro-penalties grew to include more 
and more areas of life (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Examples 
of micro-penalties include issues around the following: time 
(e.g., lateness, absence), activity (e.g., inattention, lack 
of zeal), behavior (e.g., impoliteness, disobedience), 
speech (e.g., idle chatter, insolence), body (incorrect 
gestures, attitudes, cleanliness), sexuality (e.g., 
impurity, indecency) (Foucault, 1977/1995). An important 
issue regarding this system is that rewards are dispensed as 
well as punishments. This emphasizes that the intention of 
the system is normalization, not repression. 
The established norm is the assumption of homogeneity; 
in reference to the norm finer and finer differentiation and 
individualization is possible. Through this differentiation 
then it is possible to "objectively" separate and rank 
individuals. 
Examination 
The examination is at the "heart of the procedures of 
discipline ••• " (Foucault, 19771995, p. 184). It combines the 
other two disciplinary instruments, hierarchical observation 
and normalizing judgement, into what Foucault (1995) calls 
the "normalizing gaze". This is the disciplinary technique 
in which can be found "a whole domain of knowledge, a whole 
type of power" (p. 185) which allows for differentiation, 
classification, and judgement of its subjects. Foucault 
(1995) considers this technology as a kind of tiny, slender, 
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widespread "ceremony of objectification" (p. 187). As such 
it marks "an explicit instance of the connection between 
power and knowledge" (Shumway, 1989, p. 131). 
Increased visibility is a key effect of the 
examination. Foucault reminds us that in feudal times the 
most visible people were the most important people, e.g., 
the king, the epic hero. With the rise of modern sciences 
the common folk are the ones who become visible as they are 
subjected to the mechanisms of objectification through the 
examination. This disciplinary technique of examination has 
the power to bring the individual into view, able to be seen 
in multiple ways and with finer and finer differentiation. 
What needs to be highlighted, though, is that the 
examination is the "gaze" of the one with more power upon 
the one with less or no power (Shumway, 1989). The 
visibility of the subject, or student, is heightened as more 
and more features of the person are tested and a gathered 
into a file.~ Individuals become "cases" through the 
gathering of common occurring attributes and differences 
(Smart, 1985), a case that can be described and analyzed, 
known, categorized, and re-formed. 
The way Haraway (1988/1996) highlights the metaphor of 
vision is helpful here. She insists that the visualizing 
technologies, exemplified in the examination, "are without 
67See Hanson (1993) for a comprehensive discussion of the 
number and variety of tests available and used in the U.S., in 
school settings and beyond. 
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apparent limit; the eye of any ordinary primate like us can 
be endlessly enhanced .•.. Vision in this technological feast 
becomes unregulated gluttony" (pp. 188-189). Haraway 
insists, however, that vision is always embodied. The eyes 
that see belong to some-body. This understanding exposes the 
impossibility of a "gaze from nowhere". The image of the 
eyes of the knower as always embodied renders problematic 
the claim of modern scientific methods that profess to 
"factor-out" or "control-for" the person of the scientist as 
the results or findings are understood to speak for 
themselves. On the contrary, the only possibility is vision 
from somewhere, from some-body, i.e., situated knowledge 
(Haraway, 1988/1996). 
The effectiveness of this disciplinary technique of the 
examination is intensified through an inversion of 
visibility; as the individual becomes more visible the 
disciplinary power itself becomes invisible. Foucault (1995) 
explains: 
Disciplinary power ••• is exercised through its 
invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom 
it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In 
discipline it is the subjects that have to be seen. 
Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is 
exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly 
seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his 
subjection. And the examination is the technique by 
which power, instead of emitting signs of its potency, 
instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds 
them in a mechanism of objectification. (p. 187) 
Thus, despite its potency, the technology of power that 
facilitates the rendering of subjects as objects is itself 
182 
invisible, i.e., the productive character of the examination 
is itself invisible even as it renders its subject visible. 
In its ubiquity the normalizing activity of the examination 
is not questioned. The necessity of the examination in its 
multiple forms is a commonsense practice; it is taken-for-
granted, considered natural or normal, as though things 
could not be otherwise. And this is also what renders it 
unquestioned and invisible. 
Through the technology of the examination 
classifications and comparisons of persons become possible 
along increasingly finer gradations. Individual differences 
become significant. Foucault highlights the point that the 
modern individual is a historical achievement. Subjects are 
the product of the disciplinary power by which subjects are 
objectified, analyzed, and fixed (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). 
Modern sciences have yielded the individual who is both the 
effect of power and the effect of knowledge, an example of 
questionable progress, from a dubious science (Foucault, 
1977/1995). This is a key example of what Foucault calls the 
productive aspect of power: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects 
of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 
'represses', it 'censors', it abstracts, it 'masks', it 
'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge gained of him 
belong to this production. (p. 194) 
In other words, professionals in the discipline produce the 
knowledge they apply (Caputo & Yount, 1993), "they create 
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the knowledge they require in order to fashion functioning, 
well-formed individuals" (p. 7). Through this normalizing 
technology students become objectified; they become their 
"scores" as they receive their "marks". 
This is an inversion of a modernist understanding that 
knowledge of the subject emerges through the technologies of 
the discipline. Subjects are in-scribed by the technologies 
of the discipline rather than de-scribed by them. 
Disciplinary Technologies in Educational Psychology 
The disciplinary technologies (i.e., hierarchical 
observation, normalizing judgement, examination) described 
by Foucault (1995) are obvious and operative in the 
discipline of educational psychology's discursive practices. 
The illustration of these technologies provides a way to 
interrogate how educational psychology uses power and 
knowledge to normalize students, i.e., to render students 
docile, neutral, and appropriate subjects. This 
interrogation highlights practices of the dominant discourse 
given expression in "classic" texts with the hope of "making 
the familiar strange" (Foucault, 1977/1995). When practices 
seem strange they are more open to critique and more readily 
able to be changed. 
The technologies of the discipline come together in 
various practices generated and perpetuated by the 
discipline of educational psychology. The specific areas to 
be discussed are: 1) the surveillance practices that pervade 
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educational settings; 2) classroom management practices; 3) 
the practice of testing, especially standardized testing. In 
using these practices teachers step into the web of power 
relations through which students are normalized. Through an 
uncritical use of these practices teachers participate in 
their own normalization as well, i.e., they become docile 
and useful. 
Surveillance Practices 
In today's educational settings developing the capacity 
to see students clearly is represented as key to teacher 
effectiveness. Bentham's panopticon (discussed above) is a 
metaphor for a characteristic teachers are encouraged to 
develop, namely, "withitness". The effect of the panopticon 
was meant to effect "the state of consciousness and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 201). Gage and Berliner 
(1991) describe a similar effect of withitness: 
the knack of seeming to know what is going on all over 
the room, of having 'eyes in the back of your head'. A 
teacher's awareness, and the students' awareness of it, 
make a difference. Teachers with high withitness make 
few mistakes in identifying which student is 
misbehaving, in determining which of two behaviors is 
the more serious, or in timing an effort to stop a 
misbehavior. (p. 512) 
Woolfolk (1995) also highlights the importance of 
"withitness" as a characteristic of effective classroom 
managers whose classes are "relatively free of problems". 
These are contrasted with ineffective managers whose 
classrooms are "continually plagued by chaos and disruption" 
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(p. 416). Woolfolk states that withitness "means 
communicating to students that you are aware of everything 
that is happening in the classroom, that you aren't missing 
anything" (p. 416). Woolfolk repeats the optic power image 
of "eyes in the back of your head" and adds that "with-it" 
teachers 
avoid becoming absorbed or interacting with only a few 
students, since this encourages the rest of the class 
to wander. They [with-it teachers] are always scanning 
the room, making eye contact with individual students, 
so the students know they are being monitored •••• These 
teachers prevent minor disruptions from becoming major. 
They also know who instigated the problem, and they 
make sure the right people are dealt with. In other 
words, they do not make ••• timing errors (waiting too 
long before intervening) or target errors (blaming the 
wrong student and letting the real perpetrators escape 
responsibility for their behavior). (pp. 417-419) 
"With-it" teachers convey to students that they can be seen 
and are being monitored continuously. An important effect of 
the proper development of this quality in teachers is so 
they will be able to "catch" and correct misbehaving 
students. Students know they will be punished for a 
transgression. Since normalization is the goal and not 
repression, students will also be rewarded for compliant 
behavior. 
The economy of this surveillance technique is also a 
key factor in its utility. Since students know that there is 
always the possibility that they are being watched they are 
encouraged to internalize the gaze of their super-visor 
learning to monitor themselves and each other. The direction 
is clear, "Teach students to monitor themselves" (Woolfolk, 
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1995, p. 420). Thus, the power relations in the classroom 
are diffused as teachers watch students, students watch 
teachers, themselves, and each other, and so forth. There is 
a web of relations of surveillance being weaved as Foucault 
(1995) insists "from top to bottom .•. bottom to top .•• and 
laterally" (pp. 176-177). 
Classroom Management 
Despite the promised effectiveness of surveillance, or 
because of teachers' ineffective use of this technique (Gage 
& Berliner, 1991), children do "misbehave". Classroom 
management programs and practices are recommended by the 
mainstream discourse as explicitedly aimed at maintaining an 
atmosphere conducive to learning, yet there is another side 
to these practices. Management practices are powerful tools 
(i.e., technologies) used in the normalization of students 
as they effect increasingly finer differential categories of 
what it means to "mis-behave". The discursive practices of 
classroom management attend to "the specification of the 
most detailed aspects of everyday behavior, almost anything 
could become potentially punishable" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982, p. 158). 
Classroom management is a topic of special and 
seemingly growing import in educational psychology. There 
has been a marked increased in discussion of this topic in 
the past few decades, and it has been characterized as the 
number one concern of classroom teachers (Randolf & 
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Evertsen, 1994). According to a report of content analysis 
of educational psychology textbooks (Ash & Love-Clark, 1985) 
classroom management increased in amount of actual text 
space by 75% from 1954-64 to 1965-75. There was reported a 
100% increase from 1965-1975 to 1976-83 in text space. The 
authors of this analysis speculated that the increased 
discussion may reflect the movement of textbooks toward the 
more pragmatic concerns of teachers and away from the 
'softer' side of educational psychology (Ash & Love-Clark, 
1985). 68 Despite the lack of ability to draw definitive 
conclusions from this descriptive report the authors state 
that there have been changes in textbooks used in 
educational psychology "away from theory and toward the 
classroom" (p. 54). 
The Woolfolk (1995) text, then, appropriately is 
attentive to the importance of issues related to classroom 
management. Woolfolk (1995) notes that classroom management 
is "one of the main concerns of teachers, particularly 
beginning teachers, as well as administrators and parents 
(p. 401). Woolfolk (1995) cites a Gallop Poll of the 
public's attitude toward public schools to substantiate this 
claim. Sixteen of the first seventeen polls list "lack of 
68Emotional and social development, and personality theory 
are offered as examples of "softer" areas (Ash & Love-Clark, 
1985). 
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discipline 1169 as the "number one problem facing schools" 
(p. 402). Since the late SO's only "drug use" and "funding" 
issues have seized first place. 
Gage and Berliner (1991), likewise, relate that all 
classroom needs fall into a "rough order of priority .•• the 
first [being] the establishment of classroom discipline, 
control, and management" (p. 509). It is claimed that 
"without it [classroom discipline, control, and management] 
nothing much of educational value can be done" (p. 509). 
Gage and Berliner (1991) also state that the issue of 
classroom management and discipline is considered by many 
administrators and teachers to be the "most important cause 
of teacher failure ..•. [and the] leading cause for dismissal" 
(p. 510). If teachers are judged as being ineffective in 
their management of classrooms they are dismissed. This 
indicates that the web of power relations in classroom 
management practice affects teachers and students alike. 
There are many points that could be made in critique of 
the discourse and practices of educational psychology 
regarding classroom management. I discuss three areas that 
are particularly problematic: 1) the practices of classroom 
management are based on a preemptory perspective; 2) 
"empowerment" through management practices; 3) a shift in 
69Emmer ( 1987) explains that classroom management and 
discipline are related because "management is chiefly directed 
at establishing conditions for good discipline" (p. 233). The 
terms are often used interchangeably. 
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emphasis from management as a way to access the curriculum 
to curriculum as a way to ensure good management. 
Practices based on a preemptory perspective. The 
discursive practices of traditional classroom management 
come out of a modernist view that the social world is locked 
into irrationality, where chaos will reign if order is not 
established and controlled (Ball, 1990). Practices are 
directed to the "problems" that arise in classrooms. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, these problems are viewed through 
the perspective of a rationality that looks for technical 
solutions that can be applied to restore or maintain order. 
Teachers and educational psychologists define, interpret, 
and judge both the students who resist the management 
practices and student's action from a hierarchical position 
in ways that limit the meanings that the behavior may have. 
These judgements are based on an "assumption that 
there is a proper, correct, standard, or agreed manner of 
carrying oneself" (Berry, 1995). The teacher and educational 
psychologist know what that proper deportment looks like, 
and they can easily spot improper behavior. The judgement of 
proper/improper behavior is based on a "norm" and 
increasingly fine deviations from the "norm". In this 
atmosphere the "non-conformist, even the temporary one, 
[becomes] the object of disciplinary attention" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 158). Although the judgements of both 
students and their actions are always historically, 
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socially, and politically contingent they are seldom 
problematized as such. 
For example, Woolfolk (1995) recognizes difference in 
behavior may have cultural links. The critique that American 
schools "typically reflect the white, Anglo-Saxon, 
Protestant, middle-class, male-dominated values that have 
characterized mainstream America" (p. 155) is accepted as a 
valid appraisal. Readers are told that schooling formerly 
was thought to be "the fire under the melting pot" (p. 154). 
The importance of moving away from this assimilationist 
perspective, which takes this mainstream perspective as 
normative, is espoused; a new image of "mosaic" (p. 157) 
that "celebrates" and values diverse cultural behavior is 
introduced. 70 
Yet, the deficit orientation model that judges non-
mainstream behaviors as inferior resists displacement in the 
meaning-making basis of the text. Readers are instructed to: 
••• teach students directly about how to be students. In 
the early grades this could mean directly teaching the 
courtesies and conventions of the classroom: how to get 
a turn to speak, how and when to interrupt the teacher, 
how to whisper •.•• You can ask students to learn "how we 
do it in school" without violating [the] principle 
••• respect your students •••• (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 189) 
What needs to be highlighted is that while "how we do it in 
school" is recognized as exhibiting the values of the 
70See Sleeter and Grant (1991) for a comprehensive 
examination and analysis of various models of multicultural 
education. The "mosaic" metaphor, as well as "melting pot" is 
problematic. 
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dominant culture, and is regarded as problematic, it is 
never disrupted or displaced. standards of the Anglo, male, 
middle-class culture remain the favored paradigm and retain 
the privileged position. These "standards" become the 
universal norm that is used to judge behavior as proper or 
not, and children are judged for their compliance to these 
norms. 
Earlier in the chapter normalizing judgement was 
discussed as both imposing homogeneity and constructing 
individuals simultaneously. This dual effect is obvious in 
classroom management practices as conformity to the 
homogeneous universal standard is assumed as normative. Once 
this is established finer differentiation from the norm can 
be perceived and measured; eventually individuals can be 
ranked in relation to each other. 
Other examples from Gage and Berliner (1991), explicate 
the privileged and uninterrogated view of teachers judging 
the behavior of students from a universalized norm. 
Activities of students' "misbehavior" are placed in two 
simple categories: 1) too many unwanted behaviors; and 2) 
too few wanted behaviors. Unwanted behaviors are listed as: 
physical aggression, moving around the room at 
inappropriate times, making too much noise, challenging 
authority at the wrong time or in the wrong way, and 
making unjust or destructive criticism and complaints. 
(p. 511) 
Wanted behaviors that need to be increased include: 
volunteering to recite, standing up for his or her own 
opinion, paying attention to what is being explained or 
discussed in class, being involved and active in 
individual or group projects. (p. 516} 
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What these actions mean to the students themselves is 
ignored or marginalized as unimportant. Behaviors are simply 
assigned to one category or another, and the ambiguous 
nature of students' behavior is eschewed. For instance, a 
student may view his/her own behavior as "standing up for 
his or her opinion", while the teacher judges the same 
action as "challenging authority in the wrong way" or making 
"unjust criticism". Deeper meanings of student behavior seem 
unimportant as the focus is on maintaining order and 
control. More frequently, that which is labeled misbehavior 
is lack of compliance to the preferred norm. What is ignored 
is that students are the ones producing the behavior that 
needs to be managed in the first place (Everhart, 1983). 71 
Everhart (1983} explains that student behavior has 
social and political contingencies, and these extend beyond 
the classroom experience. Students, for example, understand 
their assignment to roles within the classroom and in the 
broader social context. Their activity forms a subculture as 
they struggle with the social and political aspects of 
schooling. As Everhart (1983} explains: 
Classroom management must be understood as a social 
system, but also as an interface between the state 
71Everhart' s article is most helpful in showing the active 
construction of a subculture of student opposition to 
practices of classroom management. One of my students of 
educational psychology said in response to reading the 
article, "I never saw myself in print before". 
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educational system and students. Classroom management 
mediates social life as students attempt to "make" 
themselves in a world in which political consciousness, 
class interests, and cultural regularities enter into 
the calculus of appropriateness and certitude by which 
students define themselves. (p. 170) 
Students, from a socio-political perspective, are viewed as 
active agents who devise various strategies through which 
they contest and resist the management practices of teachers 
as well as their assignment to low status positions. 72 
Oppositional behavior of students may well be an appropriate 
response to an oppressive education (Kohl, 1994) that is 
preparing and directing them for life in subordinate 
positions in society. Their minimal involvement in school 
activities, boredom, or oppositional behavior may signify 
their own feelings of alienation from the process and 
product of their work. Through their own (sometimes 
oppositional) activities students act to reappropriate 
control of their labor process (Everhart, 1983). In 
recognizing the socio-political aspects of classroom 
relations much may be learned by teachers and students 
alike. Much needs to be learned as frequently oppositional 
activities, while a mark of student agency, have negative 
results in students' lives. Woolfolk (1995) notes, for 
example, that in high school years teachers can focus on 
academics more than procedures and rules because "By this 
72All of students' behaviors may not appear disruptive 
(e.g., use of humor, avoidance, and various communication 
practices). Students learn both how to work the system and 
beat the system (Everhart, 1983). 
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time, unfortunately, many students with overwhelming 
behavioral problems have dropped out" (p. 405). This is the 
only mention of the issue of "dropping out" I was able to 
find in the text. This lack of attention supports Fine's 
(1991) critique that the exodus of students, especially low-
income students of color, from high schools "is represented 
as if it were all quite natural" (p. 8). 
Classroom management as empowerment. Classroom 
management is generally represented as a way to promote the 
betterment of students. Yet, both texts advance models that 
focus on the empowerment of the teacher-manager (Ball, 
1990). students are not considered in terms of their own 
learning, agency, desires, and fears as discussed above. In 
the models presented in the discourse of the classic texts 
the focus is on what teachers do to maintain control and 
compliance; the activity of the teacher is central. 
Gage and Berliner (1991), for example, present 
classroom teaching practices in terms of how the teacher 
gains power in contrast to the students who have none: 
From the teacher's point of view you'll be looking at 
classroom teaching as an activity in which you have the 
power to shape the process. You probably had little of 
that power when you were in the student's role. Then 
you did pretty much what your teacher wanted you to do. 
Now, as the teacher, you have the determining role and 
the responsibility that goes with it .••• we will 
introduce you to a diverse set of teaching behaviors 
that can help you plan and actually be more effective 
whatever the subject or grade. (p. 494) 
In discussing issues of classroom management the 
perspective of Gage and Berliner (1991) is clearly based in 
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behavioristic psychology. Power is gained by the teacher, 
and order is maintained through this system set in a 
discourse of control; management is a case of extinguishing 
unwanted behavior and increasing wanted behavior. Strategies 
are suggested: 
One way of stopping misbehavior is to extinguish it, to 
withhold reinforcement. This usually means not paying 
attention to it ... Where it is feasible, simply ignore 
the [misbehaving] student. Turn your back, pay 
attention to a student who is behaving properly, walk 
away ...• Extinction takes time. It may be a while before 
a child's misbehavior begins to decrease. But be 
careful. Even an occasional reinforcement on your part 
can undo the whole process. (p. 513) 
This is a traditional prescriptive approach to classroom 
management in that the focus is directed toward the 
activities of the teacher needed to keep students on task 
and attentive (Everhart, 1983). Educational psychology is 
aimed at equipping the teacher with techniques through which 
s/he is more able to control classroom agendas. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) recognize the perspective 
presented in this text as traditional in that it "centers 
more on the teacher than the student" (p. 492). This 
perspective is represented as having an advantage over other 
perspectives of classroom management and teaching (e.g., 
open education, humanistic education). The advantage is that 
traditional, teacher-centered educational practices are 
viable: "it has one important advantage - viability. It is 
the kind of teaching toward which teachers gravitate and to 
which they return" (p. 492). 
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However, it is noted that this perspective and its 
practices are not entirely in the best interest of students. 
The comment of Cuban {1984) is reported that this model "has 
been extremely viable, for better or worse" {emphasis added, 
Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 492). This method of classroom 
management is accepted as normative and unproblematic 
despite the expressed possibility that it may not be in the 
best interest of students. 73 
The practices encouraged in the text manifest a vulgar 
pragmatism {Cherryholms, 1988), as the emphasis is focused 
on what works, regardless of effects. What Gage and Berliner 
{1991) leave out in reference to Cuban's work, and the 
discussion of classroom management in general, is the reason 
teacher-centered styles of classroom management persists. 
Cuban {1984) theorizes that "Schools are a form of social 
control and sorting" {p. 9) echoing the social reproduction 
and correspondence theory of Bowles and Gintis {1976). Cuban 
{1985) argues: 
The ways schools are organized, the curriculum, and 
teaching practices mirror the norms of the 
socioeconomic system •••• teacher practices become 
functional to achieve those ends ••. [i.e.,] reinforcing 
the teacher's authority to control the behavior of the 
class •.•. the practices encouraged by student-centered 
instruction ill-fit the character of the society 
children will enter and classrooms became inhospitable 
arenas for small group instruction, expression, student 
73Gage and Berliner { 1991) repeat the idea that the 
traditional, teacher-centered model of classroom teaching "for 
better or worse, is part of the American, indeed,- the 
worldwide experience" (p. 531). It is a taken-for-granted, 
unproblematic practice. 
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decision making, etc. Teacher-centered instruction, 
however, endured because it produces student behaviors 
expected by the larger society. (emphasis added, p. 9) 
Cuban (1984) has connected the micro-practices of schooling 
with the macro-values of the larger society. These issues 
are left unquestioned, even obscured, in the classic 
educational psychology texts. Through the traditional 
practices of classroom management students can be 
normalized, made proper citizens of the state, i.e., docile 
and useful. 
The use of behavioristic psychology, so typical of 
traditional teacher-centered classroom management practices, 
exemplifies clearly the "shaping" of students to conform to 
norms that have become naturalized. What needs to be noted 
as well is that humanistic psychologies also are useful in 
the normalization of students, albeit their role in 
governmentality is more subtle. 
In student-centered classrooms that espouse humanist 
psychology the emphasis is on the empowerment of the 
student. The student is understood as an active meaning-
maker striving to know herself or himself and become self-
actualized. This is evidenced in the content and process of 
schooling. Gage and Berliner (1991) explain self-actualized 
students as: 
•.. people who come to accept themselves, their 
feelings, and others more fully. These people are self-
directed, confident, mature, realistic about their 
goals, and flexible. They've gotten rid of maladjustive 
behaviors. They become like the people they want to be. 
(p. 479) 
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This student-centered perspective seems to be an improvement 
on the teacher-centered, traditional model. However, while 
the student is perceived as the center of the meaning-making 
system, he or she is considered self-contained, separate and 
isolated from the social and the political contingencies 
that generate the categories into which they place 
themselves. Getting rid of "maladjustive behaviors" 
mentioned in the quote above can be indicative of a even 
more subtle interiorization of a dominate and oppressive 
discourse. 74 
Usher and Edwards (1994) state that humanistic 
discourses can be more powerful than the objectifying 
discourses generated by behavioristic psychology. In 
"subjectifying discourses, within which humanistic 
psychology has been strongly implicated ••. [d]iscipline is 
not something externally imposed by teachers since students 
discipline themselves" (p. 51). It is possible to argue that 
"regulation works by empowerment" (p. 50). Humanistic 
psychology, too, provides the "justification and the means 
for intervention and "shaping'" (p. 53) students under the 
illusion of self-governance. 
Curriculum as instrumental in control. There has been a 
subtle shift toward the control of students through the use 
74This discourse appears uncomfortably close to a message 
in The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994): "The broadest 
goal is a society in which people throughout the functional 
range of intelligence can find, and feel they have found, a 
valued place for themselves" (p. 535). 
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of the curriculum. McNeil (1983) asks readers to picture a 
one room schoolhouse of the last century. The students sit 
on hard benches or at desks in rows facing front; students 
stand to recite; for much of the day they are silent and 
still. The teacher or schoolmaster is stern, perhaps 
wielding a hickory stick. There the purpose for the 
discipline is to help the students access the curriculum. 
Classroom management and discipline is viewed as 
instrumental to the learning of the curriculum. 
To a major extent classroom management procedures of 
the current day are much different although they purportedly 
are intended for the same purpose, i.e., to help students 
access the curriculum. Woolfolk (1995) lists more time for 
learning and greater access to learning as reasons for 
management practices. Gage and Berliner (1991) insist 
nothing educational happens without good management 
practices. However, there is also indication of an obvious 
shift in the idea of management practices of educational 
psychology. While classroom management practices are 
instrumental in helping students access the curriculum, 
there is also evidence that there is an inversion, i.e., the 
curriculum is a means of classroom management. For example, 
Gage and Berliner (1991) connect "mis-behavior" of students 
with the way schools are organized. They note: 
... behavioral problems ••• [can] stem from the way· 
schools are organized. Sometimes school structure 
forces students to take courses that are inappropriate 
for them, that do not allow for their individual needs 
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or level of achievement. (p. 510) 
They continue to explain that schools that do not allow for 
students' "individual needs or levels of achievement" (as 
well as a variety of other issues that are "outside the 
teachers control") contribute to the "crime, delinquency, 
and problem behavior that exist in [the schools]" (p. 511). 
The assumption is: the needs of students are met when they 
are correctly placed in appropriate learning groups and 
given the appropriate information. When and where this 
situation exists students will not "misbehave". Thus, there 
is signaled an inversion of means and ends. Where the 
practices of classroom management were intended as means 
toward the end of accessing knowledge there is a shift 
toward accessing of the curriculum as a means by which 
control is exercised. 
Testing and the Production of Students 
Following Foucault's (1995) position that normalization 
is a major aspect of the role of schooling the formation of 
the "norm" is a key consideration. As presented above, there 
may be a tacit endorsement by educationalists of what is 
"normal" or normative based in the commonsense acceptance of 
certain values, beliefs, and behaviors. These norms are 
reflective of the preference of the dominant groups and 
adopted as universal norms by social institutions, schools 
in particular. Norms grow in power through hegemonic 
control, i.e., they are validated by meaning-making systems 
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and granted consent by members of subaltern as well as 
dominant groups. They need to be continually exposed and 
critiqued. However, there is another area that needs to be 
highlighted regarding the establishment of norms. 
Foucault (1995) has noted the increasingly complex 
nature of the normalization process in that it has become 
"possible", through the human sciences, to measure or 
quantify what is judged to be "normal". The technologies of 
hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement come 
together in the quantifying of an evaluative judgement. This 
is so much of the work of educational psychology and is the 
focus of the following discussion. 
That "testing of students is ubiquitous" is a truism. 
Woolfolk (1995) remarks that "if you have seen the 
cumulative folders that include testing records for 
individual students over several years, then you know the 
many ways students are tested in this country" (p. 528). 
Hanson (1993) asserts that the testing associated with 
schooling can begin with examinations toddlers take to enter 
nursery school, and "that is just the beginning of an 
endless torrent of tests that will probe every corner of 
their nature and behavior for the rest of their lives" (p. 
1). Gage and Berliner (1991) report that a "reasonable 
estimate" of teacher time devoted to the testing process is 
20 to 30%. 
Woolfolk (1995) states: "Measurement is evaluation put 
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in quantitative terms - the numeric description of an event 
or characteristic" (emphasis added, p. 514). Educational 
psychology advances the understanding that through testing 
practices that produce these measurements the "truth" about 
an individual is able to be known. In other words, testing 
increases the visibility and describability of students. It 
is necessary to make this familiar notion strange (Foucault, 
19). It is argued in the following discussion that testing 
processes, i.e., forms of examination (especially the norm-
referenced variety), are technologies of differentiation and 
individualization that inscribe rather than describe 
students. Examinations are also technologies of power that 
work to establish hierarchies among students75 , that are a 
means of control and a method of domination (Foucault, 
1977/1995). 
An important issue in the understanding of testing 
practices is the notion of validity, particularly construct 
validity. Validity is defined by Woolfolk (1995) as the 
"degree to which a test measures what it is intended to 
measure" (p. 525). What is generally avoided in mainstream 
discussions of construct validity is the social construction 
of these abstract characteristics. Social constructs are 
considered and treated "as if" they are "real". This 
exemplifies the problem of reification. However, reification 
75Lewontin ( 1976) quotes Thorndike as saying that "the 
actual race of life ••• is not to get ahead, but to get ahead of 
somebody ••• " (p. 107). 
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of abstract concepts is imperative in testing practices 
because only "real" things are able to be measured. Within 
the ideology of meritocracy, these "real" characteristics 
need to be understood as: innate properties of individuals; 
stable over time; and, varying in measurement in 
individuals. 
Another important issue regarding testing is that it 
yields objective measurements according to a scale that is 
metric. The "normal distribution" of students along the 
bell-shaped curve assists with this process. Although the 
social construction of this arrangement has been presented 
and critiqued76 the discursive practice continues to be 
advanced unproblematically in classic texts of educational 
psychology. It is presented as "natural" as well as 
"normal". 
For example, Woolfolk (1995) states that the "bell-
shaped curve, [is] the most famous frequency distribution 
because it describes many naturally occurring physical and 
social phenomena" (p. 519)." Gage and Berliner (1991) make 
the connection as well between physical and social 
characteristics in stating that "both measures of 
76See for example Layzer, 1975; Lewontin, 1984/1996; Mensh 
and Mensh, 1991). 
77It is added that the normal distribution "has been 
thoroughly analyzed by statisticians" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 
519). In light of the history of the development of this 
"normal" distribution it seems more correct to say that it has 
been thoroughly constructed by statisticians. 
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intelligence and height are normally distributed within any 
specific age, ethnic, and gender group •.• " (p. 57). The 
argument is th~t a "naturally occurring" physical phenomenon 
(e.g., height) and "naturally occurring" social phenomenon 
(e.g., intelligence) are normally distributed within a 
specific population. 
There is constructed an illusion that there is a metric 
scale used to measure both phenomena. However, while there 
is a standard of measure for height (e.g., feet, inches, 
meters) only an ordinal system can measure "naturally 
occurring social phenomena" (see Lewontin et al., 
1984/1996). It is more than an illusion that is created 
though, as Gage and Berliner (1991) state: 
One reason for the popularity of tests is that they 
give us a quantitative estimate of ability or 
achievement; they tell us how much. In education the 
attributes that interest us emphasize the abilities and 
achievements of students - such things as intelligence, 
creativity, spelling ability, science knowledge, and 
interest in art. (p. 570) 
Mensh and Mensh (1991) refer to the bell-shaped curve 
as a "particularly mystifying aspect of IQ" (p. 75). 
Although normal distribution may occur regarding the "metric 
characteristics of animals such as birth weight in 
cattle ...• IQ tests do not possess the characteristics for 
creating a normal curve" (Mensh & Mensh, 1991, p. 172). 78 
And yet, educational psychologists continue to insist that 
78Even biology's conforming to normal distribution has 
been disputed (See Layzer, 1975; Lewontin et al, 1984/1996). 
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IQ does possess these characteristics. 
The bell-shape curve is an arbitrary and social 
artifact (Lewontin et al., 1984/1996). Testers create tests 
so that a bell-shaped curve will appear. This preserves the 
illusion that the "tests measure a real characteristic" 
(Mensh & Mensh, 1991, p. 76). Intelligence and ability tests 
have been composed of items selected after trial for 
observed conformity with the normal distribution. Items 
that showed little correlation with the overall 
expectations, or with the previous tests of the kind, 
have been systematically excluded. (Morrison, 1977, 
quoted in Mensh and Mensh, 1991, p. 76) 
This is the process Woolfolk (1995) is referring to in 
the following explanation of basic concepts in standardized 
test making: "The test items and instructions have been 
tried out to make sure they work and then rewritten and 
retested as necessary" (emphasis added, p. 517). What is 
meant by making sure "they work" is that the tests 
successfully correlate intelligence or ability scores of 
students taking the test with the placement of students in 
the social order (Mensh & Mensh, 1991). That "they work" is 
an indication of their power to differentiate (Gage & 
Berliner, 1991). 
Gage and Berliner (1991) assert that developers of 
tests use "the tests' differentiating power as their guide" 
(p. 51). This differentiating power is further explained: 
Partly because of the way the tests were made, and 
partly because of the way human intelligence functions, 
the resulting IQ scores ..• fell into a normal 
distribution (emphasis original) which has the bell 
shape ...• Why do IQ tests tend to be normally 
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distributed? Is it simply because the test is rigged? 
Not entirely (emphasis added). Remember that the tests 
consist of many items, each designed to differentiate 
among individuals. That is, the items are written so 
that on some items only about half of a given age group 
responds correctly, while on other items a higher or 
lower percentage of that group responds correctly. (p. 
56) 
The standard on which the tests' differentiating power 
is based is middle-class knowledge. Gage and Berliner (1991) 
recognize this and give many examples of this bias, and then 
they excuse it; bias is renamed "relevance": 
Middle-class bias has proved much more difficult to 
eliminate than was anticipated. For tests of 
intellectual abilities useful in modern American 
society, a "middle-class" and "urban" orientation may 
constitute not bias but relevance .••. so we may not 
want to change the tests so much as we might want to 
change the environments that promote low test 
performance. (p. 90) 
The suggestion of changing environments as a way to 
ameliorate low-test scores is contradictory and seems 
disingenuous. It is contradictory in that "intelligence" is 
repeatedly represented in the same text as an innate, 
stable, and inherited characteristic (Gage & Berliner, 
1991). It seems disingenuous in that standardized test are 
constructed to rank a certain percentage of students below 
the normal range. Effective standardized tests are 
guaranteed, or, to use Gage and Berliner's term, "rigged", 
to separate and sort children. This is the differentiating 
power that guides the development of the tests in the first 
place. This is how they work, why they were developed, and 
why questions have to be written and rewritten (Woolfolk, 
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1995). 
The "differentiating power" of tests is central to 
their use in educational institutions. The particular "norm" 
around which they are organized is never made problematic. 
On the contrary, the middle-class "relevance" is accepted as 
normative. Award or violence is distributed to students 
according to their "marks". Lewontin et al. (1984/1996) 
explain succinctly: 
••. the power of the "norm", once established, is that 
it is used to judge individuals who have been located 
along its linear scale. Deviations from the norm are 
regarded with alarm. Parents who are told that their 
child is two standard deviations from the norm on some 
behavioral scale are led to believe that he or she is 
"abnormal" and should be adjusted in some way to 
psychometry's Procrustean bed. Psychometry, above all, 
is a tool of a conformist society that, for all its 
professed concern with individuals, is in reality 
mainly concerned to match them against others and to 
attempt to adjust them to conformity. (p. 149) 
Norms are established by validating what works in 
differentiating those considered "normal" from those who are 
not. The argument is circular. The process of standardized 
testing establishes what is "normal" based on information 
gathered on who are considered normal. 
Although the classic text never say exactly who the 
norming sample is, it is noted that "social class, race, 
gender, and ethnicity can be relevant considerations" (Gage 
& Berliner, 1991, p. 574) if there is a concern with equal 
opportunity. It is stated that there is a "problem that many 
African American, Chicanos, and Native Americans face with 
norm referenced testing when the norms are based on distant 
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but supposedly representative, peer groups" (Gage & 
Berliner, 1991, p. 574). When this information is added to 
the "problem" that a hypothetical student named "Lisa" is 
having with her national percentile rank, then all the clues 
point to the norm group. The norm group is male, Anglo, and 
middle-class. It is important to note that although Gage and 
Berliner (1991) regard social class, race, and gender to be 
"relevant" considerations in discussions of equality, these 
same characteristics become "irrelevant" when the interest 
is in selecting "highly competent rather than mediocre" (p. 
574) students. 
The "objective" evaluation of students according to 
scores produced through testing needs to be regarded as a 
process that produces normalcy. This process also describes 
deviance from the norm. As more tests are taken by students 
their cumulative folder expands, and "more knowledge leads 
to more specification" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 159). 
There is developed a new visibility and a more minute 
describability. The "examination is at the center of the 
procedures that constitute the individual as both effect and 
object of power, as effect and object of knowledge" 
(Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 192). 
There is a certain "alchemy" in this process. The 
properties of a discipline's regime, i.e., its norms, 
values, procedures, and so forth, become attributes of 
persons. Rose (1989) expresses this well: 
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The procedures of visualization, individualization and 
inscription that characterize the mental sciences 
reverse the direction and domination between human 
individuals and the scientific and technical 
imagination. They domesticate and discipline 
subjectivity, transforming the intangible, changeable, 
apparently free-willed conduct of people into 
manipulable, coded, materialized, mathematized, two-
dimensional traces which may be utilized in any 
procedure of calculation. The human individual has 
become calculable and manageable. (p. 129) 
Disciplines are ways of ordering differences. Through 
their testing procedures they allow educators to categorize 
all the complexity of students by reducing them to scores, 
graphs, and tables. They present teachers with a way to 
order the world and sooth the modernist anxiety that without 
the organization they impose all will be chaos. 
Gage and Berliner (1991) remind us: "All your life 
you've been taking tests. They have brought you success or 
failure, joy or sorrow, a sense of justice done or outrage 
suffered" (p. 569). That there is not more outrage is 
surprising. 
Summary 
This chapter is entitled Disciplining the Discipline in 
order to highlight the activity of placing the discursive 
practices of the discipline under scrutiny. Utilizing the 
process of critical reading and Foucault's methods of 
critique it is possible to look at the modern science of 
educational psychology differently. The practices of the 
discipline, its disciplinary technologies, are usually 
considered progressive, as a means of enabling students, 
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i.e., used in the liberatory interest of education. However, 
the limits of these technologies need to be recognized as 
they are used to judge, construct, and normalize students as 
subjects of a particular kind, docile, and useful. 
The questioning of the discipline's practices is not 
aimed at looking for answers or universal solutions. Rather, 
the questioning is regarded as a way to engage the issues of 
the discipline more deeply and complexly. The questioning 
indicates a desire to interrogate "what what we do does" in 
the real life experiences of children - so that we can think 
about students and our own practice differently. A critique 
of the discipline needs to become an important part of the 
discipline. 
CHAPTER VI 
AT THIS JUNCTURE ..• 
It seems to me ••• that the real political task in a 
society such as ours is to criticize the working 
of institutions which appear to be both neutral 
and independent; to criticize them in such a 
manner that the political violence which has 
always exercised itself obscurely through them 
will be unmasked, so that one can fight them. 
(Foucault, quoted in Rabinow, 1983, p. 6) 
This dissertation is a form of postmodern critique that 
considers totalizing discourses and universal conclusions 
problematic (Usher & Edwards, 1994). Therefore, it would be 
contradictory to off er a set of final statements as a 
universal vision for the future in this concluding chapter. 
However, I would like to present a summary of some central 
issues of the dissertation and discuss some implications for 
the discipline of educational psychology as a feature of 
teacher education. The chapter concludes with a critique and 
an invitation for interrogations of this work as every 
discourse is an incitement to discourse (Foucault, 1990). 
Summary and Implications 
Critigue of the Modernist Project 
The current mainstream educational process in this 
country is organized around the modernist project, i.e., it 
celebrates reason and the individual subject, and has faith 
in science to provide progress, certainty, order, 
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efficiency, and control. The discipline of educational 
psychology, based in a technical rationality, is concerned 
with advancing these modern purposes. 
The work of this dissertation offered an alternative 
way of looking at modernity's project and the human science 
of educational psychology in particular. As critique the 
perspective maintained in the dissertation was a skeptical 
stance regarding the discipline as a neutral body of 
knowledge. This perspective was influenced by Michel 
Foucault's concern with how modern societies control human 
persons through the practices and knowledge claims of modern 
sciences. 
This work began with an uneasy reading of the discourse 
of educational psychology as I was teaching introductory 
courses to preservice teachers. I came to recognize myself, 
in Freire's (1970/1990) terms, as both oppressed and 
oppressor. I saw myself as oppressed because I had 
internalized the rationale of the master narrative of the 
discipline; I had assented to its hegemonic discourse with 
its power to name and define persons as "objects" through 
disciplinary technologies. It seems as though I had been 
normalized and domesticated, made fit for the educational 
system, i.e., docile and useful. At the same time I took on 
the role of the oppressor by teaching the discipline as a 
neutral body of knowledge and skills. I was critical and 
reflective in this activity, although, from a position 
within the meaning-making system of the discipline. My 
intent was to initiate preservice teachers into the 
rationality and language of educational psychology. I was 
complicitous in the system of domination (Foucault, 
1977/1995) whereby my students would be made docile and 
useful, and where they, in turn, would learn to normalize 
their own students. 
213 
A shift in my perspective took place through an 
intertextual reading and critical analysis as I struggled to 
see connections with the discipline I was teaching, the 
prevailing social order, and a community of resistance I was 
encountering (e.g., Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Freire, 
1970/1990; Giroux, 1981, 1988; Gordon, Miller, & Rollock, 
1990; Harding, 1991; hooks, 1994; McLaren, 1989). The 
discourse of educational psychology was subjected to a 
"critical gaze", and the discourse's rationality, practices, 
and effects were made problematic and interrogated. 
This dissertation questioned elements of the 
discipline's discourse that seem commonsense and taken-for-
granted, taken as normative. It was hoped that by making the 
familiar strange (Ball, 1990; Foucault, 1977/1995) these 
everyday assumptions and practices could be more easily 
questioned and changed. The questioning did not seek 
generalizable and universal solutions to the crisis in 
education. Rather, questioning was proposed as a way to open 
a space where issues can be engaged in their social, 
political, and epistemological complexity. 
Importance of Discourse 
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The importance of discourse has been emphasized 
throughout this work. Recognizing that the discipline's 
discourse needs to be taken seriously was a key point as the 
discourse is so powerful in informing how we think about 
students, teachers, and the teaching-learning process. 
Discourse was also recognized as a social artifact (Gergen, 
1985), the result of social negotiation, and the process 
through which human persons are constituted. This 
perspective subscribes to understanding that much of what we 
have taken as "real" is imminently tied with our use of 
language. Therefore, the human person as object/subject is 
understood as inscribed by language rather than described 
through scientific activity. 
This productive aspect of discourse is a matter that 
needed to be emphasized because the socially produced 
knowledges of discourses are never neutral; knowledges of 
discourses work in favor of some people over others as power 
and knowledge are implicated in each other. Therefore, 
discourses are sites of social struggle. 
However, what I attempted to show was that, although 
the discourse of educational psychology is powerful in the 
multiple ways it constructs and differentiates students, it 
is also vulnerable to counter-discourses that question, 
resist, and contest the assumptions and knowledge claims of 
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the discipline. 
Critical discourse analysis as a research activity can 
be disorienting and disrupting. Yet, it is an important 
research enterprise because without this analysis social 
sciences may become part of a "social silence" (Fine, 1992) 
regarding society's "mechanisms of legitimation, 
marginalization, and punishment" (Brown, 1992, p. 223). 
Disrupting the dominant discourse is a kind of "talking 
back" (hooks, 1989) that seems to be in contrast to a desire 
for certainty and control typical of the modernist project. 
Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Epistemology 
The understanding that all knowledge is fashioned 
through the interaction of persons in particular socially 
situated positions with interests and biases is central to 
the epistemology espoused by the perspective of this 
dissertation. People are responsible for the knowledge they 
construct. The possibility that knowledge could be 
"objective" or disinterested eliminates knowledge 
construction as a social and cultural activity, and it 
exempts its constructors from responsibility for its 
contents and/or effects. The claim of neutrality is 
considered an illusion at best, or a "cloak" at worst, that 
covers the vested interest of "elites" in protecting 
positions of power and privilege as their worldview is 
imposed as universal. 
situated knowledge is always partial, shifting, and 
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even distorted. The claim of a partial vision or perspective 
is taken as a strength in that it is open and initiates, 
rather than closes off perspectives (Haraway, 1988/1991). 
Those who profess that only situated knowledges are possible 
claim responsibility for what they see and recognize the 
importance of learning "to see ••. from another point of view" 
(Haraway, 1988/1991, p. 190). Reflexivity is desired as 
there is a recognition of personal embeddedness in macro 
tendencies (Harding, 1991) of society, i.e., the values, 
meaning-making systems, power relations of the social world. 
An effect of realizing that all knowledge is situated 
is that it makes communication among perspectives primary. 
Sharon Welch (1990) explains the difference of an "ethic of 
control", i.e., power over, and an "ethic of risk", i.e., 
power with. The "ethic of risk" understands the need for 
ethical conversations. Welch (1990) describes "communicative 
ethics" as combining pluralism and social responsibility. 
The goal is "mutual critique leading to a more adequate 
understanding of what is just and how particular forms of 
justice may be achieved" (p. 129). 
An understanding of the discipline's knowledge claims 
as situated, partial, and shifting calls for a more 
reflexive stance from educational psychologists. Recognition 
of situated knowledges also encourages ethical conversations 
among those with multiple perspectives concerned with the 
educational enterprise. 
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Social Construction of Knowledge 
The dissertation attempts to look at how the "truth" of 
the discipline is constituted. The perspective espoused is 
that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is the 
result of social processes, i.e., knowledge is produced in 
contexts by real people who have histories, biases, and are 
embedded in power relations. Thus, that which is considered 
the "truth" of the discipline is the product of social 
negotiations. 
This position and the discursive practices that result 
may be considered "radical" in a sense; and yet not so 
radical as might appear at first glance. This perspective is 
coherent with the discipline of educational psychology's 
contemporary psychological perspective (Anderson et al., 
1995), i.e., to understand the discipline from a social 
constructionist position. Perhaps the "radical" 
characteristic is in a social constructionist perspective 
itself, as Anderson et al. (1995) propose: 
••• the heart of a contemporary psychological 
perspective is an image of learners as active and 
social constructors of meaning, and an image of 
learning as an act of construction through social 
interaction in many contexts. (p. 145) 
This dissertation exemplifies the disposition encouraged for 
classroom teachers that can, and must, be applied to 
understanding the formation of disciplinary knowledge as 
well. Unless this position is taken seriously as applying to 
the knowledge of the discipline it remains a static "fact" 
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of learning that is told to preservice teachers, while the 
discipline, as we know it, remains unchanged (Carter & 
Doyle, 1996). If a social constructionist perspective is 
taken seriously there are profound implications for how we 
understand knowledge of the discipline. 
The Importance of History 
A significant ramification of this epistemology is an 
interest in the historical formation of the discipline, the 
social actors, and social and political contexts in which 
the history of the discipline is embedded. This would be a 
momentous shift for the discipline. 
The discipline of educational psychology is presented 
in classic texts as ahistorical; it seems that the 
discipline's history has been suppressed as there are few 
references to historical contexts or figures. A synchronic 
aspect of the discipline is indicated in that its focus is 
one moment in time, like a snapshot (Cherryholms, 1988). 
This situation is typical of a positivist epistemology, but 
it also has been taken to imply an "apparent lack of 
interest in the history of [the] field" (Glover & Ronning, 
1987, p. vii). Mainstream prescriptions for introductory 
classes (see Anderson et al., 1995) contend that preservice 
teachers do not need to understand "the history of 
psychological ideas" (p. 145). However, Harding (1991) 
asserts that there may be serious reasons why the history of 
science is not taught to our young people, i.e., there is a 
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fear that students would feel the enterprise is not worth 
the effort if they knew the history. Harding (1991) asks: 
What should we want students to know about the 
scientific enterprise, its history, practices, and 
goals? Would any of them go through the arduous 
training necessary to become a scientist [or 
educational psychologist] if they were told the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about this 
institution and its present-day practices? (p. 31) 
One example will provide a helpful illustration. What 
would students of educational psychology think about some of 
the discipline's central issues (e.g., nature-nurture 
questions, normal curve, psycho-metric testing) if they knew 
about the context and person who initiated them, namely, 
Galton? Francis Galton (1822-1911) is described as "a strong 
influence on what became American psychology ••. who was not a 
psychologist at all, but a wealthy and somewhat eccentric 
Briton" (Glover & Ronning, 1987, p. 19). Galton's thinking 
was organized around a hereditarian view, and he "pursued 
interests that led to the field of eugenics"n (p. 19). 
Yet, Galton and his assumptions and practices had a great 
influence on many educational psychologists who were to 
follow him including J. McKeen Cattell and Edward E. 
Thorndike. 
Today, Galton "remains a central figure in the progress 
of modern psychology" (Fancher, 1979, p. 294). Yet, when 
Galton is mentioned, albeit in passing, in "classic" texts 
79Gal ton is considered the "father" of the eugenics 
movement (see Fancher, 1979). 
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(e.g., Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 216) his position is 
unproblematic and seemingly neutral even as his ideas 
connected to eugenics can be found throughout the text and 
talk of mainstream educational psychology. So much of the 
discipline's legacy can be traced to Galton; his influence 
does matter. 
Robert v. Guthrie (1976), for example, included a 
chapter in his book, Even the Rat Was White: A Historical 
View of Psychology, that he entitled "The Past is Prologue". 
It is distressing to read his reflections of twenty years 
ago: 
Some of the dubious research of the 1920's has lingered 
nearly fifty years as a phantomlike apparition of 
pseudointellectualism. Present-day proclamations 
••• resemble the claims of biased 1920 educational 
psychologists •••• These theories recur with an 
appearance of "newness" enough to obscure the cobwebs 
of antiquity and actually encourage a repeat of the 
same defenses utilized decades ago. This is occurring 
today in the arguments against the continued use of IQ 
tests and the allegations of inherited mental deficits 
in black and brown children •..• (p. 194) 
That "not that much has changed" in the ensuing twenty years 
is evidenced in the recent publication of The Bell Curve 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Twenty years from now this 
quote may still be current. The discourse of educational 
psychology and its practices support and construct the 
conditions that made Guthrie's statement meaningful in the 
70's and make his words meaningful today. 
A comprehensive understanding of the discipline 
requires an appreciation of the history especially when the 
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history exposes undeniable propensities toward racism, 
sexism, classism, and so forth. 80 What results in a failure 
to confront this history is "social amnesia" (Giroux, 1981) 
as the memory of the past has been concealed or silenced in 
the interest of advancing disciplinary programs. 
Intertextual Reading and Critical Literacy 
It is not only the study of the discipline's most 
influential figures and accomplishments that need to be 
addressed and interrogated. The perspectives found in 
resistance movements and literature add a needed viewpoint 
to the study of educational psychology. Foucault's 
genealogies direct attention to those records of resistance 
that have not gained acceptance within the mainstream 
discourse. Genealogies attend to subaltern perspectives and 
knowledges, opening up a space where knowledge that has been 
silenced or marginalized can be heard and taken 
seriously. 81 
Some important counter-discourses have been presented 
in various chapters of this dissertation that allow a 
reading against the mainstream text: the feminist critique 
of science aims at disrupting some of the myths that have 
been perpetuated regarding neutrality, objectivity, and the 
8
°Foucault (1988) comments that the difference between a 
real science and a pseudoscience is that "A real science 
recognizes and accepts its own history without feeling 
attacked" (p. 12). 
81Silenced and marginalized voices are not to be 
romantized, however. They, too, are subject to critique. 
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primacy of scientific epistemology (Chapter II); Freire's 
resistance to a transmission model or "banking" notion of 
education and a call for critical literacy (Chapter III); 
Giroux (1981, 1988) and Kincheloe's (1993) critique of 
technical rationality, the dominant meaning-making system of 
the discipline (Chapter IV); Everhart's (1983) critique of 
prescriptive classroom management programs and his 
recommendation of a socio-political understanding of 
classroom life (Chapter V); Mensh and Mensh's (1991) 
explication of the historical fabrication of the bell-shaped 
curve that is represented in mainstream texts as "normal" 
(Chapter V) . 
These texts seek to question and disrupt the sometimes 
unconscious assumptions, "neutrality", and smooth historical 
"development" of educational psychology. Voices or 
perspectives that pose questions need not be considered 
"spoilers" to the discipline, as though all was well before 
their arrival. Rather, alternative perspectives and 
interrogations can be seen as opportunities to consider the 
discipline more critically and with a recognition of the 
greater social and political complexity of education as well 
as educational psychology's implication in social and 
political contexts. This intertextual reading is necessary 
if teachers-students of educational psychology are to move 
beyond a functional literacy to a critical literacy 
concerning the discipline. 
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Critigue of a Critigue 
Among the many things I have learned in the work of 
this research is an appreciation for the importance and 
inevitability of critique of discourses. As Foucault 
(1978/1990) has insisted, any discourse offers "a point of 
resistance and a starting point for a proposing strategy" 
(p. 10). I take responsibility for critiquing my own 
discourse from my partial, shifting, particular position, 
and I welcome critique from anyone who will take this 
discourse seriously enough to offer one. 
First, the breadth of the discourse of the discipline 
of educational psychology is immense. Consequently, I was 
able to barely "dust" a few areas of import. There is so 
much that needs to be interrogated and contested, not for 
the sake of science or in the interest of advancing the 
discipline, but in the name of social justice. 
The discourse of the discipline itself supports and 
advances social cognitions that makes sense of oppressive 
practices in such a way that they are frequently accepted as 
tolerable. The discipline has not been able to address the 
ways its own knowledge claims and practices are caught in 
the web of meaning and power that masks oppression in 
education. Critical discourse analysis is a process of 
interrogation that disrupts these commonsense understanding 
and everyday practices of the discipline. 
Second, this work is more about posing questions and 
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critique rather that offering solutions. This is not very 
satisfying to a modernist perspective. It may even be an 
irritant. However, questioning and critique as a way of 
looking at the discipline has had profound influence on my 
own practice as a teacher-learner. My hope is that in the 
future I will be able to ask better questions. 
I would like to end with a word about Paulo Freire who 
died on May 2, 1997, as I was completing this final chapter. 
I mourn the loss of Freire even as I celebrate his courage 
and teaching. The words of Peterson and Tenorio (1997) have 
expressed Freire's influence on my own educational 
experience: 
... for teachers ..• Freire leaves a profound legacy. 
Steadfastly opposed to teaching as indoctrination, he 
insisted that learning is inescapably political and 
that educators should help students articulate their 
own vision of social justice. He argued for a pedagogy 
that draws on the lives of our students to engage them 
in asking critical questions about the larger society. 
(p. 2) 
APPENDIX A 
COVER LETTER AND SURVEY 
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LOYOLA LETTERHEAD 
March 31, 1995 
(Inside Address) 
Dear •.• , 
There is general agreement that education in this country is 
in need of reform. I believe that our discipline, 
educational psychology, has been and may continue to make 
significant contributions to the discussion of education and 
its future direction. 
I am a doctoral candidate at the Loyola University of 
Chicago. My dissertation involves a study of the 
representation of unprivileged youth as expressed through 
the study of educational psychology. I will employ 
discourse analysis of the textbooks used in introductory 
courses with pre-service teachers. It is my intention to 
provide useful information to our colleagues in the 
educational psychology community as well as advancing the 
possibilities of education's service to children who are 
often characterized as unable to access our current 
educational system. 
Your assistance is important to me as I gather those texts 
which are considered the most effective vehicles for 
transmitting the discipline to newcomers to the field. Your 
name has been surfaced as the result of a sample selected 
from APA Division 15 members. Familiarity with the 
discipline and knowledge of the published texts are the 
resources I need to tap. Please consider passing this 
questionnaire to a colleague only if you feel that the 
person is in a more suitable position to respond to this 
very brief survey. You can imagine how grateful I am for 
your response. 
The confidentiality of your response is assured. The number 
found on this questionnaire is an identification number 
which facilitates mailing purposes only, allowing me too 
indicate that you have returned your response. Your name 
will never be placed on the questionnaire. 
If anyone would like a summary of the results of this survey 
please write "copy of results requested," as well as your 
name and address, on the back of the return envelope. · 
Please do not put this information on the questionnaire 
itself. 
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Any questions you might have are welcomed. Please feel free 
to write or call me. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Suzanne Gallagher 
(312) 274-5069 
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Please return to: Suzanne Gallagher 
c/o Carol Harding 
Loyola University of 
Chicago, Mallinckrodt 
1041 Ridge Road 
Willmette, IL 60091 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Demographic information 
1) Where is educational psychology housed in your 
institution? (Circle one) 
department/school of education 
school/college of arts and sciences 
2) Do you currently teach introductory educational 
psychology courses, or have you taught these courses in the 
last five years? (Circle one) 
YES NO 
3) For how many years have you considered yourself a member 
of the educational psychology community? 
Textbook Information 
1) Please indicate two texts you consider "classic" for an 
introductory educational psychology course. 
(Please provide as much information as you can.) 
Title -
Author -
Publisher -
Edition - Publication Date -
second recommendation: 
Title -
Author -
Publisher -
Edition - Publication Date -
(Over) 
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2) Have you used the above texts for introductory courses in 
educational psychology? 
(Circle one) 
YES NO 
3) If you do not use the above two texts, please list the 
books you do use in your courses. 
Title -
Author -
Publisher -
Edition - Publication Date -
second choice: 
Title -
Author -
Publisher -
Edition- Publication Date -
Please check if you would like the results of this 
survey. 
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY RESULTS 
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"CLASSIC" TEXTBOOKS - SURVEY RESULTS 
Suzanne Gallagher 
September, 1996 
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A random sample of members of APA 
(Educational Psychology) received the survey. 
of 63.3% was realized with 133 of 210 surveys 
results are given in the following tables. 
Table 1 
Division 15 
A return rate 
returned. The 
survey Returns Tabulation 
Type of Surveys No. of Responses 
Total returned 133 
Nominating texts 84 
Not nominating texts* 49 
* Responses varied including: Do not teach educational 
psychology (29 responses); Courses taught in modules and do 
not use textbooks as such (7 responses); There are no classic 
texts (2). 
Table 2 
Textbooks nominated as "classic" - traditional discourse of 
the field. 
Author** 
Frequency 
Woolfolk, A. 
Gage, N.L. & 
Berliner, D. 
Good, T.L. & 
Brophy, J. 
Slavin, R. 
Biehler, R.F. & 
Snowman, J. 
Dembo, M.H. 
Sprinthall, N.A. & 
Sprinthall, R.C 
Title/Publisher/Date*** 
Educational Psychology 
6th Ed., Allyn & Bacon (1995) 
Education Psychology 
5th Ed., Houghton Mifflin (1992) 
Contemporary Education Psychology 
5th Ed., Longman (1995) 
Educational Psychology: 
Theory and Practice 
4th Ed., Allyn and Bacon (1994) 
Psychology Applied to Teaching 
6th Ed., Houghton Mifflin (1990) 
Applying Educational Psychology 
5th Ed., Longman (1994) 
Educational Psychology: 
A Developmental Approach 
5th Ed. McGraw Hill (1990) 
43 
32 
19 
9 
8 
5 
5 
** Fourteen other authors received less than five nominations. 
*** Edition cited most. 
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